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May 14, 1981 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 80-1429 Cert to CA 3 (en bane) 
(Adams for 5-judge majority; 
Se1tz for 4-judge concurrence) 
Youngberg (superintendent, 
Pennhurs~tate ~c~ol), et. al~ / 
' v. Romeo Federal/civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs contend that the CA 3 erred in holding 
that institutionalized, mentally retarded persons have substantive 
due process rights (1) to receive treatment which is the "least 
intrusive" treatment under the circumstances, (2) to be free of 
2 • 
restraints absent "compelling necessity," and (3) to be protected 
from harm absent "substantial necessity." Petrs also contend that 
the CA 3 erred in refusing to dismiss this §1983 claim on the ground 
of qualified immunity. 
2. FACTS and DECISION BELOW: This case arises from the 
same Pennhurst State School and Hospital at issue in the Court's 
recently decided Pennhurst v. Halderman, et al., Nos. 79-1404, etc 
(April 20, 1981). Petrs are the superintendent and two directors of 
Pennhurst. Resp, who was a member of the class in Pennhurst, is a 
profoundly mentally retarded resident of Pennhurst. (Although 30 
years old, a chemical imbalance of the brain retarded resp's mental 
capacity at the level of an 18 month old). His mother requested 
that he be committed in 1974, when his father's death left his 
mother financially unable to care for him. 
Resp has been injured at Pennhurst over 70 [sic] times, 
both from self-infliction and from the attacks of other residents. 
Some of these attacks were in retaliation for resp's aggressive 
behavior. Some of resp's injuries became inflected, either from 
inadequate medical attention or from contact with human excrement 
that had not been cleaned up from the Pennhurst wards. Resp's 
mother brought this §1983 suit in 1976 on resp's behalf, alleging 
that these injuries violated resp's constitutional rights. An 
amended complaint also alleged that resp had been shackled to a bed 
or chair for long periods each day, and that this too violated 
constitutional rights. According to the CA 3, resp's complaint did 
not specify the exact constitutional rights asserted, but the CA 3 
read the complaint to allege violations of substantive due process 
under the 14th Amendment and of the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment. The complaint sought 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
3 • 
At trial, the dist ct refused to permit testimony by two 
experts on resp's behalf. They would have testified that the lack 
of "programming and activities" on resp's ward accounted for the 
numerous injuries. One of the experts also would have testified 
that the shackling served no medical purpose and was used solely for 
the staff's convenience. The dist ct excluded this testimony on the 
ground that its admission would have turned this §1983 claim into a 
malpractice suit. The dist ct also refused resp's proffered jury 
instructions, which maintained that resp had a "right to treatment 
in the least restrictive environment." Rather, the ct followed an 
8th Amendment standard and instructed the jury that it should find 
~ petrs liable if they exhibited "deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976). The 
jury returned a verdict for petrs. 
The en bane CA 3 reversed. All nine judges agreed that 
the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the 8th 
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause governs this case, 
and all nine agreed that the dist ct's judgment should be vacated 
and a new trial be had. But the CA split 5-4 over the standard of 
liability mandated by the Due Process Clause. 
The majority viewed resp's complaint as asserting three 
rights: (1) a right to be free from undue bodily restraint; (2) a 
right to personal security and protection; and (3) a right to 
adequate treatment. The following statement by the majority sums up 
4 . 
its decision as to the standards of liability for violating these 
rights: "The first two [rights] are undiluted legal concerns, 
relating to protected liberty interests; as such, they are entitled 
to heightened judicial scrutiny. The t~d entails mixed questions 
of law and medical judgment, and thus requires a more flexible 
standard of judicial review and suitable deference to informed 
' medical opinion." More specifically, theCA decided as follows as 
to each right: 
(1) Right to freedom from bodily restraint. According to 
the majority, resp's claim that he had been shackled to a bed or 
chair stated a claim of deprivation of a substantive liberty 
interest--i.e. the right to be free from bodily restraint. This is 
so because shackling is a type of punishment and because the liberty 
interest in the Due Process Clause protects those not committed of 
crimes from punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520 (1979). 
The majority held: "The trial judge, therefore, should instruct the 
jury [upon retrial] that such shackling may be justified only by a 
compelling necessity, i.e., that the shackling was essential to 
protect the patient or to treat him." In the alternative, the 
majority held that the trial court could charge the jury that petrs 
are not liable if shackling was the "least restrictive method of 
dealing with the patient in the light of his problems and 
surrounding." In the majority's view, "[a] 'least restrictive' 
charge will not only insure that compelling treatment explanations, 
as opposed to fiscal concerns or staff convenience, were the basis 
for shackling, but also that the institution considered and rejected 
5. 
alternative methods of restraining the resident, if some restraint 
indeed was required." 
(2) Right to personal security. The majority also held 
that the "concept of liberty .•• embrace[s] the 'right to be free from 
and to obtain judicial relief for unjustified intrusions on personal 
security.' Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u.s. 651, 673 (1977) ." Resp 
stated a claim under this right by alleging that he had been 
attacked many times and that petrs knew or should have known of some 
of these attacks. A violation of this right, according to the 
majority, is justified by a "substantial necessity." The majority 
explained: 
"Substantial necessity is more appropriate than 
the compelling necessity standard employed in 
connection with the shackling claim, for it 
enables a court and jury to distinguish between 
isolated incidents and inadvertent accidents, on 
the one hand, and persistent disregard for 
patients' needs, on the other. If the [petrs] 
disregarded [resp's] injuries or failed to take 
steps to protect [resp,] then they should be 
liable unless they can offer explanations based 
on important state interests." 
Given this standard, the majority concluded that the trial ct had 
erred in excluding the testimony of resp's expert witnesses. 
(3) Right to treatment. In the view of the majority, 
this right, unlike the first two, "does not present a purely legal 
issue," for courts must recognize their own limited knowledge and 
doctors' expertise. The majority also recognized that the "right to 
treatment" comprehends a broad spectrum of treatments--everything 
from minor, daily decisions about medication to "nonreversible 
physical operations" such as lobotomies. Thus, the majority 
'- concluded that judicial authority increases as the treatment becomes 
..• 
6 . 
more unalterable, for "whenever unalterable interferences with 
bodily integrity place deprivations of liberty in issue, the law and 
not medicine is the ultimate decision-maker." As to the applicable 
standard, the majority rejected resp's theory that he has a right to 
judicial review of every "day-to-day" decision, and it also rejected 
petrs' view that only deliberate indifference to medical needs 
constitutes a violation. Rather, the majority held: "It should be 
made clear to the jury that for the plaintiff to prevail it is 
necessary to find that an individual confined in a facility for the 
mentally retarded did not receive a form of treatment that is 
regarded as acceptible for him in light of present medical or other 
scientific knowledge." 
In light of its decision to remand for new trial, the 
majority did not address resp's other claims of trial error. Nor 
did it decide the question whether petrs are immune from violations 
if the jury finds violations after the new trial. The majority did 
state, however, that the trial judge "should instruct the jury 
regarding the possibility of immunity with the caveat that 
defendants' reasonable belief is to be judged at the time their 
actions were taken" and that petrs "are not responsible for 
unforeseeable developments in the law." 
The concurrence disagreed with the majority's delineation 
of differing standards of review depending on the right involved. 
In the concurrence's view, each of resp's rights involved mixed 
questions of law and medical judgment. Accordingly, the concurrence 
would judge resp's claims under one standard: whether petrs' 
conduct "was such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
7 . 
judgment, practice, or standards in the care and treatment of this 
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the [petrs] did not base their 
conduct on a professional judgment." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend that the CA's decision 
raises important questions which the CA decided incorrectly. 
The questions are important, petrs contend, for at least 
three reasons: 
First, petrs contend that the CA's decision goes far 
beyond anything this Court has decided about the 
mentally retarded or the competence of courts to determine liability 
~
for violations of those rights. In short, petrs contend that the CA 
has created a new constitutional tort out of state malpractice law. 
Petrs suggest that the CA went beyond (1) O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
u.s. 563 (1974), in recognizing a right to treatment in the least 
intrusive manner, and (2) Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in 
establishing "compelling necessity" and "substantial necessity" 
standards of liability under the Due Process Clause. 
Second, petrs contend that the CA's decision will 
encourage federal litigation. There are approximately 150,000 
mentally retarded persons in state institutions. Under the CA's 
decision, petrs contend, the federal courts will become 
"repositories for most, if not all, personal injury claims arising 
in those institutions." 
Third, petrs contend that the CA's delineation of duties 
and standards of liability is so unclear that it will seriously 
hinder the care of the retarded. In this regard, petrs adopt the 
concurrence's view that physicians no longer will dare work at a 
state institution, insurers no longer will dare insure them, and 
state executive officials no longer will dare fund them, all for 
fear of uncertain and unpredictable liability. 
8 . 
Beyond contending that the questions are important, petrs 
contend that the CA decided them incorrectly. In petrs' view, the 
CA's decision requires doctors and staff persons to engage in a 
delicate balancing of vague constitutional rights and standards 
everytime a decision must be made about the care of an 
institutionalized person. Furthermore, petrs contend that the 
decision actually places conflicting obligations upon doctors and 
staff persons. For example, resp's right to treatment in the least 
intrusive manner might mean that petrs should allow him to roam the 
institution relatively freely, but the right of other persons to 
personal security might mean that resp, who sometimes is aggressive, 
should be restrained from roaming. Finally, petrs contend that the 
CA's decision ignores the relative incompetence of courts and juries 
to decide whether medical judgments were proper or improper. 
Beyond the merits of the constitutional questions, petrs 
contend that the CA should have directed the dist ct to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that petrs are immune, under good-faith 
qualified immunity, even if they did violate resp's rights. 
Resp does not dispute that the questions decided by the CA 
are important. But resp contends that these questions are not ripe 
for review. The CA remanded for new trial, at which the dist ct is 
to admit the testimony of resp's expert witnesses. Until their 
testimony is in the record, resp contends, (along with whatever 
testimony petrs might offer) , this Court will not have an adequate 
9 0 
record upon which to the CA's decision. After trial, the record 
will contain testimony as to the availability, efficacy, and cost of 
different forms of care and treatment. As the record now stands, 
resp concludes, the legal questions raised are too abstract to allow 
the Court to make a sound decision in this important new area of the 
law. 
Turning to the merits, resp contends that the CA was 
correct in deciding (1) that the 14th Amendment rather than the 8th 
Amendment governs, and (2) that institutionalized, mentally retarded 
persons have substantive due process rights to treatment, personal 
security, and freedom from restraint. Resp contends that most of 
the lower federal courts that have considered the questions have 
agreed with the CA here. 
Finally, resp contends that the question of petrs' 
immunity must await the development of a factual record as to petrs' 
knowledge of resp's injuries and the law at the time. 
There are two amicus briefs. The American Psychiatric 
Assoc urges a grant. In its view, the CA's decision may do more 
harm than good, for tempering or displacing medical judgments with 
legal ones is "neither required by the Constitution nor desirable as 
a method of upgrading state programs." The other amicus brief was 
filed by 35 states and American Samoa. They contend that nearly all 
of them are confronted with litigation raising exactly the issues in 
this case. 
4. DISCUSSION: The questions obviously are important and 
difficult. In my view, the only reason not to grant would be to 
follow resp's suggestion of awaiting the development of a fuller 
10. 
record at the new trial. But I am inclined to think that a fuller 
record would not enhance this Court's review materially, for the 
CA's decision is not pinned to the facts of this case. Rather, it 
is a broad and theoretical statement of law. 
05/05/81 
I therefore recommend a grant. 
There is a response and two amici. 
Morgan Opin in petn. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell January 4, 1982 
From: Mary 
No. 80-1429, Duane Youngberg, et al. (superintendant, et. al.), 
v. Nicholas Romeo, by his mother and next friend 
Questions Presented 
The major question presented is whether the involuntarily 
committed enjoy a constitutional right to affirmative treatment 
("habilitation"). The petn presents two questions. The first is 
2. 
whether the CA3 erred in holding that institutionalized mentally 
retarded persons have substantive due process rights (1} to receive 
treatment that is both acceptable in light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge and which is the least intrusive 
treatment available under the circumstances; (2} to be free of 
restraints, whether for treatment or protection, absent a showing of 
compelling necessity; and (3} to be protected from harm, however 
caused, absent a showing of substantial necessity. 
The second question is whether, when an appellate court 
admittedly creates a new constitutional right in an action for 
damages under 42 u.s.c. §1983, it must, as a matter of law, direct 
dismissal of that claim on the grounds of qualified immunity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court has never determined whether involuntarily 
institutionalized mentally-retarded persons have a right to 
treatment under the Constitution. Last year in Pennhurst v. 
Halderman, 101 s. Ct. 1531 (1981}, the Court considered whether 42 
U.S.C. §60101 gives the mentally retarded a substantive right to 
"appropriate treatment" in "the least restrictive" environment. The 
Court concluded that it did not, and remanded for consideration of 
(1} whether the mentally retarded had standing to compel compliance 
with those conditions that are imposed on participating states by 
1Title 42 u.s.c. §6010 is a "bill-of-rights" provision in a 
federal-state grant program. It states that the mentally retarded 
"have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation" 
in "the setting that is least restrictive of ••. personal liberty." 
the act, (2) federal constitutional claims, and (3) claims under 
another federal statute. 
The patient in this case is a member of the class in 
Halderman, and his claims for injunctive relief are before the 
courts in that action, not this one. See Petn n.S at 5. Here, resp 
Nicholas Romeo seeks only compensatory and punitive damages from the 
Director and two supervisors. Resp does not seek release or any 
"----- ~
procedural safeguards: he does not dispute his inability to survive 
, t \ \... 
on the outside. Instead, he seeks a substantive right to better (or 
""----"" ~ ...-, ~ ---
different) treatment and conditions as a matter of constitutional 
I 
law, a right enforceable in a §1983 suit for monetary damages. --
A. The Facts and Proceedings Below 
Resp is a profoundly-retarded 33-year old man, with an IQ 
estimated between 8 and 10 and the mental age of a child of 18-24 
months. He lived at home with his parents until he was 26. During 
those years, Romeo suffered no serious injuries. Mrs. Romeo did 
testify, however, that she remembers seeing Romeo slap people when 
frustrated and that she and his father "may have been bruised by 
such slapping." 2 After his father died in May of 1974, his mother 
was unable to control him. 
Initially, on May 22, 1974, he was admitted to Penn. 
Hospital Community Mental Health and Retardation Center. His 
admission report states that he was admitted "following assaultive, 
2Pltf•s Anws to Dfts• first set of interrogatories at 2. 
4. 
) uncontrollable behavior at horne following the death of his father who had cared closely for him." R. 7-72. His physical condition 
was described as "basically good health except for multiple bruises 
'- ........_.____ ........__ -and lacerations that were self-inflicted by banging himself against 
walls and other objects." His stay was described in these words: 
"He presented a severe management problem requiring constant nursing 
care, occasional wrist and ankle restraints. He responded well to 
attention and enjoyed a physical stimulation. Although he could not 
talk, he was able to learn a few small tasks of self-care. 
Eventually, a good relationship was established with him and he was 
transferred to Pennhurst without incident." R. 7-73. 
The transfer to Pennhurst took place on June 12, 1974. 
Between that date and November of 1976, when the complaint was 
filed, Romeo was not without any medical care or treatment. 
Following his admission, he underwent a physical. Thereafter, he 
was hospitalized for hepititis (12/10/74 to 12/27/74) and to treat a 
finger fracture (3/20/76 to 4/21/76) . 3 He was treated nine times 
for boils, and nine times for diarrhea. He was also treated for 
acne, eye irritation, an eye infection, possible cellulitis of the 
elbow, and colds. In addition, he was treated for a "fissure R 
foot." 
The finger fracture (3/20/76) apparently involved some 
laceration of the finger, and it is this event that began Mrs. 
Romeo's current dissatisfaction with her son's treatment. Shortly 
3Exhibit B attached to Pltf's answers to defts' first set of 
interrogatories. 
5. 
before that event, in February of 1976, Romeo underwent Pennhurst's 
annual review. That report states that, although Romeo 11 likes 
attention from staff, .. he is 11 [a]busive to residents and staff: not 
cooperative: doesn't seem to respond to commands well: eats feces. 114 
His then-current program included a 11 2-hr toileting 
schedule 11 and a program to teach eating and dressing skills. A new 
program was regarded as necessary 11 to stop him from throwing his 
tray ... A behavior-modification program was then designed for Romeo. 
This program was to teach him to stop throwing his tray (by having 
him pick-up everything thrown) and to decrease his violence by 
putting 11 mitts 11 on him for 15 minutes each occurance. This was 
regarded as necessary (2/20/76) 11 [b]ecause of the number of injuries 
Nicky's hitting, pinching and scratching has [sic] caused and 
because of the danger that Nicky's behaviors present to other 
residents and staff. 115 
I~ ~ 
The program to restain Romeo's violence was not, however, 
implemente~because h~ mother ~uld not :gree~to it. 6 R. 5-57 to 
~-------
5-58. Shortly thereafter, his finger was fractured. The records 
indicate that Pennhurst does not know how it happened. Entries from 
the 11 daybook 11 and 11 progress notes 11 for this period indicate that 
Romeo was very violent to staff as well as other inmates. For 
6Earlier, in 1975, his mother requested that he be given a 
helmet, but she did not want him to have to wear it against his 
will. Pennhurst got the requested helmut for Romeo, but he would 
not wear it voluntarily. Id. 
6 0 
example, at 6:00 p.m. on April 21, 1976, he slapped an aide in the 
chest at 6 p.m. At 8:00p.m., he slapped an LPN on the back and 
attempted to kick an aide in the face twice. On the following day, 
between 7:00 and 8:00a.m., he slapped aides three times. 
In July (the 13 & 18) of 1976, when Mrs. Romeo visited her 
son, she observed that his eyes were black and his lip split open 
with a hole where a tooth apparently went completely through. This 
set of injuries seems to have begun with a laceration above the eye 
on 6/18/76 (suffered when he slipped into a door). On 6/19/76, the 
laceration was reopened (no notation as to how). It was reopened 
again on 6/25 by Romeo banging his head on window. On 6/27, it was 
again reopened, and his chin was bleeding (both self-inflicted). 
Two days later, his mouth was bleeding from his own slapping. On 
7/8, he pushed another patient and received another small laceration 
over the eye. On 7/10, he pushed another patient into a wall and 
received a lacerated upper lip and a nosebleed. 7 Apparently, Mrs. 
Romeo saw the cumulative result of these incidents (and presumably 
smaller, unreported incidents) when she visited in July. 
By August of 1976, Pennhurst had received several 
complaints about the way in which Romeo was being treated. On the 
6th, a log was kept of his behavior for 3 hrs and 7 min (8:25 a.m. 
to 11:32 a.m.). During that period, he slept for approximately one 
hour. In addition, he slapped others 20 times, grabbed or pinched 
others 22 times, hit himself 15 times; bit himself 8 times, "dug his 
rectum" 15 times, hit the window or wall twice, scratched others 
once, banged his head twice, and was pushed by another 3 times. 8 
On Nov. 4, 1976, the complaint was filed. The complaint 
7. 
(at 3) alleged that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, 
pltf has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions. These 
injuries include: a permanently deformed finger; broken bones; 
injuries to his sexual organs, boils, and human bites." The 
original complaint sought damages and injunctive relief from three 
of Pennhurst's supervisory officials, who allegedly knew that Romeo 
had suffered injuries and had failed to create procedures which 
would have prevented them from occurring, thus violating his rights 
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 
After the complaint was filed, in late 1976, Romeo was 
transfered from his ward to the hospital for treatment for a broken 
arm suffered when he was being seated by a staff member. While in -the infirmary, he was physically restrained during portions of the 
day. In Dec. of 1976, a second amended complaint was filed alleging 
that defts had kept him restrained in the infirmary for prolonged 
periods of time each day. In addition, he now sought damages for 
defts' alleged failure to provide him with appropriate treatment 
throughout his stay at Pennhurst. 
An eight-day jury trial was held in Apr. of 1978. During 
the trial, the trial judge refused to allow testimony of experts 
proffered by Romeo to show that Romeo could have been effectively 
8. 
treated under other programs (not involving restraints) and that the 
lack of programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive 
behavior. He would also have testified that psychologists are 
ethically bound to choose methods that do not use restraints and 
that there is no dispute in the literature on this point. The trial 
tud~e disallowed this testimony. He explained that it was relevant 
~--------
to a malpractice suit but that he did not consider it relevant to a 
§1983 constitutional claim. 
At trial, in addition to evidence of the factual background 
discussed above, a Pennhurst aide testified that she had seen one of 
the other aides knock Romeo down in the shower and punch him 
repeatedly in the face. She reported this to the authorities, but 
they purportedly felt unable to act on the unsubstantiated testimony 
of one employee. ~~ 
At the close of the trial, the ~udg~inst~cted the jury ~. 
that "if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas 
Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A. 
73a. And the jury was instruced that if the defts shackled Romeo 
other than in a good faith effort to treat him, then his rights wre 
violated. Ibid. Finally, the jury was instructed that if Romeo was 
denied programs "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if 
defts were "deliberately indifferent to the medical and 
psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional rights 
were violated under the eighth amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. 
The trial judge denied the jury instruction proposed by 
Romeo, which asserted that he had: (1) a right to "such treatment 
.. 
as will afford [him] a reasonable to acquire and 
maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as [his] 
capacities permit," Petn. App. 94a-95a, and (2) a right to treatment 
"under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the purpose 
of the commitment," id., at 95a. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defts. On appeal, the 
CA3 vacated the judgment of the DC and remanded for a new trial. 
All of the judges agreed that the eighth amenment was inapplicable 
and that the expert testimony should have been admitted. The CA 
was, however, divided (5-4) as to the substantive rights 
institutionalized mentally retarded. 
With regard to the equal protection claim, the majority 
(Adams, Gibbons, Weis, Higginbotham, & Sloviter) held that failureS_+ 
of the defts to provide for the pltf's safety can be justified only 
I\ '- \ 
by a showing of substantial necessity. And, because physical 
restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive sanction," it can be 
l \ ~ 
justified only by a compelling necessity. In addition, the majority 
held that the pltf is entitled to an instruction that the defts must - ----------.-.-..~ 
show that restraint was the "least restrictive method of dealing 
with the patient, in light of his problems and the surrounding 
-- e~ ' environment." Third, the majority divided the treatment claim into ----three categories. If a jury finds that no treatment has been 
administered, it may hold the defts liable unless they can provide a 
compelling explanation for the lack of treatment. If some treatment 
was administered, the defts will not be liable if that treatment was 
"acceptable in light of present medical or other scientific 
knowledge •••• Thus, if defendants can demonstrate a coherent 
10. 
relationship between a particular treatment program and a resident's 
needs, they would not be lable." Finally, "least intrusive" 
analysis applies to the selection of a treatment approach if the 
jury finds that the approach subjected the pltf to "significant 
deprivations of ~Lf 
 
eitz, Aldisert, Rosenn, & 
the in establishing its "multilevel standards" 
and that a unitary standard should be applied. They found the 
----------------------majority standards unreasonably strict irtd often indistinghuishable 
from medical malpractice. They would have adopted this standard: 
...... 
was the defts' conduct "such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards in the care and 
treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants 
did not base their conduct on a professional judgment." The 
minority concluded that the Constitutiton "only requires that 
courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was 
exercised." 
With regard to immunity, the majority noted that the defts 
"are not responsible for unforseeable developments in the law," and 
held that, on remand, the judge should insturct the jury that their 
reasonable good faith is to be judged as of the time they acted. 
The majority recognized that "[t]he present controversy inhabits the 
twilight area of developing law concerning the constitutional rights 
of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded." But the majority 
did not, apparently, regard the law as so unsettled as to 
-----------------------,---~ ~ 
~ 
necessarily provide defts with a good faith immunity. 
----------------------------- -----The portions of the CA3's decisions finding substantive 
11. 
rights to treatment under the due process clause are discussed in 
the next section. 
a, cr rl/ 
B. Substantive oue Process and the Right to Treatment ~
As mentioned earlier, the Court has never directly 
addressed the question presented here although, in Sanchez v. New 
Mexico, 396 U.S. 276 (1970), the Court dismissed an appeal from a 
lower court decision holding that the involuntarily committed have 
no right to treatment. The appeal was dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question. 
The purpose of this section is to provide background 
information for resolving the right-to-treatment question. This 
section discusses (1) the analytic substance of substantive due 
process; (2) the s. Ct. cases dealing with (a) prisoners' 
substantive rights and (b) the rights of the involuntarily 
committed; and (3) the lower court decisions 
including the decisions below. 
1. The anal tic substance 
recent years, the Court 
--~~----~~------~~~~ 
activities relating c 1 
relationships, See, e.g., Roe v. -
In 
Wade, 410 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (right to abortion) ; Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortions for minors and 
parental consent); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U~ 
632 (1974) (school board policy regarding pregnant teachers); Moore 
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.) 
(zoning ordinace cannot proscribe extended family unit from living 
12. 
together); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 u.s. 678 (1977) 
(right to contraceptives); Zabloci v. Redhail, 434 u.s. 374 (1978) 
(right to remarry though paying child support). 
Analytically, these cases begin with a finding of a 
"fundamental right." In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court 
began by examining the cases in which substantive due process had 
been applied. Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 632, 639-
640 (1923) (reversing conviction of teacher for teaching German) and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925) 
(upholding challenge to Oregon law requiring all children to attend 
public schools), the Court cited a "host of cases" recognizing that 
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life 
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Moore, 431 u.s. at 499. 
It is, however, by no means clear what rights will be 
considered fundamental in addition to those already recognized by 
the Court. The Court has stopped "far short of any general 
recognition of a "fundamental value" in individual autonomy." - - ...-...._. 
Gunther, Cases and Materials on 
1981) • Substantive due process 
Constitutional Law, 
d).A-
claims based such a 
1\ 
at 607 (lOth ed. 
right were 
rejected in Doe v. Commnwealth's Attorney, 425 u.s. 901 (1976) 
(affirming without opinion or argument lower court's decision 
upholding constitutionality of statute regulating consensual sexual 
behavior between adults) and Kelley v. Johnson, 425 u.s. 238 (1976) 
(regulation of length of policeman's hair sustained). 
Once a fundamental right is found, the level of scrutiny to 
be applied seems to be, in the majority's view, the strictest. It 
', 
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is true that in Moore, the Court did not state that only compelling 
state interests could justify the challenged regulation. Instead, 
the test was expressed as "whether the importance of the 
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are 
served by the challenged regulation" justify the interference with a 
fundamental right. Id., at 499. And in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
u.s. 438 (1972) (contraceptives) the Court articulated the rational-
relationship test, though, in fact it may have exercised a somewhat 
stricter scrutiny than the usual deference to legislative decisions. 
See Gunther, Forward: [A] Model for a Newer Equal Prottection, 46 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). In Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973), 
however, the Court stated "where certain 'fundamental rights' are 
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights 
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' [and] that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake." 
Post-Roe v. Wade, the majority of the Court seems to have 
adopted the l&ompelling-state interest level of scrutiny" whenever a 
fundamental right is regulated as well as when it is totally 
frustrated. In Carey v. Population Sevices Int'l, 431 u.s. 678 
(1977), the Court invalidated a number of restrictions on the 
distribution and advertising of nonprescription contraceptives. The 
statute prohibited the sale of such items by anyone other than a 
licensed pharmacist ~nd prohibited their sale or distribution to 
minors. The majority ·(~ Brennan, J.) used the compelling-state-
interest standard: ."'Compelling' is of course the key word: where a 




involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only 
by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express 
only those interests." Id., at 686 (citing Roe v. Wade). 
In y~ separate opinion, you rejected the proposition that 
------------------
strict scutiny is the appropriate standard of review in all cases 
inolving regulation of adult sexual relations: "In my view, the 
extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal 
decisions in matters of sex is neither required by the Constitution 
nor supported by our prior decisions." Id., at 703. Actually, the 
strict-scrutiny standard had only been applied in cases involving 
substantial interference with constitutional rights. Id., at 703-
704. As discussed above, your decision is Moore also failed to 
apply strict scrutiny, though it was decided after Roe v. Wade. 
2. Supreme Court caselaw. (a). Substantive and 
procedural rights of pre-trial detainees. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
u.s. 520 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.), discussed in greater detail below, 
pre-trial detainees challenged the constitutionality of their 
conditions of confinement. The lower courts held that a number of 
the conditions under which the pltfs were held were 
unconstitutional. The CA3 held that the pltfs, who had not been 
found guilty of any crime, could only be subjected to those 
"restrictions and privations" which "inhere in thier confinement 
itself or which are justified by compelling necessities of jail 
administration." 
This Court reversed, rejecting the "compelling necessity" 
standard, and upholding the consitituionality of the conditions of 
15. 
confinement because the restrictions were reasonably related to the 
institution's interest in security or other valid administrative 
interests. 9 The Court also noted that conditions did not violate 
the eighth amendment, observing that, "[~] fortiori, pretrial 
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at 
least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by 
convicted prisoners." Id., at 520. 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715 (1972), discussed in 
greater detail in section II.A.2 infra, a pre-trial detainee was 
found incompetent at a competency hearing and then held indefinitely 
(until competent) in an institution for the mentally incompetent 
without either criminal process or civil commitment. It appeared 
unlikely that the detainee (who was very retarded) would ever be 
competent to stand trial. The Court held that the state could not 
continue to hold him without initiating civil commitment 
proceedings, noting that, as a minimum, due process at least 
"requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose of commitment." Id., at 738. 
In summary, pre-trial detainees have a right to conditions 
reasonably-related to the security and administrative needs of the 
. . . 
facility. And, although the eighth amendment does not apply 
directly to pre-trial· detainees, they, a fortiorari, have a right to 
. -
confinement without cruel and unusual punishment (because they have 
9You joined the majority in Bell except insofar as it upheld 
routine body-cavity searches. 441 u.s., at 563. 
t, r .• 
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the right to confinement without any punishment). Moreover, the 
nature and duration of confinement without criminal process must 
bear some reasonable relation to its purposes. 
(b) • The ~ubstantive rights of prisoneis. In EStelle v. 
Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976) (Marshall, J.), the Court considered the 
extent to which prisoners have a constitutional right to medical 
treatment. The decision rested on the eighth amendment rather than 
any substantive right to certain conditions of confinement. The 
Court concluded that "deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain'" proscribed by the eighth amendment. !d., at 
104. The Court noted that its holding did not constitutionalize 
(2.....-
medical malpractice "merely because the v1im is a prisoner ••.• [A] 
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is 
only such indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of 
decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." !d., at 106. 
In Gamble, the prisoner had been seen by medical personel 
17 times during a 3-month period. They treated his back injury, 
high blood pressure, and heart problems. The complaint was based on 
their failure to provide the proper treatment; an x-ray or other 
tests would have revealed the true nature of that injury. The Court 
examined these facts and concluded that failing to order an x-ray 
"does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At most, it is 
medical malpractice, and as such the proper forum is the state court 
under the Texas Tort Claims Act." !d., at 107. 10 
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages. 
.. 
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In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 u.s. 396 (1974)~well, J.), 
the Court considered the validity of prisoner-mail censorship 
regulations and a ban on the use of law students and legal para-
professionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates. 
The regulations were held invalid. Because the censorship 
regulations incidentally restricted speech, a first amendment right, 
~
they were sustainable only if (1) they furthered onfe1 or more 
important and substantial governmental interests in security, order, 
and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) they restricted speech no 
more than necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest 
involved. The censorship regulations went so far as proscribing 
criticism or expression of inflamatory religious view--and clearly 
failed to meet this standard. 11 In reaching this decision, the 
10 In a footnote, 429 u.s., at 96 n.lO, the Court cited four 
lower court decisions illustrating violations of the eighth 
amendment in the context of medical care: 
"Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2 1974) (doctor's 
choosing the 'easier and less efficacious treatment' of 
throwing away the prisoner's ear and stitching t~e stump 
may be attributable to 'deliberate indifference ••• rather 
than an exercise of professional judgment')~ Thomas v. 
Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. 
Thomas v. Cannon, 419 u.s. 879 (1974) (injection of 
penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and 
refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction)~ Jones v. 
Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973) (refusal of paramedic 
to provide treatment)~ Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 
(CA2 1970) (prison physician refuses to administer the 
prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery 
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to to stand despite 
contrary instructions of surgeon)." 
11The restriction on the use of law students (not applicable to 
sudents employed by practicing attorneys) was an infringment of the 
due process clause because "[t]he constitutional guarantee of due 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~Jtr r:fr ~8. 
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Court did not determine the extent to which prisoners enjoy the 
protection of the first amendment because the challenged regulations 
implicated the first amendment rights of those on the outside with 
whom the prisoners were communicating as well as the rights (if any) 
of the prisoners themselves. Id., at 408. 
In~hodes v. Chapman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4677 (No. 80-332 June 1 , 
1981) (Powell, J.), the Court rejected claims that double-bunking 
violated the eighth amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court noted that "[i]n assessing claims that conditions of 
confinement are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that 
their inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that 
judicial answers to them reflect that fact rather than a court's 
idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Id., at 4680 
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s., at 539) (footnote omitted). 
In summary, prisoners have a right to conditions that do 
not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under "the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 173 (1976). Petrs have a limited 
right to medical treatment; deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need violates their right to be kept free from cruel and 
process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be 
afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful 
convictions and to seek redress for violations of their 
constitutional rights. Id., at 419. Because the regulation 
interfered with that right--a procedural, not a substantive, due 
process right--it was also declared unconstitutional. 
~.-. 
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unusual punishment. And regulation of prisoners' correspondence 
with those on the outside must satisy the first amendment standards 
applicable to regulation (in contrast to prohibition} of speech. 
Finally, althought the conditions under which prisoners are kept 
might constitute cruel and unusual punishment, double-bunking in 
itself does not. 
(c). The rights of the involuntarily committed. In 
~dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979} (Burger, C.J.}, the Court 
held that "clear unequivocal and convincing evidence" is required to 
commit a mentally ill person involuntarily for his own care and 
protection or the protection of others. The Court noted that, as 
parens patriae, the state has a legitimate interest in providing for 
its citizens who cannot care for themselves. And the state has 
authority, under its police power, to protect other citizens form 
injury. Although the Court rejected the "beyond reasonable doubt" 
standard provided in criminal process, it also concluded that a mere 
preponderance standard would fail to adequately protect the strong 
liberty inte~t of individuals being committed. 
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563 (1973} (Stewart, 
J.}, the Court held that a state cannot constitutionally confine, 
without more, a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving 
in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible 
family membeJY and friends. 
In Parnham v. J. R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979} (Burger, C.J.}, 
the Court upheld a statute providing for commitment of minors by 
their parents without an adversarial hearing. An independent 
- ? /YUV ~ T_ j: ~~7Jo_l~, 
~?'(''~~~~ 
medical evaluation was considered sufficient. The Court expressed 
doubt that the risks of error in this process would be significantly 
reduced by a more formal, judicial-type hearing. 
In summary, the ~unta~y com~d have the right to a 
"clear and convincing" evidence standard in their commitment 
proceedings, and the state has no legitimate reason for committing 
involuntarily {for treatment) someone who is not dangerous and who 
can survive on the outside. And a minor can be committed by his 
parents without an adverserial hearing when there is an independent 
medical evaluation of his condition. 
3. The CAs and the right to treatment. {a). The CADC. The 
CADC first recognized a right to treatment based on a DC statute. 
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F. 2d 451 {CADC 1966). But in Covington v. 
Harris, 419 F. 2d 617 {CADC Fahy, & McGowan), the 
CADC suggested is independent of the DC 
s;rute: 
~new legislation apart, however, the principle of the 
least restrictive alternative consistent with the 
legitimate purposes of commitment inheres in the very 
, nature of civil commitment, which entails an extra-
~ ordinary deprivation of liberty justifiable only when the 
respondent is 'mentally ill to the extent that he is 
likely to injure himself of other persons if allowed to 
remain at liberty.'" Id., at 623 {quoting D.C Code). 
As far as I can tell, this language is the original source for the 
proposition that the firs! amendment's_principle of;'least 
~ '-'-- ~~.._... 
r~rictive m~ans"--a principle developed in cases reviewing 
statutes proscribing speech--applies to conditions of confinement of 




for the proposition that any such substantive right exists 
independent of statute. There is no analysis developing either 
propostion. But the principles are immediately applied to treatment 
decisions within a hospital: 
"The principle of the least restrictive alternative is 
equally applicable to alternate dispostions within a 
mental hospital. It makes little-Bense to guard zealously 
against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior 
to hospitalizations only to abandon the watch once the 
patient disappears behind hospital doors." Id., at 623-
24. ,/ -
In the context of determing whether patients have received the care 
to which they are constitutionally entitled, the least-restrictive-
means principle presupposes, not only that it is an appropriate 
standard for making medical decisions relevant to treatment, but 
also that courts are competent to review such decisions and 
determine what treatment is best. 
{b). CAS. In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F. 2d S07 {CAS 
1974) {Rives, Wisdom, & Morgan), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. S63 
{197S) {state cannot confine non-dangerous mentally ill person who 
can survive on the outside, discussed above), the CAS became the -
first circuit to find a right to treatment for the involuntarily 
~ted in the absence of any statutory provision, solely on the 
basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The 
CAS's substantive-due-process analysis began with noting "the 
\ 
}ndisputable fact that civil commitment entails a massive 
curtailment of liberty" in the constitutional sense." Id., at S20 
{quoting Humprey v. Cady, 40S U.S. S04, S09 {1972) •12 
12Humphre¥ involved procedural due process. There, the pltf 
had been conv1cted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 
I ' 
I 
Footnote continued on next page. 
>. 
22. 
Judge Wisdom then advanced the proposition that any substantial 
abridgment of "liberty" must be justified in terms of some 
permissible governmental goal. Three grounds for civil commitment 
are generally recognized: the need for (1) treatment, (2) care, 
(both parens patriae) and (3) the need to protect others (police 
power). 
In Donaldson's case, the jury had found him harmless, both 
to himself and others. The only legitimate governmental reason to 
commit him was, therefore, treatment. Judge Wisdom concluded that 
it was a violation of due process to deprive a person of his liberty 
upon the theory that confinement would be thearapeutic and then to 
fail to provide any treatment. Id., at 521. 
Next, Judge Wisdom stated that long-term detention is 
generally permitted only when an individual is guilty of a specific 
act and has been accorded the protections of criminal process. When 
the government detains the incompetent by use of its police power 
for their own safety and that of others, there must be a quid pro 
In lieu of criminal sentence, he was committed to the "sex deviate 
facility" in the state prison for a potentially indefinite period 
pursuant to the Wise. Sex Crimes Acct. At the time he sued, pltf's 
commitment was essentially equivalent to a civil commitment under 
Wisc.'s Mental Health Act, except that he would have had a jury if 
he had been civilly committed. (He had already served a term equal 
to the longest possible sentence--1 year--that could have been 
imposed as punishment for his misdeamenor conviction.) 
The DC dismissed his claims, but the Court remanded for further 
development, noting that his equal protection claim would be 
persuasive if he had been deprived of a jury or other procedural 
protections merely by an arbitrary decision to seek commitment under 
one act rather than another. The Court's reference (~Marshall, 
J.) to "massive curtailment of liberty" was made in the context of 
the procedural protections afforded by Wise. to ensure that 
involuntary commitment was justified. Id., at 509. 
23. 
quo justifying the confinement given the absence of the protections 
of criminal process. 13 
In Wyatt v. Alderholt, S03 F. ed 130S (CAS 1974) (Wisdom, 
Bell, & Coleman), theCA held that the state must provide treatment-
-treatment to help each be cured or improve his condition--to the 
civilly committed mentally retarded and mentally ill. Judge Wisdom 
rejected the argument that "the principal justification for 
commitment lies in the inability of the mentally ill and mentally 
retarded to care for themselves"--and that care, not treatment, is 
all that is necessary for the state to provide conditions consistent 
with the terms of commitment. Id., at 1312. In his view, "care" 
alone would not be sufficient justification for so "massive" a 
13To support this 9uid ~ro quo requirement, the CAS cited S 
lines of cases. The f1rst 1nvolved citizens held in penal 
institutions for nonpenal reasons, and these courts held such 
conduct impermissible (2 CADC, 1 Mich., 1 Mass.). A second set (2 
CADC 1 CA4, 1 Mass.) extended this holding by requiring that such 
persons must be held where conditions are actually theapeutic. The 
third line are cases in which courts have upheld ex-offender and 
defective-delinquent status (providing for confinement of habitual 
offenders to protect society and to provide rehabilitative care. 
Some courts (1 CA4, 1 M.D. Ala.) have stated that the 
constantitutionality of these statutes depends upon the realization 
of the statutory promise of rehabilitative treatment. The fourth 
set is the recent right to treatment caselaw, which, Judge Wisdom 
reports, neither recognizes nor rejects explicitly a constitutional 
right to treatment. When such a right is found, it rests on on both 
statutory and constitutional grounds or the case is ambiguous as to 
the precise ground (S CADC, 1 Mass.). The fifth group consists of 
modern class actions challenging conditions in state institutions. 
The cited courts had, for one reason or another, not dismissed the 
actions. (1 CAS, 1 ND Ill., 1 ND Geo., 1 D. Minn., 1 C.A.7, 1 D 
R.I., 1 E.D. Tex., & 1 SONY). 
In addition, the CAS cited, somewhat out of context, a S. 
Ct. case using "quid pro quo" in the context of a special statute 
for juveniles. See detailed discussion of this S. Ct. case in text 
following n.lS infra . 
. ~ 
.. ~·. ,., ~.· .. ~:;:.. 
I> 
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"curtailment" of liberty. He also found that the hospitals of Ala. 
were not providing even adequate custodial care. 
The CAS may have abandoned its vanguard position in this 
area. In Morales v. Turnian, S62 F. 2d 993 (1977), the CAS 
considered the appeal of a class action challenging the adequacy of 
Texas' programs for juvenile offenders. The DC ordered the 
submission of a curative plan. Because of intervening program 
changes, the CAS remanded for the DC's reconsideration. in doing 
so, the CAS (Ainsworth, Morgan, & Roney) stated that "we have 
considerable doubt about the legal theory of a right to treatment 
that was relied on so heavily by the District Court." 
(c). The CAS. In Welsch v. Likins, SSO F. 2d 1122 (CAS 
1977), the CAS upheld a DC decision insofar as it held that due 
process compells that minimally adequate treatment be provided for 
involuntary patients in state institutions, but the CAS did not 
explain the basis for this constitutional right. See also 
....:;.__~.___ 
v. Parwatiker, S70 F. 2d SOl (CAS 197S) (Ross, Stephenson, & 
Webster). ~ 
(d). The decisions below. Like the CAS in Donaldson v. 
O'Connor, the majority opinion in the case at bar began with the 
proposition that involuntary civil commitment entails a "massive 
curtailment of liberty,'" quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 40S u.s. S04, 
S09 (1972) •14 The CA then stated that as a consequence, involuntary 
commitment is circumscribed with due process protection, citing 
14For a discussion of the details of this procedural due 
process case, see n.l2 infra. 
Addington v., Texas, discussed above, the procedural due process 
case requiring clear and convincing evidence. The court then 
explained that commitment does not extinguish all aspects of an 
individual's liberty interest--instead, the power of locomotion 
without restraint and the right to personal _security and freedom -----from punishment are fundamental liberties that can only be 
encroached upon when justified by an overriding, non-punitive 
interest related to the reasons for confinement. 
25. 
The majority considered Romeo's claims in the light of this 
principle. The CA described his claims as (1) the right to be free 
from undue bodily restraint; (2) the right to personal security and 
protection; and (3) the right to adequate treatment. The CA 
continued by noting that the first claim was based on undue 
shackling, and it held that, though shackling may not be punishment 
per se, it raises a presumtion of a punitive sanction. The court 
stated, without support, that "shackling" is not normally within the 
range of conditions of confinement contemplated in a "habilitative 
institutionalization." And the CA concluded that careful scrutiny 
is the proper judicial posture in reviewing such treatment--because 
there is a right to treatment under the least restrictive conditions 
consistent with the purpose of the commitment," and shackling can be 
justified only by compelling necessity. 
With regard to the right to treatment, the CA simply stated 
that the individual's right to personal security and the state's 
interest in providing ~are "converge to support a right to 
protection from attack." Failure to provide for personal security 
could be justified in a §1983 case only by "substantial necessity." 
,• .y 
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With regard to Romeo's claimed right to treatment, the CA 
merely noted that the right to appropriate treatment was independent 
of the purpose of commitment (i.e., care, protection, treatment), 
and adopted the convoluted three-part standard described at 9-10 
supra. 
Judge Seitz's minority opinion gave even less consideration 
to the constitutional underpinings of the right to treatment. He 
merely stated that the constitutional right is no longer disputed 





There are several ways in which the Court can resolve this 
T~ost obvious way is by determining whether there is a 
right to treatment under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendmen~. A second is~holding, instead, that the defts are 
necessarily covered by a good faith immunity because, at the time 
they acted, they could not reasonably have known that there is a 
right to treatment. A .third way would be ~ispose of the case on 
the ground that the jury has already determined that the defts were 
not more than negligent, and that mere negligence, i.e., medical 
malpractice, cannot be a basis for a constitutional violation of a 
I 
substantive due process right (or, more narrowly, cannot be a basis 
for a constitutional violation when the patient is involuntarily 
committed any more than when the patient is a prisoner). This 
section will discuss each of these possible dispositions in turn, 
and will then discuss the failure to allow the expert testimony 
27. 
proffered by Romeo and the effect that failure should have on the 
disposition of the case. Finally, it will address resp's argument 
that the state has created a substantive liberty interest entitled 
to due process protection. 
A. The Right to Treatment 
1. The decisions of the lower courts. In finding a 
1/ \\ 
substantive due process right to treatment, the lower courts have 
not clearly distingushed procedural and substantive rights. They 
have found a fundamental right in liberty after commitment, and have 
used that "fundamental right" as the basis of their substantive due 
process analysis. But tbe courts have based their finding of that 
right on a procedural due process case: Humphrey v. Cady, 405 u.s. 
504, 509 (1972} (discussed in detail in n.l2 supra}. Humphrey 
involved only a possible possi~ equal protection right to a jury 
determination on the question of commitment because one state 
statute provided for such process and another state statute (for no 
apparent reason} did not. The case was remanded for further 
development, without even a finding of a procedural right. Humphrey 
does not, therefore, provide much support for the notion that post-
commitment conditions implicate a liberty interest that is 
"fundamental" in the sense in which that term is used in substantive 
due process cases. 
!)~7 As discussed above, thg Court has stoj>ped "far short of any 
~ general recognition of a "fundamental value" in individual 
~ ./?a~y," see discussion at f<. suera. The lower courts have 
ignored, however, the fact that post-commitment conditions are not 
'·, 
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at all similar to the rights this Court has found in substantive due 
process cases. As discussed above, those cases have generally found 
substantive rights in areas closely related to the family, 
procreation, and child-rearing. 1S 
The quid pro quo theory, relied on by the CAS in finding an 
affirmative right to treatment in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F. 2d 
S07 (CAS 1974), should also be rejected. The CAS considered a right 
to treatment as part of the quid pro quo of confinement without the 
procedural safeguards of criminal process. 
The Constitution requires, however, that criminal process 
be used only for criminal "commitments," not all commitments. Ther 
is no right to criminal process prior to civil commitment--see ~ 
Aldington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ("clear and convincing 
proof," rather than "beyond reasonable doubt," adequate for civil 
commitment) . 
The quid pro quo theory seems to have originated in a 
decision of this Court, In re Gault, 387 u.s. 1, 22 n.30 (1967), 
lSThe Court has been criticized for treating such values, 
values neither explicitly stated in the Constitution nor based on 
the Carolene Prpducts footnote as "fundamental." See Ely, The 
Supreme Court 1977 Teim, 92 Harv. L. Rev. S, 12 (1978) ("No Carolene 
Products Court this."). Ely's point is that the Carolene Products 
footnote limited post-Lochner deference to le~islative decisions to 
instances in which the pol1tical process coul be entrusted with the 
decision--but not those in which that process itself simply is not 
reliable--e.g., when the majority interferes with the rights of 
"discrete and insular minorities," or with the ability of others to 
use the political process is itself weakened. United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 u.s. 144, 1S2 n.4 (1938). Fundamental 
(
(typically traditional) famil values are widely held, and there is, 
t~ore, no need ·u 1cial inter erence on e round tnat the 





quoted by the CAS, in which the Court explained that if juveniles 
are subjected to special procedures which are justified in terms 
the special consideration and treatment thereby afforded them, 
juveniles should receive the promised treatment (the 
and would probably be entitled to challenge custody 
special procedures on the ground that they were not 
recieving "any special treatment." Thus, the Court A 
is confined under X procedure because he will treatment, 
he can challenge his confinement if, in fact, receiving Y. 
This quid pro quo principle can, however, the basis for a 
right to treatment only by bootstrapping. 
If a state confines a person to care an protect him, but not 
to treat him, that person is entitled to and protection, not 
treatment. In Donaldson, the CAS rejected the idea that 
stated that the "protection" go was a_lso shared by criminal 
confinement and therefore co d be achieved without criminal process 
only by adding another . g al. The CA gave no basis for this latter 
... 
proposition. e former, the S. Ct. in O'Connor v. Donaldson 
held that is not a sufficient basis for curtailing 
liberty. even the CAS would not now argue that the state 
cannot legiti ately confine for care someone who is not dangerous 
but incapabl 
Finally s amicus brief on behalf of the 
American merits) at lS-23, does an 
') 
excellent job of ar uing that the concepts of least restrictive 
_ \ \ It , • ~ 
means and compell1ng necess1ty (the latter was imposed by the CA3 as 
'•· 
the standard for justifying shackling) ~e "inscrutable in clinical 
terms." For example, it is difficult to tell "whether confinement ____.... 
o a room is more or less restrictive than the use of shackles or 
administration of a ~rug that permits the resident to remain with 
ther residents in a group situation. The difficulty is made worse 
-------by the fact that some treatments may be more · intensive but of 
shorter duration Furthermore, the lessening of restrictions 
one resident may lead to an increase in restrictions on other 
~ 
residents." Id., at 21-23. And I cannot make any sense out of the 
CA's holding that a patient has a right to be free from h rm in the 
/ 
absence of substantial necessity. What kind of 
necessity would justify harm? What kind of harm? Any accident? 
There is rarely a "need" for an accident--would this standard make 
every tort occuring in a mental hospital a constitutional violat' n? 
2. Suggested substantive due process analysis. Under the 
express language of the Constitution, a state can curtail a person's 
liberty only after affording due process. And, under O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563 (1975), the state can curtail liberty by 
institutionalizing someone to serve a legitmate state interest, but 
it cannot do so to treat a non-dangerous person capable of surviving 
on the outside. After Donaldson, there are two legitimate reasons 
for involuntary commitment: ' (1) to care for an inJdividual who 
cannot care for himself on the outside; and (2) to protect an 
individual or others from his own violence. . ' 
' ·, 
As discussed above, the 
Donaldson Court explicitly noted that these goals can be achieved 




parens patriae power. Exercises of these powers, in the absence of 
a "fundamental right," can normally be justified,;zr if there is a 
"rational relationship" between the legitimate governmental end and 
the means chosen to attain that end. 
Given that this is not an area in which the Court has 
recognized "fundamental rights, n 16 one would expect the ratJonal 
relationship test to apgly: it is sufficient if there is a rational 
relationship between the terms and conditions of confinement and the 
purposes of confinement. Moreover, the application of this standard 
16 In cases such as the one at bar, the "fundamental rights" 
rhetoric _is troubling. Fundamental rights include the right to send 
your child tQ-prfvate school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 
510 (1925), the right to teach while pregnant, Cleveland Bd. of 
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and the right to remarry 
while paying child support, Zabloci v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
But one detained pending trial and subject to all manner of 
restraints, restrictions, and interferences, does not have a 
"fundamental" liberty interest in the conditions of confinement: 
"And to the extent the [lower] court relied on the 
detainee's desire to be free from discomfort, it suffices 
to say that this desire simply does not rise to the level 
of those fundamental liberty interests delineated in cases 
such as Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973) [abortions]; 
Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972) [contraceptives]; 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 u.s. 645 (1972) [unmarried 
father's right to custody of children after death of 
mother]; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965) 
[contraceptives]; Ma*er v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390 
(1923) [right to teac German in public school]." Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 534 (1979). 
The interests denominated "fundamental" seem like frosting on a cake 
compared to the interests of the involuntarily committed with regard 
to their conditions of confinement or the interests of Bell v. 
Wolfish's pre-trial detainees, who want to free of intrusions such 
as internal body-cavity seaches. It may be that the detainee has no 
such "right" and that the Constitution does not protest every 
aspect of an involuntarily committed patient's confinement, but it 
is surely not because the interests involved are not "fundamental." 





. cases most relevant to the right-to-
• Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520 (1979) 
briefly above, dealing with the rights of 
pre-trial detainees the conditions of detention) and 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715 (1972) (also discussed above). 
In Jackson, in a competency hearing, a state criminal court 
found that Jackson was incompetent to stand trial (because he was 
profoundly retarded). At the time the case reached the court, he 
had been held for 3 1/2 years in an institution for the mentally 
incompetent without either criminal process or civil commitment. 
Under state law, he could be held indefinitely--i.e., until such 
time as he became competent. 
The Court held that the state could not continue to hold 
him without initiating civil commitment proceedings. In a way, this 
was purely a procedural due process case--the Court found that 
Jackson was entitled to additional procedures. 
The case also involved, however, Jackson's substantive 
right to confinement conditions consistent with the terms of his 
confinement. Given the stability of his condition and the period 
that had already passed, Jackson could not reasonably be regarded as 
being temporaily confined until he became competent. Yet, the only 
procedure he had been afforded had been a competancy hearing. The 
Court held that temporary commitment following a finding of 
incompetence at a competency hearing could not last beyond a 
reasonable period "necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the 
forseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, 
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then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment 
proceeding or release [him] • • . Furthermore, even if it is 
determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand 
trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward 
that goal." Id., at 738. 
The principle behind this conclusion was simply stated by 
the Court in Jackson: 
"At the least, due process requires that the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose of commitment." Ibid. 
This is at once a procedural and a substantive right. Thus, if A is 
committed for care and safety, A cannot be held under purely 
punitive conditions. A has a substantive right to non-punitive 
conditions unless A has received criminal process. 
Thus, Jackson supports the proposition that the 
involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to be held under 
conditions reasonably related to the purposes of commitment, a right 
that is procedural and substantive. If a person is committted for 
care, he should b~ confined in conditions reasonably related to that 
purpose--(i.e., providing at least some minimal, subsistance, level 
of care)--or else he should be accorded whatever procedures justify 
confinement under the actual conditions in which he is kept. At 
times, of course, as O'Connor v. Donaldson itself suggests, this 
will be purely a substantive right, rather than a procedural right--
there are simply some purposes for which the state cannot legitimately 
confine a person no matter what procedures are used, e.g., 
confinement of a non-dangerous person for treatment. 




protection. The conditions under which he is confined must be 
reasonably related to these ends or else he has not received 
procedural due process--he should receive instead the procedures 
appropriate to his actual confinement conditions. This can, or 
course, also be expressed as a substantive right--Romeo has a 
substantive right to conditions reasonably related to care and 
pro~on since he has been committed under procedures used by the 
state in confining persons forl~are and protection~ 
The other case supporting the application of the rational 
relationship test to the case at bar is Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 
520 (1979). As discussed above, Wolfish involved a constitutional 
challenge to the conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees. 
Like the case at bar, Wolfish involved persons who had not been 
accorded criminal process and was decided by reference to the due 
process clause. Like the involuntarily committed, the pre-trial 
detainees could not be punished at all because they had not been 
accorded the criminal process that was their due prior to 
punishment. 
In Wolfish, pre-trial detainees challenged the 
constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The lower 
courts held that a number of the conditions under which the pltfs 
were held were unconstitutional. The CA3 held that the pltfs, who 
had not been found guilty of any crime, could only be subjected to 
those "restrictions and privations" which "inhere in their 
confinement itself or which are justified by compelling necessities 
of jail administration." 
This Court reversed, rejecting the "compelling necessity" 
.. 
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standard, and holding that the detainee's desire to be as free as 
possible from restrictions and discomfort was not a fundamental 
liberty interest entitled to the level of protection accorded under 
Roe v. Wade, et al. 441 U.S., at 534. All parties conceded that 
the government had a legitimate interest in detaining the pltfs to 
ensure their appearance for trial. The Court explained that under 
the eighth amendment, the detainees could not be actually punished 
because they had not yet been tried. Therefore, conditions could 
not "amount to punishment of the detainee." But the Court rejected 
the argument that every restriction placed on a detainee was a 
punishment; the relevant inquiry is whether the "particular 
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related 
to a legitimate governmental objective." Id., at 539. If a 
condition or restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate 
governmental objective, it does not, " without more," amount to 
"punishment." Ibid (footnote omitted). 
Under this approach, the terms and conditions of the 
confinement of the involuntarily committed should be considered to 
see if they are reasonably related to care and protection. With 
regard to the right to food and other non-medical confinement 
conditions, the involuntarily committed have a right to such food 
and conditions as can reasonably be expected to sustain them. With 
regard to medical care, the involuntarily committed are entitled to 
a level of care reasonably related to the state's purpose of caring 
for them. No medical care at all would clearly violate this 
standard. On the other hand, the Constitution requires only a 
reasonable relation, not a perfect fulfillment, of the state's 
i ..• 
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purpose. Perfect medical care would not, therefore, be mandated by 
the Constitution. 
Can the standard of Estelle v. Gamble, establishing the 
level of medical care for prisoners under the eighth amendment be 
adopted as an appropriate level for patients involuntarily committed 
to receive "care"? The power of the state confines both against 
their will and makes it impossible for either to go independently to 
the doctor of his choice. 
In~graham v. Wright, 430 u.s. 651 {1971) {Powell, J.), 
the Court held that the eighth amendment does not app~y universally. 
There, the pltfs alleged that paddling school children constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment and the due 
process clause. In rejecting the eighth amendment claim, the Court 
examined the history of the amendment and the caselaw construing it 
and concluded that it was designed "to protect those convicted of 
crimes." Id., at 664. The Court declined to extend the amendment's 
protection beyond the criminal process, stressing that "[t]he 
prisoner and the school child stand in wholly different 
circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction 
and incarceration." Id., at 669. Unlike the prisoner, the school 
child is not classified as a criminal nor removed from family and 
friends. The Court concluded that the eighth amendment simply has 
no place in the school room. 
The involuntarily committed have not been found guilty of 
crimes, so the eighth amendment does not apply directly to them. 
But, like the detainees in Wolfish, the state is not yet empowered 
to punish them in~ way--let alone in a cruel and unusual way. 
' ~· . 
I 
_. ......................... ,_.,. ....,--,.,~---1 
~kc.t~--~k~ 
And in Wolfish, the Court noted that"[~] fortiori, pretrial  
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at 
least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by 
convicted prisoners." Id., at 520. 
I would argue that Ingraham stands for the proposition that 
some grqyps, e.g., school children, are in a situation so unlike ,........ 
that of prisoners that the eighth amendment is simply of no 
relevance to them. But Bell v. Wolfish stands for the proposition 
y that other are so like prisoners that, a fortorari, they are 
entitled to at least those conditions of confinement to which the 
convicted are entitled, despite the fact that the eighth amendment 
does not directly apply. The involuntarily committed are much more 
like prisoners and pre-trial detainees than they are like school 
children. Like prisoners, and to a perhaps lesser extent pre-trial 
detainees, the involuntarily committed have been classified, 
sigmatized, and removed from their family and friends. They, like 
the pre-trial detainees in Wolfish, should therefore be accorded, a 
fortiori, at least those conditions mandated by the eighth 
amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. 
But is the level of Estelle v. Gamble--deliberate 
indifference to medical needs or the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain--a high enough standard for those who have not 
been accorded criminal process? It is precisely at this level--
tdeliberate indifference to medical need~--that it is clear that the 
state is not confining the mental patient in conditions rationally 
related to the purpose (care) given for commitment. Moreover, on a ------policy level, there is no intuitively obvious reason a prisoner 
should receive less medical care than the 
I would therefore suggest the 
standard. more generous standard 
that would medical-malpractice torts whenever 
involuntarily committed. 
Applying these principles to the facts of the case at bar, 
it seems likely that the conditions under which Romeo was kept did 
.:...-
not amount to pnishment, let alone cruel and unusual punisment, and 
that the conditions were reasonably related to the purp~ses for 
------------------------which he was confined. The CA found that he was being punished 
because it considered shackling not within the range of conditions 
of confinement contemplated in a "habilitative institution" and, as 
a result, though not per se punishment, shackling raised a 
presumption of a punitive sanction. 
There are several problems with this approach. First, 
there is the assumption that Romeo has a right to be in a 
"habilitative institution." The purposes for which he was 
committed--care and protection--do not require a habilitative 
ins~. A custodial one will do. Next, it is by no means ~~ 
clear that shackling is not within the range of conditions one would 
expect to find in even a "habilitative institution" for the 
profoundly retarded. Indeed, physical restraints appear to be 
widely used and are seen by some psychiatrists as necessary to 
control violent behavior. See H. Rosen & J. Digiacomo, The Role of 
Physical Restraint, 39 Jr. Clinical Psychiatry 228 (1978). 17 
17Romeo offered experts who would have testified that no 
ethical pshciatrist would have shackled a patient if any less-
Footnote continued on next page • 
.... ). .. 
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Moreover, a closer look at the facts, as discussed in 
section I.A supra, reveals that restraints were used, not to punish 
Romeo but because in all likelihood the defts did not know how else 
to protect him from injury. When they did not use restraints, he -
was constantly being injured, and his mother filed this suit. Only 
thereafter, when the defts probably had no idea how to limit their 
liability, did they use restraints. Indeed, in this action, Romeo 
is seeking what may be impossible for anyone to provide him in an 
institutional setting: safety and freedom from restraints. The only 
time when these goals were both achieved seems to have been when he 
lived at home with his parents. After his father's death, however, 
his mother was unable to control his violence and keep him 
uninjured--see description of his condition when she first took him 
to the hospital, supra at 3-4. She now expects others to be able 
to do what she could not do, and to be able to do it in the context 
of a large institution. 
If there is no presumption that shackling is punitive, 
shackling seems reasonably related to the purposes ofARomeo's 
confinement. It protects him from injuries he would otherwise -
receive as a result of his own violence. The other conditions of 
Romeo's confinement also seem reasonably related to its purposes. 
Conditions were no doubt less than ideal~ additional staff would no 
doubt have made his life easier, and perhaps additional programs 
restrictive alternative were available and that there is no dispute 
in the literature on this point. See discussion in section I.A 
supra. Both points are impeached by the article cited in text. 
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could effectively restrain his violence and teach him additional 
skills. But Romeo was not confined for treatment purposes and he 
had no right to treatment prior to confinement. When a state 
exercises its power to care for and protect an individual, there is 
no basis for imposing, as a matter of constiitutional law, a duty to 
provide treatment also. 
B. Immunity 
ll 
If there is no affirmative right to treatment, the jury 
instructions appear to have been adequate. 18 But even if there is a ------ ~ --- ......, 
constitutional right to treatment, the right was by no means clear 
at the time of the defts' acts, and they should, therefore, be 
be; covered by good faith immunity with regard to that right. This 
approach was taken by the CAS in a recent case. 
In Dilmore v. Stubbs, 636 F. 2d 966 (CAS 1981), the CAS 
upheld the DC's dismissal of an action on the ground that officials 
of the Miss. state hospital could not have known that their ppolicy 
of temporarily placing admittees in the most restrictive ward for 
18It is true that the instructions used the eighth amendment 
and the Estelle v. Gamble standard. And, as discussed above, 
neither applies directly as a limit to conditions of confinement for 
a group that has not received criminal process. But, as discussed 
above, there is no apparent reason why criminals should, as a matter 
of constitutional law, be entitled to less in the way of medical 
care than the involuntarily committed. And in Wolfish, the Court 
indicated that the eighth amendment standard of cruel and unusual 
punishment a fortiori sets limits on conditions under which 
detainees could be kept even though the amendment itself does not 
directly apply. See discussion at 3~-37 supra. The references to the 
eighth amendment would seem to be harmless error and the Estelle v. 
Gamble standard appropriate unless you think there is a 
constitutional right to treatment. 
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observation and treatment would give rise to a constitutional 
violation and therefore such officials were immune from damages in a 
civil suit under §1983. 
In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555 (1978), cert was 
granted on whether negligence in handling prisoners' mail violated 
the constitutional rights of prisoners. Rather than reaching this 
issue, however, the court held that the defts were immune from 
damages in a §1983 suit because they could not have known that their 
conduct would violate the constitutional rights of prisoners. 
A similar approach could be taken in disposing of the case 
at bar. The jury was instructed that there was a right to an 
Estelle v. Gamble level of treatment, and there is no way the defts 
could have known that a higher standard would apply. 
An argument can be made that the case should be disposed of 
on immunity grounds. Reaching the substantive merits of a claimed 
new constitutional right may be inappropriate in a case for monetary 
damages because of the inherent unfairness of assessing such an 
award against defts in such an action; that unfairness may create 
too strong a pressure against finding any such new right. I do not 
find this a compelling reason for ducking the issue on which cert 
was granted, however. Even if the new constitutional right is 
found, on remand, jury instructions on good-faith immunity will be 
given. 
c. Negligence. 
The Court has now granted cert three times to determine ,, 
whether a §1983 claim can be based on mere nelige9ce and has never -
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reached the issue. See Procunier v. Navarette,. 434 u.s. 555 
(1978); Baker v. McCollan, 443 u.s. 147 (1979); Parratt v. Taylor, 
U.S.L.W. --- ___ , No. 79-1734 (Mar. 2, 1981). It now appears 
unlikely that the Court will reach any across-the-board holding on a 
single standard of culpability for §1983 liability. In Parratt v. 
Taylor, you indicated that you would not necessarily give the §1983 
intent requirement uniform treatment: 
"The intent question cannot be given "a uniform answer 
across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional 
violations which might be the subject of a §1983 action," 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 u.s. 137, 139-40 (1979). Rather, 
we must give close attention to the nature of the 
particular constitutional violation asserted, in 
determining whether intent is a necessary element of such 
a violation." Parratt v. Taylor, slip op. at 2 (Powell, 
J., concurring in the result). 
In Taylor, you did, however, indicate that in the context 
of substantive due process claims, you would not view negligence as 
a sufficient basis for finding a constitutional deprivation: 
"As I do not consider a negligent act the kind of 
deprivation that implicates the procedural guarantees of 
the Due Process Clause, I certainly would not view 
negligent acts as violative of these substantive 
guarantees." Id., at 8. r 
This case could be used as the basis for holding that ~ 
deliberate indifference, rather than negligence, is needed to hold 
an official liable for a violation of substantive due process. The 
rejection of negligence as the basis of liability would be based on 
the history and purpose of §1983 and would limit the dicta in Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, the Court suggested that 
all tort concepts might be applicable in §1983 actions because it 
"should be read against the background of tort liability." Id., at 




importation of a criminal-law standard of "wilfulness" into §1983 
and adopting instead the civil concept of intent (a man intends the 
natural consequences of his actions} found in tort law. 
The "background of tort liability" language should be 
limited to the intent requirement, and its extension to incororate 
other elements of tort law, i.e., negligence liability regardless of 
the underlying constitutional tort, should be rejected as 
inconsistent with the history and purposes of §1983, which indicate 
that the statute was not intended to constitutionalize tort law 
whenever a deft was a state official. 
Thus, although the decision would not hold that negligence 
is never enough to express a claim under §1983, it would hold that 
negligence is not enough to state a substantive due process claim. 
D. The Proffered Expert Testimony 
During the trial, the trial judge refused to allow 
testimony of experts proffered by Romeo to show that Romeo could 
have been effectively treated under other programs (not involving 
restraints} and that the lack of programming in Romeo's ward was the 
cause of aggressive behavior. He would also have testified that 
psychologists are ethically bound to choose methods that do not use 
restraints and that there is no dispute in the literature on this 
point. 19 The trial judge disallowed this testimony. He explained 
19Even the most cursory glance through the literature reveals 
that the footnoted sentence is not true. See H. Rosen & J. 
Digiacomo, The Role of Restraint, 39 Jr. Clinical Psychiatry 228 
(1978}. 
that it was relevant to a malpractice suit but that he id not 
consider it relevant to a §1983 constitutional claim. 
The CA3 did held that the trial judge in disallowing 
this testimony because it was relevant to the questi n of whether 
had been deprived of his substantive to treatment a delineated by 
the CA3. Petn at 26a-27a. 
As a general matter, the admission of expe t testimony 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial JU will not be 
overturned absent manifest error. Spokane and Inland Empire 
Railroad Co. v. United States, 241 u.s. 351 (1915): Spring Co. v. 
Edgar, 99 u.s. 645, 656 (1878). 
In Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U?S? 31, 35 
(1962), the Court explained the general rule: 
"[E]xpert testimony not only is unnecessary but indeed may 
properly be excluded in the discretion of the trial judge 
if all the primary facts can be accurately and 
intelligently described to the jury, and if they, as men 
of common understanding, are as capable of comprehending 
the primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from 
them as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar 
training, experience or observation in respect of the 
subject under investigation." 
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4677, No. 80-332 (June 
15, 1981) (Powell, J.), the Court upheld the exclusion of expert 
testimony on prison conditions: 
"As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s., at 543-544, 
n.27, [expert] opin1ons may be helpful and relevant with 
respect to some questions, but "they simply do not 
establish the constitutional minima: rather, they 
establish goals recommended by the organization in 
question." Rhodes v. Chapman, n.l3. 
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the key 
question is whether the jury could understand the primary facts 
,_ .... ··'*''• 
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relevant to the consitutionally-mandated "minima" without the 
testimony of resp's experts. If so, the exclusion was not erroneous 
no matter how relevant the testimony. The answer turns, of course, 
on the "constitutional minima" one would find in the case at bar. 
If you agree that there is no affirmative right to treatment or to 
the least restrictive treatment method, then the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in disallowing the testimony. If you think 
that the involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to some 
affirmative level of treatment under the least restrictive 
conditions possible, then a jury is going to have no idea what the 
primary facts are without expert testimony. 
E. Resp's State-created Substantive Liberty Right 
Romeo argues that the state has created a right to 
treatment (a liberty interest) and that the failure to provide him 
with that treatment violates due process. Insofar as Romeo is only 
arguing that the state's deprivation of his liberty to "care and 
protect" him gives him a substantive right to conditions reasonably 
related to those purposes, I agree. See Resp. (red) at 15 (quoting 
Jackson v. Indiana). This principle is one of federal 
constitutional law, however, and is entirely independent of the 
particular language in any state commitment statute. 
Resp makes another argument: Penn., by statute, as 
interpreted by the Pa. S. Ct., has given him a right to certain 
services and certain treatment. See id., at 27 (citing In re 
Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631, 636 (Pa. 1981) (retarded persons are 
entitled to "live a life as close as possible to that which is 
46. 
typical for the general population"). According to resp, the 
failure to accord him this right (a liberty right) is a violation of 
due process. 
Resp argues that it is undisputed that state-created rights 
are entitled to due-process proctection. The cases he cites 
involve--insofar as they involve state-created rights--procedural, 
not substantive, liberty rights. For example at 25, he states: 
"[T]he state statute created a valid liberty interest in 
the expectation of care which the State may not thereafter 
arbitrarily abridge; See Vitek v. Jones, supra 
[procedural rights of convicted felon transgered from 
state prison to mental hospital]; Wolf v. McDonnell, supra 
[procedural rights attached to state-created interest in 
"good time"]; O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra (when the State 
confines a person for a stated purpose, it must fulfill 
that purpose) [state cannot confine involuntarily non-
dangerous mentally-ill person who can survive on outside]; 
Jackson v. Indiana, supra [there must be a reasonable 
relation between the purposes of confinement and the 
conditions of confinement]." 
As the bracketed descriptions indicated, none of these cases involve 
a state-created substantive liberty right. 
Indeed, only Wolf v. McDonnell (right to procedures when 
"good time" taken away) involves a state-created right. 
The right to conditions of confinement reasonably related 
to the purpose of confinement is a federal right independent of 
state law. O'Connor v. Donaldson held invalid a state law providing 
for commitment solely for purposes of treatment. After O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, the only relevance of state law to conditions of 
confinement is that state law defines the purpose of commitment, 
justifying, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the 
deprivation of liberty. Federal constitutional law recognizes only 
two purposes as legitimate: care or protection. If a state has 
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another purpose, it simply cannot deprive a person of liberty for 
that reason no matter how good it would be for them. And the fact 
that the state has additional purposes--e.g., treatment--does not 
automatically make the attainment of that that purpose a matter of 
federal constitutional law. 
In the case at bar, Penn.'s civil commitment law provides 
for confinement for "care and treatment." Resp. (red) at 26. 
Conditions that provide custodial care are consistent with the 
purpose of "care," and more is not required by the federal 
Constitution. And the fact that the Pa. S. Ct. has stated that 
there is an affirmative right to "normalization" for the mentally 
retarded under that act does not make its achievement a federal 
issue. 5~ 
! 
Moreover, I do not understand how a state can possibly ~
create a substantive '1-i,....,b_e_r_t _y_ r-:i-g-h- t- . __ O_n_e_ 1:-. s __ b_o_r_n_ w_1:-. t- h--t-h_e ___ /~"i'-:;_-----J --substantive right to liberty. It does not depend on any 
beneficience conferred by the state. When the state releases a 
criminal to absolute liberty (without probation), it is not 
conferring liberty upon him, liberty which it can either give or 
withhold because it is truly the state's to dispose of. Rather, the 
state must release him when he has served the time the state 
legitimately imposed as punishment. A person out on bail enjoys 
liberty at the grace of the state, but he only has a procedural, not 
a substantive, right to that liberty. After the appropriate 
procedures, the state can take that liberty away again. I find the 
idea of substantive liberty turning on state law nonsense. 




created substantive "liberty" interests federal issues, I don't see 
where it would stop. Would every state created "liberty interest" 
{expectation?) be entitled to federal due-process protection? This 
could conceivably include every state-created hope. Resp has never 
included state-law claims in this action, and his argument would 
turn every state-law claim into a federal constitutional issue. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There are three ways to decide this case: the substantive 
right to treatment; immunity; and the lack of the relevant intent. 
On the first point, the state has legitimate reasons for 
committing resp in the exercise of its parens patriae and police 
power. As a general matter, exercises of these powers need only be 
rationally related to the purposes of the exercise. Unless you are 
willing to find a "fundamental right" {a substantive due process 
right) to treatment, the applicable constitutional standard is 
whether the conditions of Romeo's confinement are rationally related 
to the legitimate goals of care and protection. In applying this 
standard, the standard enunciated by Estelle v. Gamble would seem in 
appropriate to adopt: when those in a state institution are 
deliberately indifferent to a patient's needs, the state is not 
holding the patient in conditions reasonably related to the only 
legitmate reasons for committment, care and protection. {If you 
th4t:: 
thinklthere is no affirmative right to treatment and that the 
standard of Estelle v. Gamble is appropriate, then the trial judge 





On the next point, the Court could order the reinstatement 
of the jury verdict because the defts are covered by good faith 
immunity. The jury was instructed to find them liable if their 
conduct met the Estelle v. Gamble level of deliberate indifference. 
They could not reasonably have known, at the time they acted, that 
the Constitution would impose a higher standard, and the jury 
verdict should therefore be sustained on immunity grounds. 
The case could also be decided on the ground that 
deliberate indifference is needed to state a §1983 claim for 
violation of a substantive due process right. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In re: No. 80-1429, Duane Youngberg, et al. (super intendant, 
et. al.), v. Nicholas Romeo, by his mother and next 
friend ( 19--~~t/"$ ~ ~
~~~) 
This memo discusses several possible articulations of the 
substantive rights of the involuntarily committed to care and 
protection. 
1. Negligence. (a). To establish a medical-malpractice 
claim in an action against a treating physician, a pltf must 
establish: (1) the existence of the physician's duty to the pltf, 
usually based on the MD-client relationship; (2) the applicable 
standard of care and its violation; (3) a compensable injury; and 
(4) a causal connection between the violation of the standard of 
care and the harm complained of. 
The standard of care imposed generally by negligence law is ._____ ____, ,_____.., 
not one of acting in good faith, but rather of acting as would a 
reasonable man in like circumstances. For doctors, this objective 
I{ 
standard is measured by the acts of a reasonable doctor in similar 
\\. 
circumstances. The prevailing statement of the professional 
standard is referred to as the "customary practice" formulation: a 
2. 
doctor has a duty to use the degree of care and skill ex~cted of a 
-----------------------------------------reasonably competent practitioner in same class (with the same -specialty) and in the same or similar circumstances (which 
traditionally limits the comparison to MDs in the MD's geopraphic 
area). King, The Law of Medical Malpractice, at 37-44 (1977). 
When the action is against the hospital, the negligence 
~andard of care is articulated slightly differently. Private 
· ~ hospitals are not the guarantors of the safety or health of their 
patients. The duty imposed on private hospitals is a duty to ------
exercise reasonable care in accordance with sound hospital practice ----------------------
to protect the health and safety of patients. 
If doctors have a good-faith immunity, a substantive right 
to care under a negligence standard will not result in liability 
against a treating physician in the absence of a lack of good 
faith. And doctors in state institutions should have at least a 
good faith immunity. In past immunity decisions, the Court has 
refused to extend liability when it would interfere with the proper 
functioning of institutions. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 u.s. 
409, 426 (1976) (Powell, J.) (even qualified immunity for prosecutor 
would have adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal 
justice system). 
State institutions cannot be attractive places in which to 
work. If doctors are subject to personal liability on the basis of 
--------~ ~ -
judgments and decisions made in good faith, it will be even harder 
for such institutions to attract and ke~ the competent 
professionals they need to provide patients with good care. A 




grounds for believing that his action does not work a constitutional 
deprivation. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975) 
(White, J.) • 
1(. 
Provided that doctors have this good faith defense, they 
will be protected regardless of the substantive standard. Would 
'- ~ - --
~ negligence then be the appropriate standard, applicable in actions 
~~~or injunctive relief or instances in which a doctor acts without 
~- good faith? This would impose the "customary practice" standard on 
~v~ treating physicians and would obligate state institutions to provide 
~ v==c;:::::: r· ~~ reasonable care in accordance with sound hospital practice to ensure 
~- the safety of patients. This standard is doubtless desirable. But 
it would mean that states could only commit those they could care 
for at the generally accepted level afforded by private 
institutions. This would impose severe financial constraints on 
states and would constitutionalize medical malpractice in state 
institutions. The choice before a state would then be one of two 
extremes: either provide no care and protection or provide a fairly 
high level of care and protection. As a historical matter, the 
Constitution certainly has not been regarded as imposing this choice 
on states. 
2. The standards applicable to prisoners. If the 
involuntarily committed are only entitled to the substantive 
standards afforded prisoners, their constitutional rights are not 
violated if their treating physicians and the administrators of 
their institutions are not deliberately indifferent to their 
seri'6us medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976) 
'-"" 
4. 
(medical treatment of prisoners). They would also have the right to 
conditions that are not equivalent to "serious deprivations of 
basic human needs"--conditions "cruel and unusual under the 
contemporary standard of decency." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 49 U.S.L.W. 
4677, 4679 (1981) (Powell, J.). 
~ The eighth am~ent is not, however, the relevant limit on 
~~the ability of the state to subject the involuntarily committed to 
~ objectionable conditions. First, the state does not have the right 
to punish the involuntarily committed, and cannot, therefore, 
subject them to treatment or conditions as long as the conditions or 
treatment fall short of cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, the 
state has committed these people to care and protect them. This is 
quite different from confinemen to punish--confinement to care 
certainly suggests a higher substantive obligation on the state than 
that imposed after the state has afforded the procedures required 
prior to punishment. 
In addition, the Estelle Court relied on the contemporary 
standard of decency manifest in modern legislation codifying the 
common-law view that "'it is but just that the public be required to 
care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of 
liberty, care for himself.'" 429 u.s., at 95-96. With the 
involuntarily committed, care should be given not just because the 
patients are unable to obtain it on their own due to their 
confinement, but because their very confinement--for care and 
treatment--is unjustified in the absence of that care and treatment. 
There is some force to the argument that, if a state cannot provide 
a reasonable level of care and protection, it should have to face 
,. 
J·, . 
the political consequences of that inability, a pressure it will 
only feel if it is not allowed to confine the incompetent without 
such care. 
3. Suggested standard. (a). General living conditions. 
5. 
Under Bell v. Wolfish (conditions of pre-trial detainees), at a 
minimum, the involuntarily confined are entitled to conditions 
reasonably related to their conditions of confinement, i.e., because 
they are confined for care and protection, they should receive at 
least decent and adequate food, living conditions, and clothing. 
(b). Protection and medical care. Because they are 
committed for protection, the involuntarily committed have the right 
to conditions designed to afford some degree of safety. On the 
other hand, the fact that the state has confined them to protect 
them cannot mean that the state is strictly liable for every injury 
sustained. Articulation of even a standard is difficult. The 
patient in the private institution would have the right to the 
exercise of reasonable care in protecting the safety of patients by 
the hospital administration. As a minimum, under the "reasonably 
related" standard of Jackson v. Indiana, the involuntarily committed 
are entitled to conditions that can reaonably be expected to provide 
enough safety to justify commitment. 
Similarly, because they are committed for care, the 
involuntarily committed have the right to medical care and 
attention, at least sufficient to justify their committal. 
o. 
Is it possible to articulate the level of protection and of 
medical care and attention which, together with decent living 
conditions, would justify commitment to care and protect? In my 
bench memo, I suggested that it is at the point at which the 
authorities are "deliberately indifferent" to the needs of the 
involuntarily committed that the state is not providing conditions 
reasonably related to the purposes of confinement. 
That standard may be too low. The "deliberate" part of 
deliberate indifference certainly suggests more than mere 
indifference--it suggests a studied, intentional, and cruel 
attitude. ~is is borne out by the examples of deliberate 
indifference given by the Estelle Court: 
"See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2 
1974) (doctor's choosing the 'easier and less efficacious 
treatment' of throwing away the prisoner's ear and 
stitching the stump may be attributable to 'deliberate 
indifference ••• rather than an exercise of professional 
judgment')~ Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7), 
cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 u.s. 879 
(1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that 
prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat 
allergic reaction)~ Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 
1973) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment)~ 
Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970) (prison 
physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer 
and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner 
to to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon)." 
429 U.S. n.lO, at 96. 
Thus, by deliberate indifference (sufficient to be cruel and unusual 
punishment) , the Court meant a rather extereme indifference to 
unneccessary pain by a doctor or the intentional denial or delay of 
access to medical care by others. 
But if the doctors and supervisors in a state institution 
are simply indifferent to the medical needs and safety of their 
patients, has not the state failed to provide conditions reasonably 
' . 
vr- ~I 
related to th~e and protection for which they confined the 
individuals? This standard would be at least somewhat lower than 
I • 
the Estelle standard, because mere indifferent indifference--rather 
than the higher standard of deliberate indifference (with its 
overtones of intentional infliction of unnecessary pain) would 
violate the constitutional rights of the involuntarily committed. 
Another formulation might be that doctors are indifferent when they 
fail to make any attempt to provide decent conditions or care to 
residents of state institutions. 
This standard would be far from the negligence standard. 
The question would not be, what treatment or conditions would be 
--. 
customary in a private hospital or in treatment from a private 
physician. Instead, the question would be whether those the state 
has employed to care for and protect the involuntarily committed 
have made at least a reasonable effort to do so. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: · 
Re: No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
J 
The above could well have been set back-to-hack 
with No. 80-1417, Mills v. Rogers. Since I overlooked 
that the next best thlng is to dlscuss them together. 
(Each involves a good bit of "insanity"!) 
Accordingly, I suggest discussion of Youngberg 




TO: Mary DATE: Feb. 22, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
This memorandum, dictated at home on Sunday, 
reflects my initial reaction to your draft of Feb. 19. I 
should say that I am quite "cold" on the case, and on the 
eve of two weeks of argument I will have no opportunity to 
go back to the briefs or even to your fine bench memo. 
Thus, for the most part my comments are suggestive and 
inquisitive, rather than definitive. 
My general impression is that the draft is quite a 
bit too long. In a case of this kind where there is no real 
guidance in our cases, and subjective judgments will be made 
by all of us, the less we write the more likely we are - in 
all probability - to obtain a Court. 
I now comment briefly on the various parts of the 
draft. 
Part I (p. 1-12) 
This is an excellent statement of the case. 
Part II (p. 12-24) 
Subpart A (p. 13-18) • The draft finds a liberty 
interest continues following commitment, makes clear th~ 
this is substantive rather than procedural, but reasons that 
2. 
the Matthews v. Eldridge factors also apply for purpose of 
analysis. (13-17) Subject to some editing that I have 
undertaken, I think to this point, the draft is on target. 
In stating, in accord with the Matthews forumla, 
respondent's interests in the first full paragraph on page 
17, I would think it desirable to state them in terms of 
respondent's three claims (see p. 10 of your draft). As now 
framed, this takes no account specifically of the 
claimedrights to be free of physican constraints or the 
right to safety and protection. 
Subpart B (p. 19-24). My impression of these five 
pages in particular is that they are a bit discursive, and 
are not as sharply focused on the precise claims as may be 
desirable. 
Would it make sense, Mary, to eliminate subpart B, 
and restructure Part III by identifying and addressing in 
order respondent's claims (i) to be free from physicial 
restraint, (ii) to protection and safety, and (iii) to 
treatment. After all, these are the interests claimed in 
this case, and those that must be weighed against the state 
interests. 
There does not now seem to be a logical flow from 
page 19 to the end of the draft. If we structure this 
around respondent's three claims, there would be a logical 
flow. Also, the draft could be substantially shortened. 
3. 
I note, for example, that in Part III the draft 
returns - at least it seems to me - to what already has been 
said about the presence of a substantive due process claim 
and its distinction from procedural due process (see pp. 28-
30) • 
It is clear that the state owes respondent a duty 
to take reasonable measures to protect him from violence by 
other patients. The state owes a duty to other patients to 
protect them from respondent's violence, and also to protect 
respondent himself from his own self mutilation. Thus, 
reasonable shackling - on the basis of this record - is 
necessary at times. 
Medical care and treatment are quite different 
kinds of duties. I suppose care (other than medical care) 
could be defined or identified as suggested on p. 24, to 
mean food, shelter, clothing and reasonable safety. The 
state{ concedes these duties. In view of respondent's 
specific allegations, and his profound handicap, special 
safety measures - in addition to those generally applicable 
- probably are required. I would address "safety" biefly as 
separate from the conceded duty to provide food, shelter and 
clothing. 
The most difficult question is what level of 
medical care and treatment is required. Here, I ~~ 
are generally agreed that the substance of Chief e 
'. 
4. 
Seitz's formulation is about right. Perhaps you can frame 
it more felicitously. (Any hel~here from amici briefs?) 
Part IV (p. 32-33) 
I understand that you have not concluded~ft 
of this part. My recollection is that Judge Seitz, and the 
judges who agreed with him, would remand this case for 
retrial under proper instructions with respect to the 
applicable standards. I believe Seitz also agreed with the 
majority that on a retrial the testimony of respondent's 
experts should be admitted. Perhaps the best things for us 
to do with respect to this is simply to say in a footnote 
that we have no reason to disagree with the view that such 
testimony should be admitted. 
* * * 
I am aware, Mary, that restructuring the opinion 
as above suggested will require substantial rewriting. I 
emphasize that there is no time pressure whatever. It may 
be a good idea before you undertake changes in the 
organization of the opinion, to have David read the draft 
simply to have the benefit of his advice as to how to 
organize it. I may not have made the best suggestions. 
This is not an easy case, and yet it is quite an 





TO: ~1ary DA~E: Feb. 22, 1982 
F'ROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
This memorandum, dictated at home on Sunday, 
reflects my initial reaction to your draft of Feb. 19. I 
should say that I am quite "cold" on the ca~e, and on the 
eve of tvm weeks of argument I will have no opportunj ty to 
go back to the briefs or even to your fine bench memo. 
Thus, for the most T;>art my comments are suqqestive and 
inquisitive, rather than definitive. 
~Y general impression is that the draft is quite a 
bit too lonq. In a case of this kind where there is no real 
quidance in our cases, and subjective judgments will be made 
by all of us, the less we write the more likely we ar.e - in 
all probability - to obtain a Court. 
I now comment briefly on the various parts of the 
draft. 
Part I (p. 1-12) 
~his 5s an excellent statement of the case. 
Part II (o. 12-24) 
qubpart A (p. 13-18) • ~he draft finds a liberty 
interest contjnues following commitment, makes clear tht 
this is substantive rather than procedural, but re~sons that 
' ,I• 
l 
the Matthews v. Eldridge factors also aoply f.or purpose of 
anaJysis. (13-17) t::;ubiect to some ~ditinq that I have 
undertaken, I think to this point, the draft is on target. 
2. 
In qtatinq, in accord with the Matthews forumla, 
respondent's interests in the first full paragraph on page 
17, I would think it desirable to state them in terms of 
respondent's three claims (seep. 10 of your draft). A~ now 
framed, this takes no account specificallv of the 
claimedrights to be free of physican constraints or the 
right to safety and protection. 
Subpart B (p. 19-24). My impression of these five 
pages in particular is that they are a bit discursive, and 
are not as sharply focused on the precise clai~s as may be 
desirable. 
Would it make sense, Marv, to eliminate subpart B, 
and restructure Part III by identifying ana addressing in 
order respondent's claims (i) to be free from physicial 
restr~int, (ii) to protection and safety, and (iii) to 
treatment. After all, these are the interests claimed in 
this case, and those that must be weighed against the state 
interests. 
't'here does not now seem to be a logical flow from 
page 19 to the end of the draft. If we structure this 
around respondent's three clai.ms, there t!7ou1 d be a logical 
flow. Also, the draft could be substantiaJJy shortened. 
3. 
I note, for exam~le, that in Part III the draft 
returns - at l.east tt seems to me - to what Already has been 
said about the nre~ence of a subc:!tantive ou~ process claim 
and its distinction from procerlural t1ue process (see pp. 28-
30) • 
It i.::: clear that the state m<~es respondent a duty 
to take reasonable measures to prot~ct hi.m from vi.olence by 
other pati.ents. The state owes a duty to other patients to 
protect them from respondent's violence, and also to protect 
resoondent hi.mse1f from his own self mutilation. Thus, 
reasonable shacklina- on the basis of this record- is 
necessary at times. 
Medical care and treatment are quite different 
kinds of duties. I suppose care (other than medical care) 
could be defined or identified as suggested on p. 24, to 
mean food, shelter, c\othing and reasonable safety. The 
states concedes these duties. tn view of respondent's 
specific allegations, and his profound handicap, special 
safety measures - in addition to those qenerally applicable 
- probably are required. I would address "safety" biefly as 
separate from the conceded duty to provide rood, shelter and 
clothing. 
The most difficult question is what level of 
medical care and treatment is required. qere, I think we 









Seitz's formulation is about right. Perhaps you can frame 
it more felicitously. (Any held here from amici briefs?) 
Part IV (p. 32-33) 
4. 
I understano that you have not concluded a draft 
of this part. My recollection is that Judge Reitz , and the 
judges who agreed with him, would remand this case for 
retrial under proper instructions with respect to the 
applicable standards . I believe ~eitz also agreed with the 
majority that on a retrial the testimony of respondent's 
experts should be admitted. Perhaps the best things for us 
to do with respect to this is simply to say in a footnote 
that we have no reason to disagree with the view that such 
testimony should be admitted. 
* * * 
I am aware, Mary, that restructuring the opi.nion 
as above suggested will require substantial rewriting . I 
emphasize that there is no time pressure whatever. It may 
be a good idea before you undertake changes in the 
organization of the opinion, to have David read the draft 
simply to have the benefit of his advice as to how to 
organize it . I may not have made the best suggestions. 
This is not an easy case, and yet it is quite an 
important one. So take your time. 




TO: Mary DATE: March 26, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Your revised draft of 3/24 is quite good and I 
congratulate you on putting together so well the "humpty 
dumpty" that I handed you a few days ago. 
I have indicated on the left margin pages on which 
I have made an occasional "fly specking" editing change. 
The only substantive point that still concerns me 
is our reliance on the Matthews v. Eldridge formula. In 
thinking futher about this, I am not sure that it is useful. 
Of its three factors, the one that often is decisive in a 
procedural due process case concerns the "risk of error". 
This factor is not specifically involved in a substantive 
due process case. I have dictated a very rough alternative 
that would substitute for portions of pages 13-15. I 
suggest that you discuss with David whether my concern about 
~ reliance on Matthews is well founded, and whether 
something along the lines of my rider is preferable. Of 
course, you will have to edit and clarify my rough draft. I 




It is still also desirable to add a footnote 
indicating in a general way what we mean by "professionals". 
We can be reasonably certain that the average state mental 
institution is understaffed with genuine professionals. 
Rather, they use employees that a hospital like George 
Washington would characterize as "orderlies", or "interns" -
sometimes people who have had no formal training. Yet, some 
people with practical experience are very good indeed. Try 
a draft of a rather broad definition to be added as a 
footnote, making clear that the term "professional" is not 
limited to graduate M.D.'s in medicine, psychiatry, or even 
physical therapy. 
Subject to the foregoing, I think you have a fine 
draft. Let's have your editor review it and then move it to 
a printed Chambers draft promptly. I would like, if it 
seems reasonable, to circulate both your case and Mills 
before the Chief Justice makes assignments for the March 
arguments. This would mean circulating by April 2. 
I have mentioned to Dick the importance of Mills 
and Romeo being entirely consistent, both in substance and 
terminology. In addition to David, you and Dick should 
collaborate. 
ss 
cc: David and Dick 
lfp/ss 03/26/82 
~EMORANOUM 
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It is still also desirable to add a footnote 
indicating in a general way what we mean by "professionals". 
We can be reasonably certain that the average statP- m~ntal 
institution is understaffed with genuine professionals. 
Rather, they use employees that a hospital like George 
Washington would characterize as "orderlies", or "interns" -
sometimes people who have had no formal training. Yet, some 
people with practical experience are very good inoeed. Trv 
a draft of a rather broad definition to be added as a 
footnote, making clear that the term "professional" is not 
limited to graduate M.D.'s in medicine, psychiatry, o r even 
physical therapy. 
Subject to the foregoing, I think you have a fine 
draft. Let's have your editor review it and then move it to 
a printed Chambers draft promptly. I would like, if it 
seems reasonable, to circulate both your case and Mills 
before the Chief Justice makes assignments for the March 
arguments. Thi.s would mean circulating by April 2. 
I have mentioned to nick the imoortance of Mills 
and Romeo being entirely consistent, both in substance and 
terminology. In addition to David, you and Dick should 
collaborate. 
t. F. P. , Jr. 
ss 
cc: David and Dick 
-~---------~---------
dfl 04/01/82 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David, Mary, Dick 
Re: Youngberg v. Romeo: 
we are agreed that Part II of the opinion--in which 
you describe the competing interests of the state and the 
individual--needs some revision. The opinion needs to defend 
the proposition that a person who has been committed to a 
mental institution retains a "liberty" interest in safety, 
freedom from bodily restraint, and in training (the state 
concedes food and medical treatment) • 
It seems fairly easy to argue for a liberty interest 
in safety. First, there are cases that suggest as much. 
Second, it would shock the conscience to permit the state to 
house such patients in unsafe conditions. Third, the 
conditions in which persons are held must bear some reasonable 
relation to the state's purpose in confining them in the first 
place. So long as a person is confined because unable to take 
care of himself, the state can hardly hold him in conditions 
in which he is endangered. (However, if the State only 
confined someone because dangerous to others, then this third 
point would not be of any force.) 
The argument that a patient retains a liberty 
interest in free movement is only slightly more difficult to 
2. 
make. It is more difficult because whereas the commitment 
proceeding would not seem to reduce a patient's interest in 
safety, it clearly does restrict a patient's ability to move 
about--either outside or within the institution. Even so, it 
would seem fairly clear that the state cannot simply shackle 
someone to the bed for no reason at all. That would be 
tantamount to punishment. It would not be permitted in a 
prison: a fortior ar i it is impermissible here. In sum, we 
think you can argue persuasively that a patient retains a 
liberty interest in free movement. Yet the interest has been 
qualified by the commitment proceeding such that a "compelling 
necessity" standard for shackling--the standard adopted by the 
CA3-- is not appropriate. 
Much more difficult is the claim that a patient has 
a liberty interest in training or "habilitation." The "right 
to treatment" question has been here before in O'Connor. 
Justice Stewart found there that there was "no reason now to 
decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or 
to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory 
confinement by the State." He characterized the question as a 
difficult one. In our current draft we simply assume that 
such a liberty interest exists. Given that the question is so 
important and controversial, the draft should address the 
question head on. We think you have three choices: 
1. You can find a liberty interest in training by 




The incorporation cases such as Palko and Adamson, Just ice 
Harlan's dissent in Ullman, and Justice Frankfurter in Rochin 
establish the sort of rhetorical approach used in "natural 
right" or substantive due process cases. As you noted in 
Furman, the eighth amendment cases and the incorporation cases 
are essentially similar in approach: the Court looks to 
"objective" indications of contemporary ethics--state 
legislation, lower court decisions, expert writing etc. One 
can make out a fairly persuasive case for a right to training. 
Of course, you will be subject to the charge that you made it / 
up. 
1/ ,, 
Also, if it is true that contemporary morality recognizes 
a right to treatment then it may be said that there is no 
reason for the Court to create a constitutional requirement. 
2. Alternatively you can find that there is no 
right to training. If the State provides care--food, medical 
treatment, and shelter--and safety, it need not provide 
educational or habilitative programs as a constitutional 
matter. There are hard choices for a state to make as 
between educating Romeo {to tie his shoes or dress himself) 
and between providing better education for ghetto children in 
Philadelphia. The constitution does not require the state to 
provide for Romeo simply because the State has had the 
humanity to institutionalize him. 
3. Finally, you can find a right to some minimal 




care, and freedom from restraint. Even if you find that there 
is no broad right to treatment--subject to the same Seitz 
standard as the right to safety and freedom of movement-- you 
need not rule out all "right" to training. Although there 
would be no direct constitutional right to training, to the ______ ......,__ 
extent that training was necessary to safety it might be 
required. Moreover, when some minimal amount of treatment 
might significantly contribute to the comfort of a patient or 
might make shackling unnecessary or less necessary then it 
might be required as well. It will be somewhat difficult to 
give precision to this minimal "right" to treatment. But in j ~11.(-<­
any event there would be no general right to training such as --
the draft now proposes. 
Kissinger always presented Nixon with 3 options--two 
of which were usually crazy. We have done the same! Probably 
the third of these alternatives is the most desirable, but it 
is unclear whether it would gain a Court. For that matter, it 
is unclear from the Conference which of the alternatives has 
the most support. 
Finally--and however you choose--you may wish to 
sharpen the standard a bit, or express it in more traditional 
language. We are quite divided on how the standard should be 
stated. Perhaps we can discuss this further after you decide 
the right to training question. 
lfp/ss 04/03/82 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Memo to Mary, David and Dick 
Your memorandum, written on April Fools Day, 
leaves me little choice! In gentle language you warn me 
that, following Kissinger's practice with Nixon, you 
present three "options" - two of which are "crazy". One 
of the "crazy" options is the one that I incorporated in 
the draft opinion. 
At least you treated me better than Kissinger 
treated Nixon. I cannot imagine his identifying for the 
President the "crazy" ones. 
Kidding aside, I am not yet entirely persuaded 
to give up at least a part of my "crazy" view that there 
is an obligation to provide some "training". It may be 
that, in part at least, differences of view turn on 
definitions. I have taken another look at Joel Klein's 
amicus brief, and he argues for the following - stated in 
the briefest summary: 
Civil commitment constitutes a significant 
deprivation of liberty. The mentally retarded therefore 
have a substantial liberty interest in not being confined 




defines it as a term used by psychiatrists rather than the 
term "treatment": 
"The word 'habilitation' rather than 
'treatment', is used to refer to programs for 
the mentally retarded because mental retardation 
is a learning disability and training 
impairment rather than an illness. While 
psychiatric treatment may comprise part of a 
prgram for the mentally retarded, the principal 
focus of habilitation is upon training and 
development of needed skills." {Brief, p. 4, n. 
1) • 
The argument makes the following points: lack 
of habilitation will deny the only real chance the 
confined person has to regain freedom, as mental 
retardation does not lessen by itself. Habilitation is 
necessary to develop skills for the patient's own care, 
and a capability where this is possible for the 
patient to live independently or with the help of family. 
Even if this type of training does not lead to eventual 
release, it may increase the liberty achievable within the 
instituion itself. 
The analogy is drawn to the state's duty to 
provide medical care. In Estelle v. Gamble {429 u.s., at 
97), we said that principles derived from the Eighth 
Amendment "establish the government's obligation to 
provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration". The principal medical needs of a person 
i~a mental institution are psychiat~ In this case the -· - - ~) 
state concedes, as I understand it, a duty to provide 
medical care as this term in used for physical ailments. 
And, certainty in most cases, psychiatristic care is 
provided by M.D.'s and is medical care also. This 
includes a great deal more than prescribing drugs. 
Of course, psychiatric patients vary widely in 
their needs. My guess is that professional judgments 
would conclude they Romeo's condition is beyond the 
capacity of anyone to improve by treatment or training. 
But I would assume that a large percentage of patients can 
and do respond to programs designed to improve the 
patient's capacity to function more normally within the 
institution if not outside of it. 
I put this question: if a confined person has a 
constitutionally based liberty interest in reasonable 
medical care, would this not embrace the type of such care 
that provided by psychiatrists? 
Putting it differently, is the state's duty to patients 
confined in a mental institution limited to provide 
medical care for ell health ailments except psychiatric 
' 
care? (ra,"', ,., ) V, r b J' {. I ~ fr !C. 
,..)._,((/ < ( 4 ( 
.,;, 
··. 
It may be that our difficulty has arisen in part 
from viewing "training" as something separate and apart 
from the overall duty of "care", that concededly includes 
housing, food, clothing and medical care. If an inmate 
J , t z suffered a L,Vt.Jt,tl \ 
physiotherapy. 
stroke, medical care would include 
Specifically, where are we drawing the 
line and is it justified by any constitutional rationale? 
I have not mentioned your discussion of 
"safety", as I agree with it. The safety of a patient -
from injury to himself or by others - is certainly a 
liberty interest that a state owes even persons criminally 
convicted. Indeed, the term "care" viewed in its normal 
sense seems broad enough to include this and each of the 
needs that we have identified separately. 
The foregoing reflects my concern as to the 
soundness of limiting the "sane" option as narrowly as I 
read your memo. What does my "braintrust" think? 
* * * 
I add that when we agree on the type of care 
that the liberty interest requires, I would hold that a 
state discharges its duty when decisions are made by 
professionals as we have defined them. 
't 
Moreover, we should make clear that individual 
liability should not be imposed where the absence of 
reasonable care is attributable to the failure of the 
state itself to provide the necessary resources in terms 
of personnel and facilities. There would be a duty on the 
responsible people in an institution to make budget 
requests that would assure reasonably adequate staffing 
and facilities. But if a state legislature, for whatever 
reason, fails to provide the funds, personnel in the 
institution should not be subject to damage suit liability 
therefor. There would be injunctive remedies available. 
May I conclude by thanking all three of you, and 
particularly Mary, for your patience and interest in 
finding a reasonable and principled basis for deciding 
this important case. I appreciate your making me face up 
more thoughtfully to the foregoing type of problems, and 
again - in fairness - Mary alerted me to these and similar 
ones in her bench memorandum. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 




To: Mr. Justice Powell , 
From: Mary, David, & Dick ~~4.}-~~ 
~) ' Th-e~ l4J  
to tJlA..t.. d-.f~ ~.) ~ 
In re: No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo ~ )7 ~ .1 , 
This memo assume~~~::: i:::::t :-:::c:;;t: 7T 
freedom from restraints along the lines discussed in our earlier 
I 
memo; the focus here is on the right-to-treatment issue. In the 
first part of this memo, we articulate the rationale for the 
I 
position that there is a right to treatment; the purpose of this 
section is . primarily to make sure we understand this position as 
you described it in your memo. The second half defends the~ 
"middle position" suggested in our memo of last week. 
I. THERE IS A RIGHT TO TREATMENT 
A. Holding 
Depending on the factual situation, one of two specific 
"rights" would be found. 
(1) If "habilitation" would lead to the restoration of 
liberty, there would be a constitutional right to habilitation. 
This right would exist regardless of the purpose of confinement 
(care, protection, etc.). Thus, the federal Constitution would 
place a substantive limit on the state's ability to confine 
'·' 
2 0 
civilly: if a reasonable (or some level) of care (habilitation) 
can reasonably be expected to end the need for involuntary 
commitment, the state cannot commit without providing such care. 
(2) If "habilitation," including self-care skills, would 
lead to greater liberty within the institution, there also would 
be a consitutitional right to habilitation. Thus, the federal 
Consitution would place another substantive limit on the state's 
ability to confine for civil reasons: if a reasonable (or some 
level) of care (habilitation) can reasonably be expected to 
significantly increase the patient's ability to function 
independently within the institution (his liberty), then the 
state cannot commit without providing such care. 
B. Rationale 
What are the bases for these limits on state action? It 
is possible to draw some analogy to the duty to provide medical 
care to prisoners in Estelle. But in Estelle, the Court did not 
hold that prisoners have a right to reasonable medical treatment. 
Instead, the Court held that prisoners are constitutionally 
entitled to some level of medical care because contempory 
standards would regard "deliberate indifference" to serious 
medical needs as cruel and unusual punishment. If Estelle were 
based on the state's duty to provide medical care, would not the 
constitutional right (though not, perhaps, the §1983 cause of 
action) have been some right to reasonable medical care, not just 




than Estelle is needed, unless we are to adopt only the Estelle 
standard. 
As suggested in our earlier memo, one source for a right 
to treatment, including training or "habilitation" is a Harlan-
' 
Frankfurter-contemporary-standards substantive-due-process 
analysis. This analysis would conclude that, for those 
involuntarily committed, civil commitment does not extinguish the 
liberty interests described in #1 & #2, above. (#1 need not 
actually be mentioned, since it is not presented by the facts of 
this case) . 
Once that right is found--a right to reasonable 
habilitation if it can be expected that such habilitation will 
significantly improve the individual's ability to function 
independently within (or without) the institution--then the 
opinion could go on to hold that the state discharges its duty 
when these decisions are made by professionals. The opinion 
would also stress that in an action for damages, the professional 
is not personally liable if an inadequate treatment decision was 
due to lack of funds. 
c. Problems with The Right to Treatment 
Several of the possible problems with this approach were 
mentioned in the last memo. Use of the substantive-due-process 
approach always opens the Court open to the charge that it has 
"made up" a constitutional right. And, if this standard is 
dictated by contemporary morality, there may be little reason for 
4 . 
the Court to create a constitutional right as a limit on 
majoritarian decisionmaking. 
Another problem is that, in an action for injunctive 
relief, the suggested right-to-treatment standard would not be an 
~
easy one with which to work. What if there are professionals in 
the institution, but they say (or others say) that their 
decisions are not professional ones because of lack of funds? 
Will the standard "degenerate" into medical malpractice: whether 
a reasonable professional have made this decision? Although our 
case does not involve injunctive relief, I don't see any basis 
for distinguishing the two if the rationale suggested above is 
adopted. Similar problems (in the context of suits for 
injunctive relief) could also be raised regarding rights to 
safety and freedom from restraints if the standard chosen is one 
of delegation of decisionmaking to professionals. 
II: NO RIGHT TO TREATMENT PER SE 
The major criticism of the middle-of-the road position 
suggested in our earlier memo is: how can you find a 
constitutional basis or, indeed, any other basis, for 
distinguishing between forms of medical treatment (i.e., physical 
theraphy following a stroke) which we would regard as required by 
the Constitution, on the one hand, and the habilitation Romeo 
wants on the other. 
In response, it can be argued that this is no different 
from other "lines" with which we work, and no more unprincipled. 
5. 
Even laymen usually can distinguish with ease between "training" 
or "education" (designed to teach an individual a skill he has ....., ...... 
never had} and medical treatment, designed to ensure health. At 
times, this line may be difficult--especially when one compares 
psychiatric medical treatment and the "habilitation" claimed by -Romeo. But I do think that this line can be one maintained. 
And the constitutional basis for finding no liberty 
interest in any right to treatment per se would be no different 
from the consitutional basis for the broader right to treatment, 
discussed above. The Court would note that no case has ever 
recognized such a right and would then turn to consider whether 
decency nevertheless impose such a duty contemporary standards of 
(}.!1-
on the state. Contempo¥y standards may not be offended by civil --commitment of those in Romeo's condition even though the state 
does not assume any obligation to habilitate, at least when 
habilitation cannot lead to release (we can leave that harder 
case for another day}. Whether to expend limited state resources 
on habiltation of those who can never be released simply so that 
----------------- -
they can be somewhat more independent within the institution is a 
decision which "we, as a nation," may have delegated to state 
legislatures. (parahrasing Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman}. 
(The opinion would, of course, recognize a protected liberty 
interest in safety and freedom from restraints--but it should be 
possible to do so on the basis of prior cases rather than 
substantive due process.}. 
If one considers the facts and claims in the case at 
........ ,_,..--.._..---
bar, it is suprisingly easy to classify various forms of -
.· 
~·' 
' . ' 
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/}') (b) d) 
"training" as related t~dical care, safety, or reasonable use -- -
of restraints (and therefore constitutionally required without a 
----~ 
right to treatment per se) and those forms of "training" which 
would not be constitutionally requried in the absence of a 
specific right to treatment. For example, a behavior-
modification program designed to curb Romeo's violence would be 
related to safety and restraints and thus constitutionally 
required (under the appropriate standard) regardless opf whether 
there is any general right to treatment. Similar, toilet 
training would be related to medical care since Romeo's current 
behavior in this area causes infections. But teaching Romeo to 
tie his shoes or dress himself, rather than have another perform 
these tasks, would not be constitutionally required because such 
treatment would be "pure" training. 
If the opinion were written along these lines, it could, -
of course, stress (in addition to those factors mentioned above) 
--- li \\, 
that the Court is not reaching the right-to-treatment question in 
a case in which treatment might lead to freedom. Here, it is 
conceded that Romeo cannot be trained to live in freedom--there 
is no need for the Court to consider whether treatment might not 
be constitutionally required when it could lead to freedom. In 
this other case, the state interest's would, of course, be much 
different from those in the case at bar since indefinite 
confinement will often cost the state more than "habilitative" 
treatment. And, of course, the individual's liberty interest in 
treatment would be clearer and stronger than in the case at bar 
since it could lead to actual physical freedom. 
• 
7 • 
When you have chosen an approach, some further 
discussion of the appropriate standard would be helpful. Many of 
the problems mentioned above regarding application of the 
professional-judgment standard in suits for injunctive relief 
would apply also in the context of the right to safety and 
freedom from restraints. 
meb 05/11/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: Justice Brennan's note in No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
Justice Brennan makes two points. One is that resp waived 
any right to treatment peir se and the other that we should treat 
I 
this case and Mills in the same manner. I attach a copy of the 
transcript of oral argument. 
1. It is true that the resp did not argue for the Adams 
standard. But I do not think one can honestly argue that resp 
waived all rights to treatment other than those related to safety 
and restraints. 
After we got the note, David went down to the Brennan 
chambers to argue with Mark Campisano, but Justice Brennan came in 
and David ended up arguing with him! Justice Brennan conceded that 
the waiver point was an unreasonably harsh reading of oral argument-
-it's based on a statement at 47 of oral argument, a statement by 
the lawyer during which Justice Brennan cutoff the lawyer. The 
lawyer's truncated statement cannot reasonably be regarded as an 
exhaustive description of the rights resp seeks (and therefore a 
2. 
waiver of other rights). Cf. 28-29 of Oral Argument where the 
lawyer discusses the right to treatment. 
In any event, David's discussion with Justice Brennan 
indicates that Justice Berennan will not press this waiver point 
.... 4 
again. 
2. With regard to th~~, there are several 
points to nate. First, Mills involved a claim to federal procedural 
•• 
protection based on state substantive law. And during the time the 
case was before the federal courts, state law appeared to have 
changed. In Youngberg, resp claims only federal substantive rights. -
And there has been no change in state law. 
Second, resp in Youngberg claims only damages for breach of 
federal substantive rights. According to resp's lawyer at oral 
argument, the damage claim could not have been brought originally as 
a pendent state-law claim, at the time the complaint was filed, 
because of the then-existing Pa. soveign-immunity law, and would now 
be barred by the state statute of limitations. See Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 36. At least in the brief in this Court, the Mills 
plaintiffs argued that their claims could be satisfied by Mass.'s 
new state law. No similar claim is made here because a suit for 
damages could not now be brought in Pa. 
~
h I . . b BQga~oe t e cla1ms 1n Young erg 
1\ 
u~ 
{f~ral substantive) are 
so different from the claims in Mills {fede al procedural based on 
state-created rights ~~h~ have a 
hard time imagining what it means to treat this case like Mills. 
3. 
In his discussion with David, Justice Brennan kept 
stressing how important it was that the states be free to experiment 
in this area. This point is also made in his memo. Perhaps this is 
another area like Fair Assessment (the tax case we heard earlier 
this year) in which he would have the federal courts abstain 
regardless of what arguments were or were not made by resp here. 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTIC E w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,jn.prmtt <!fxrud xrf tfrt ~b ,jtatt,g 
'~lbudtingt~ J . <!f. 20gt'1' 
May 11, 1982. 
No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo. 
Dear Lewis, 
You have written a fine draft opinion in a very 
difficult case. My concerns focus on the position 
taken by respondent at oral argument, which to my mind 
made unnecessary the extensive discussion of respon-
dent's constitutional rights that you have undertaken. 
At pages 9-13 of your draft, you discuss respon-
dent's claim of "a constitutional right to 'habilita-
tion,'" Draft at 9, which leads you into a discussion 
Of--Rodriguez and Paul v. Davis. I do not think that 
this discussion is required, for two reasons. (fi;Sf) 
at oral argument, respondent withdrew completel~
the position taken on this point in Judge Adams' opin-
ion in the Third Cjrcuit, as well as from the position 
that respondent himself took on this point in his brief 
filed in this Court: In fact, respondent pointedly re-
fused to defend Judge Adams' opinion to the extent that 
it "announced a right to treatment in the sense of 
treatment to achieve maximum potential." Tr. of Oral 
Arq. 46-47, 48. Rather, he took the position-- which 
I gather is your own -- that petitioners were only "ob-
ligated to use behavioral programming to ... reduce vi-
olence and prevent aggressive [behavior]," and that 
this obligation was "a part of the minimum care that's 
required." Id., at 47. As a result, \!_hY Q...o we ~e~d to 
ascribe to resondent the position that "the Sta e ••. 
nas- a const1 ut1ona u y -o pro 1 e reasonable train-
ing, both to preserve existinq skills and develop new 
ones," Draft at 9? Respondent has given up that posi-
'. 
... 
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tion, and now presses a claim for "habilitation" only 
to the extent -- again as you suggest -- that such 
treatment is required to ensure "safe conditions" and 
to permit "freedom from bodily restraint" to the extent 
possible. 
Second, and particularly significant, I think, re-
spondent took the position in his brief and at oral ar-
gument that Pennsylvania law has created "a liberty in-
terest in habilitation." Brief of Respondent 25-29, 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Indeed, at oral argument I asked 
respondent, "Well, is it your view that ... the statute 
... provides everything that you say constitutionally 
you're also entitled to?" Ibid. Respondent answered, 
"Yes, yes," ibid., and then launched into an explana-
tion, irrelevant for our purposes, of why he had not 
made a statutory claim, id., at 36-37. As a result of 
respondent's position, is he not right that "there is 
no need for this Court in this case to decide whether 
the Constitution of its own force and without regard to 
state statutory law entitles retarded persons to mini-
mally adequate habilitation when confined in state in-
stitutions"? Brief of Respondent 29. 
I recall that at Conference some of our colleagues 
suggested that this field was best left to state ex-
perimentation, at least for the time being. That es-
sentially was respondent's position at oral argument, 
and I see wisdom in it. Moreover, you are following 
that course in Mills v. Rogers: To be consistent, 
shouldn't we follow it here too? 
SN , 
w. J. B., Jr. 
Justice Powell. 
... 
-iay 12, 19 8 2 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear 'Rill: 
When I returneet this morninq, I found your letter 
of May 11. Than~ vou fo~ writinq, and I appreciat~ your 
makinq it a orivat~ letter. 
I will now try to answer the two quPstions you 
r i.se. 
l. t do not think w~ fairly can sav that 
respon~ent waived the claim for "habilitation" (training) 
that ~lear1y was in this case when we qranted it. ~he 
absence of a '~aiver ic:; clear., I think, from a readinq of the 
transcript. T send to you with this letter the copy of the 
transcript thiit my clerk and I have used in preparing the 
draft. The ~ritical paqes are 46-49. As often happens at 
oral argument, it is not clear at all that vou and Mr. 
Tiryak w~re understanding each othe~. It is clear, I think, 
that he supported Ju~ge Adams' opinion. 
t have aqain tak~n a look at respondent's brief. 
On page 7, he summarizes the three separate holdinqs of CA3, 
including "a right to habilitation that was acceptable in 
light of oresent meoical or other scientifjc knowledge." At 
pages 23-28, resoondent argues for "an independent 
constitutional right to •inimally adequate habilitation". 
~espondent's brief relies expressly on the brief 
of American Psychiatric Association in which "habilitation" 
ig defined ("the principal focus of habilitation is upon 
training and development of needed skills" p. 4, fn. 1}. 
Respondent's brief also stated that "the riqht to minimal 
adequate habilitation should depend upon the prospect of a 
cure rather than amelioration of the ~isabilities of 
retar~atlon." ~espondent, of cou~se, argues that "the Court 
of ~ppeals (judqmant} should be affirmed". 
2. 
2. Your second suggestion is that we follow the 
course ! propose in Mills v. Rogers and remand this case for. 
a determination whether under Pennsylvania law there is a 
"liberty interest in habilitation". I would hesitate to 
propose this for several reasons. There are major 
differences between the two cases. Mills involved a claim 
to federal procedural protection that could not be decided 
properly without reference to state substant i.ve law. Some 
five months after CAl decided Mills, and after we granted 
certiorari, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
decided Roe rLL· At least on its face, Roe III appears to 
to make a substantial change in Massachusetts law. we 
remanded Mills to enable CAl "to determine how Roe III may 
have changed the law of Massachusetts and how any changes 
may affect this case". Draft of Mills, p. 14. 
The situation in this case is entirely different. 
We have been advised of no change in Pennsyvlania law. ~he 
courts below decided the case in light of their 
understanding of the Pennsylvania statute, as then 
interpreted. Moreover, the only claim before us in 
Youngberg is fo~ damages for a violation of a substantive 
federal right. Respondent's counsel, at oral argument, 
advised that the damage claim could not have been brought 
originally as a pendent state-law claim because of the then 
existing Pennsylvania sovereign immunity law. The damage 
cla.im now would be barred by the state statute of 
limitations. See Tr. Oral ~rgument, at 36. In Mills, the 







JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu:prmtt <!fqttrl qf tfrt ~b' .§taft~ 
Jfuipttgtlltt. ~. <!f. 2llgt'1~ 
May 13, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
Thanks so much for your prompt response to my suggestions 
in the above. 
I suppose my difficulties with this case count for my hope 
that we could find a way of disposing of it without having to 
answer how far treatment was constitutionally required. While 
I am not as sure in my own mind as apparently you are that 
11 the absence of a waiver is clear 11 , I can•t say that a reading 
of the transcript supports a conclusion that he clearly did 
waive the claim for training. And I might say the same about 
the brief. 
Respondent•s basic argument was that what the Pennsylvania 
statute gave him the Federal Constitution also required. He 
sought damages for the denial of those claims. I suppose in-
sofar as he relies on the statute he can•t succeed because 
although Pennsylvania has now abolished sovereign immunity,the 
statute of limitations bars the claim. Hence he has to press 
the claim on the Constitution. That means I suppose that we•11 
have to decide what the Constitution gives him. I may finally 
agree that the Constitution goes no further than your opinion 
suggests. But I have not yet come to rest on that. 
I am returning with thanks your copy of the transcript of 
the oral argument. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell '. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.iu:.prttttt <!Jau.rt of Urt ~ta .itattg 
jt:udpngtott. !J. <!f. 2ll&f11~ 
May 14, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
Jnvrttttt ato:ud cf ±4t 1hittb Jtatt.s' 
'!lht.&'ftittgton. ~. Clt· 2llbi~' 
May 20, 1982 
No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
I generally agree with your excellent handling of the 
right-to-treatment claim. I am concerned about an issue which is 
not directly discussed. 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715, 738 (1972), the 
Court held that, at a minimum, due process requires some rational 
relation between the nature of a mental health commitment and its 
purpose. In the present case, Pennsylvania has agreed to commit 
and care for Romeo because he cannot ~ake care of himself, and 
his mother is also unable to do so. / The purpose of his 
~nommitment, as I understand it, is to provide some reasonable 
~~ degree of care, safety, and limited freedom of movement within 
the institution ~ Yet, if, as a result of the care and treatment 
or lack thereof, in the institution, he loses some of the basic 
skills he had on commitment, he will have lost what little 
"liberty" he had left. 
Absent reasonable care and training, necessary in the 
judgment of professionals charged with his care, the nature of 
Romeo's confinement may not be rationally related to the purpose 
of his confinement. This concept may fit comfortably within your 
conclusion that the respondent is entitled to "reasonably non-
restrictive confinement conditions." 
If you think you would be willing to address this 
problem in your opinion, I would hope to join. Otherwise, I may 




JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
~nvrtutt Qfltltd af tqt ~itth ~tatt.s­
Jhurftington, ~- ~- 2.0bl~~ 
May 20, 1982 
No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
' · 
I generally agree with your excellent handling of the 
right-to-treatment claim. I am concerned about an issue which is 
not directly discussed. 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715, 738 (1972}, the 
Court held that, at a minimum, due process requires some rational 
relation between the nature of a mental health commitment and its 
purpose. In the present case, Pennsylvania has agreed to commit 
and care for Romeo because he cannot take care of himself, and 
his mother is also unable to do so. The purpose of his 
commitment, as I understand it, is to provide some reasonable 
degree of care, safety, and limited freedom of movement within 
the institution. Yet, if, as a result of the care and treatment, 
or lack thereof, in the institution, he loses some of the basic 
skills he had on commitment, he will have lost what little 
"liberty" he had left. 
Absent reasonable care and training, necessary in the 
judgment of professionals charged with his care, the nature of 
Romeo's confinement may not be rationally related to the purpose 
of his confinement. This concept may fit comfortably within your 
conclusion that the respondent is entitled to "reasonably non-
restrictive confinement conditions." 
If you think you would be willing to address this 
problem in your opinion, I would hope to join. Otherwise, I may 
decide I should write something separately to address it. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
CH A M B E R S OF 
,jnprmu <!Jcttri cf tlrt ~b ,jtattll' 
._Mlrittgtcn. ~. <!J. 20.;t'!~ 
JU S T IC E w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. May 20, 1982. 
No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo. 
Dear Lewis, 
Your draft op1n1on is a very fine job, and in most 
respects I find it quite persuasive. My principal con-
cerns focus on Part II-B, Draft at 9-13. You conclude 
that Part by holding that "involuntarily-committed men-
tally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in training~ se." Id., 
at 13. This holding differs, of course, from the anal-
ysis adopted by Chief Judge Seitz in his concurrence in 
the CA3: 
"I believe that [Romeo] has a constitutional right 
to minimally adequate care and treatment. The ex-
istence of a constitutional right to care and 
treatment is no longer a novel legal proposition. 
See,~~' Donaldson v . O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 
(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds and re-
manded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Although the seminal 
right-to-treatment cases were concerned with the 
mentally ill, recent cases have extended this 
right to the mentally retarded. See,~~' 
Welsch v. Likins, 550 F . 2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) ." 
644 F. 2d, at 176 (Seitz, C. J., concurring). 
You expressly reject this analysis. Draft at 15, n. 
29. But my recollection of our Conference discussion 
is that while no formal vote was taken, a majority of 
our colleagues were in favor of embracing Chief Judge 
Seitz's view on this issue, as on the other issues in 
.... _ 
No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo. 2. 
the case. If my recollection is accurate, then I would 
be willing to join that view and so could not join your 
opinion as Part II-B is currently written. I might add 
that since petitioners have already conceded that Romeo 
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
personal security and freedom from bodily restraint, 
Draft at 8 & n. 17, this issue-- whether Romeo has a 
constitutional right to "training," id., at 9 & n. 19 
-- seems to be the principal issue remaining in the 
case. 
Of course we had no formal vote at Conference, and 
our colleagues will doubtless let you have their reac-
tion in due course. 
Si~ 
w. J. B., Jr. 
Justice Powell. 
Copies to the Conference. 
,. 
meb 05/22/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo (and Justice O'Connor's 
memo) 
I don't understand what Justice O'Connor is talking about 
in her second paragraph. The institution is most unlikely to be 
able to maintain Romeo's skills, ability to interact, etc., at the 
level they were when he lived with his parents. Moreover, Justice 
O'Connor seems to suggest that any skill or ability is a "liberty" 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, though she gives no guidance 
as to the constitutional basis for this conclusion (a conclusion not 
unlike the holding of our earlier draft). 
I think the language you suggest at the bottom of the memo 
is fine, but I am somewhat worried about also including Justice 
O'Connor's point about the purposes of commitment. In Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 u.s. 715, 738 (1972), a person was incarcerated pending 
competency to stand trial; he was afforded neither civil commitment 
nor criminal process. Because his incompentency was due to mental 
retardation it was unlikely that he would ever be competent to stand 





involuntarily confined, without criminal process or civil 
commitment, for several years. In an opinion written by Justice 
Blackmun, the Court held that the State could not hold him 
indefinitely pending competency with no civil or criminal procedures 
and little or no likelihood that he would ever attain competency. 
In reaching this holding, the Court stated that, at a minimum, due 
process requires some relationship between the purpose of commitment 
and its terms or conditions. In that case, there was no such 
relationship because, though he was committed pending competency, 
there was little or no chance he would ever become competent. 
Jackson v. Indiana did not deal with the conditions of 
confinement--and it is those conditions that are at issue in Romeo. 
Moreover, in Jackson, the deft was being held for only one 
constitutionally permissible reason--pending competency to stand 
trial--whereas in Romeo, the Pa. commitment statute states that any 
person needing commitment for care can be committed for care and 
treatment. And the state has conceded that Romeo is entitled to 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. That may 
be all the "care and treatment" required by the state commitment 
statute. In any event, the meaning of care and treatment in that 
-------~ -
statute is purely a question of state law, and state law was cited 
r ~ .......... ~ ._......_..... • 
by respondent for the first time in his reply brief to this Court. 
See n. 23 of our opinion (The Jackson v. Indiana and Pa.-
commitment-statute argument was made by the Adams majority at the CA 
level, but they made it on their own--resp did not argue or even ~~ 
cite either the Pa. commitment statute or Jackson v. Indiana to the ~ 
3. 
CA. And the Adams majority gave no guidance as to the meaning of 
the terms "care and guidance" at state law.). 
To say that in Pa., the precise "purposes" of commitment 
under the commitment statute is unclear is an understatement, which 
is not suprising given the late point at which Pa. law is being 
argued. Resp cites two cases for the proposition that the 
committment statute gives him substantive rights at state law, but 
neither of those Pa. cases actually construe the commitment statute. 
Indeed, a reading of those cases reveals that there is no reason for 
Pennsylvania courts to ever construe the commitment statute's 
substantive implications because there is another set of Pa. 
statutes, not cited by resp even now, giving him substantive rights. 
Presumably these statutes aren't cited because they don't fit in 
with the Jackson v. Indiana-type analysis, basing a federal right on 
the purpose of commitment. 
As this discussion suggests, the precise purpose of 
Romeo's commitment under the relevant Pa. statute is unclear enough 
.... --- .. 
as a matter of state law that we might be better off avoiding any 
statements such as that suggested by Justice O'Connor (i.e., .. 
concerning the purposes of his commitment); such statements might 
end up giving Justice Brennan a real reason for remanding--to 
certify the question of the purpose of Romeo's commitment under the 
commitment statute as a matter of state law. Because the answer to 
that question probably would have no implications for state law 
given the other substantive state-law statutes give the mentally 
retarded the rights Romeo seems to seek, the rather bizarre effect ....._.._ ____ __ 
would be to ask the state court to decide the federa~n. -----
'. 
4. 
I think this approach incorrect, not only because of that 
aspect, but because, first of all, a state substantive right may 
create a federal procedural right but not a federal substantive 
right (and resp only argues that a state substantive right creates a 
federal substantive right). In addition, resp does not argue--as J' ~ 
did the deft in Donaldson and Jackson, for either freedom or another 
procedure. He only wants substantive rights. ~Because Romeo could 
be committed solely for safety of others, and because he does not 
seek either release or, in the absence of release, another 
procedure, his Jackson v. Indiana argument should fail. Finally, as ;>~ 
a matter of federal law, I don't think Romeo could be committed just~~ 
~ for care and treatment (if he was capable of surviving on the 
outside and wanted to do so). See Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418~~ . 
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563, 576 (1975). Why should • . yJ .J_ 
~~/~ 
it matter, for federal substantive law, that the state has confined 
him for reasons in addition to those that are constitutionally 
permissible (i.e., for his own survival and the safety of himself 
and others) • I think this point sharply distinguishes the case from 
Jackson, in which there was only one constitutionally permissible 
reason for confinement (confinement pending competency) and the 
Court required a rational relation between that single 
constitutionally-permissible reason for commitment and the "terms 
and conditions" of his confinement. Here, Romeo could be confined 
constitutionally purely for the safety of others. If that were 
done, under the Jackson v. Indiana rationale, he would only be 
entitled to high walls--not much of a federal right. 
~ 
5. 
Instead of saying something about the purposes of Romeo's 
commitment, what would you think of expanding footnote 23 to 
something along these lines? (most of this is actually from any 
earlier draft). Perhaps Justice O'Connor would then be willing to 
go along. 
note 23, at 11 (first ~ as in current opinion, with only slight 
changes) . 
Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and 
treatment under state law, and that he therefore has a state 
substantive right entitled to substantive, not procedural, 
protection under the Due Process Clause of the/ Federal 
Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in 
repondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts 
below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for 
reversing the trial Court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsyvannia 
law and the lack of guidance from the lower federal courts as to the 
precise meaning of "care and treatment" under state law, we decline 
to consider respondent's argument now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 u.s. 321, 323 N.l (1977); Duigman v. United States, 274 u.s. 
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des 
Mines, 164 u.s. 2612, 264-265 (1896). 
Moreover, there are serious problems with the substance of 
respondent's argumenmt. Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 u.s. 715 (1972). There, a mentally retarded person was 
6 . 
incarcerated pending competency to stand trial for a criminal 
offense. Given the cause of his incompetency, it was most unlikely 
that he would ever become competent, yet, by the time the case 
reached this Court, he had been held several years without either 
criminal process or civil-commitment proceedings. The Court held 
that he must be afforded civil-commitment proceedings since there 
was little, if any, likelihood he would ever be competent to stand 
trial. In reaching this decision, the Court stated that due process 
requires, at a minimum, terms and conditions of confinement that 
bear some rational relation to the purposes of confinement. Id., at 
738. 
Respondent argues that the wording of the relevant 
Pennsylvania commitment statute reveals the purposes for which he 
was committed--care and treatment--and that statute creates a state-
created right to treatment entitled to federal protection under 
Jackson because due process requires some relationship between the 
conditions of confinement and its purposes. In Jackson, however, 
the Court was considering only the need for a relationship between 
the single reason justifying confinement as a matter of federal law-
-temporary confinement pending competency to stand trial--and the 
"terms and conditions" of confinement. It is most unlikely that, as 
a matter of federal law, Romeo could be committed for care and 
treatment if he were actually capable of surviving on the outside. 
See Addington v. Texas, O'Connor v. Donaldson. Romeo could, as a 
matter of federal law, be confined to protect others. See text and 
notes at n. 1 & n. 2, supra; Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418, 426 
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563, 573 (1975). Respondent 
may have been confined for additional reasons under state law, but 
that would normally entitle him to state, not federal, substantive 
rights. 
7. 
If respondent were seeking different conditions of 
confinement unless he were released or given additional procedures, 
we would be presented with a quite different case. But respondent 
is not seeking another state procedure, one that could commit him 
solely because he is violent, nor is he seeking release in the 
absence of an additional procedure. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 401 
u.s., ___ (Jackson wanted another procedure); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 u.s., at 568 (Donaldson requested release). 
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive right 
to treatment should vary with the wording of the relevant state 
commitment statute or with the precise reason given for commitment. 
Why, as a matter of federal law, should a mentally retarded person 
involuntarily committed to protect himself and others receive less 
treatment or inferior conditions than one involuntarily committed 
only because he is unable to care for himself? It is true that 
state substantive rights implicate federal procedural due process. 
And it is also true that we have never held explicitly that state 
substantive rights cannot be the basis for federal substantive 
rights under the Due Process Clause. In Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977) (Brennan, J.), we 
indicated that even when a federal procedural right exists, the 
existence of a related federal substantive right is not automatic, 
but is an entirely distinct question. 
CHAMeERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hvrtuu Qtourl ttf tlft ~h .ifattg 
.uJri:ngton.1J. Qt. 2ll.;t'l~ 
Re: No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
May 24, 1982 
My own views for this case coincide with those of 
Chief Judge Seitz. My notes and recollections may be 
in error, but I, too, thought that a majority favored 




cc: The Conference 
May 24, 1982 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Sandra: 
I am recirculating Youngberg this afternoon. 
In addition to a few stylistic changes, those made in 
n. 27 on p. 14, and in the text on p. 18, will - 1 believe -
comply with your suggestion that we make clear that this 
opinion is con~fstent with Jackson v. Indiana. 
Of course, Jackson has very little to do with this 
case, as I think the addition in n. 27 makes clear. 










May 24, 1982 ~ 
ROMEO SALLY-POW 
80-1429 Younberg v. Romeo 
Dear Bill: 1 ~ 
It is good know that we may not be ria~~ 
this case. ~ 
As I understand your concern, it 
extent of a constitutional right to "treatment'. 
is symonymous with "habilitation" in the arcane world of 
psychiatry, and is defined in the brief of the American 
Psychiatric Association. See n. 1, p. 1, my draft 
opinion. 
I gave a great deal of thought to how far we 
should go in holding, as a matter of federal 
constitutional right, that a state must provide training. 
The proposed holding is stated on p. 18 of my 3rd draft as 
follows: 
"Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally 
protected interests in conditions of reasonable 
care and safety, reasonably non-restrictive 
confinement conditions, and such training as may 
be required by these interests. These 
conditions of confinement comport fully with the 
purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U.S.715, 738 (1972); seen. 27, 
ante. 
2. 
Respondent apparently wants a more expansive 
"right" to training. Although, he never clearly spells 
this out, asserts a constitutional right to "reasonable 
training" both to preserve existing skills and develop new 
ones. It is clear that Respondent's "existing skills" -
limited as they are - will be and improved preserved under 
the standards of my draft. It is equally clear, I think, 
that the state's obligations with respect to safety and 
personal confinement also will improve his ability to live 
within the institution. The state is presently providing 
training in this respect. See opinion p. 4 and n. 7. 
It is not easy to define other limits to a 
state's duty. I find no basis for imposing a 
constitutional obligation on every state mental 
institution to provide for each patient all training that 
competent professionals think might possibly be desirable. 
I have left open, however, situations where training may 
enable the patient to live outside of an institution. 
We could say simply that the duty is to impose 
"reasonable training" under the circumstances. This would 
be one way to write this case (and a rather inviting way), 
3. 
but we would leave unanswered the question that we granted 
the case to resolve. 
The draft opinion agrees with Chief Judge Seitz 
in important respects. See pp. 6, 15. But, the Seitz 
language that you quote, is too general to be very 
helpful: "constitutional right [exists] to minimally 
adequate care and treatment". This sheds no light on the 
difficult questions of what specifically what kind of 
treatment and for what purpose? Moreover, Judge Seitz 
bracketed "care and treatment", without making clear 
whether he was distinguishing between the two. The state 
has conceded a broad duty of care, including the right to 
provide adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. 
As you note, the principal issue remaining in the case is 
the right to "training", but we would accomplish little by 
simply adopting Judge Seitz's general language. 
When we are construing "liberty interests" to 
create rights not specified in the Constitution, one tends 
to be cautious. It already is established by our cases 
that "liberty interests" include personal safety and a 
4. 
right not to be shackled unless necessary. I thought it 
best to relate training to these established rights. 
In sum, I have written the opinion in light of 
Romeo's condition and needs. We would have a different 
case where the liberty interest involves the prospect of 
the patient returning to life outside of an institution. 
I will be glad to consider any language you may suggest. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
May 25, 1982 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Bil1: 
I have not overJooken replying to your. letter of May 
20. I had to speak at washington & Lee University on 
Friday, and generally am behind in my opinion work. 
I also aqree largely with Chief Judge Seitz, an~ had 
not thouqht that my draft opinion departed substantially 
from his view. I will, however, take another careful look 
and be in touch with you. 
S5ncerely, 
Justice Brennan 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
IN re: No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
David and I are both a little worried that the rider for 
page 15 sounds like we may be reaching the entire "habilitation'' issue. 
Unless the reader knows what we mean by the "purpose for which the 
individual is committed,'~ i.e., in this case, Romeo was committed 
for care and safety by his mother, as n. 27 explains, I am not sure that 
• this sentence will not be read as a broad holding of a right to minimally 
adequate habilitation." I am also troubled by tying the federal rights 
(anymore than we have to to get Justice O'Connor's vote) to the 
purposes of commitment. What i f Romeo's mother had stated that she was 
committing him because she could no longer care for him or provide safety 
for him and she wanted him to be habilitated (as much as possible) through 
participation in Pennhurst programs. 
David and I would make the following suggestions--they are 
alternatives, with the favored suggestion first. 
~tc.4~r.ta.d·~ ~r l~td'~r .A t p . ft(' ,, 
1. We have already determined that in this case we need not reach 
the difficult question whether someone involuntarily committed to a state 
institution for the mentally retarded has a constitutional right to treatment 
S 
orthabilitation unrelated to the need for safety and freedom from fui5ta~~g~s. 
e1 an e, at: . c.as4! 
-Lin this c~e~, we hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed 
mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate interests of the State, i 
including administrative and fiscal restraints, due process requires that 
c:Jfie:!e in~i j1~he State subject ·these individuals only to reasonable 
physical constraints, (ii) it provide them reasonably safe conditions, and (ii 
(iii) it afford them such training as is necessarty to achieve 
II reasonable safety and freedom of movement within the institution. 
2. We could the delete the "we /10ld" sentence at 
"' 15-16 entirely, and provide some other transiMtion into the "deference 
.._/ 
to the professional'' discussion, which comes next. The problem with this 
approach is that the constitutional right is then only stated in 
-2-
terms of ~ a right to a professional decisionmaker, with great 
deference to that decisionmaker. In other words (in fact, in David's words) 
this gives one the constitutional right to a negligent professional decision. 
It sounds better to say there is a right to some reasonable level of 
care, safety, etc., but that great deference will be given to 
professionals to keep courts from running institutions, etc. 
lfp/ss 05/27/82 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mary DATE: May 27, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Your editing of my rider A, page 8 has improved 
it. 
I also have made some changes in Parts III-B and 
IV. I think the change included in my rider A for page 15 -
though a major one - is necessary for consistency with what 
we say in the basic change set forth in our long rider, page 
8. At this point (i.e., p. 15, 16) we are stating general 
rules rather than addressing Romeo's situation. We come to 
Romeo's case on page 18. There, I would omit the reference 
to training per se. Again the language in the first 
paragraph of p. 18 will be of general application. It is 
limited significantly by what we have said with respect to 
reasonableness being determined by the appropriate 
professional. If we can put a Court together on an opinion 
along the lines we are now discussing, we do leave questions 
open for the future. But I believe our emphasis of 
deference to a professional judgment - not the best 
available such judgments - adequately protects a state's 
legitimate interest. 
If you and David are content with these changes, I 
suggest that you ask the print shop to incorporate them in 




tentative fourth draft, giving us only a half a dozen copies 
for us to review in Chambers. Possibly, I would submit 
copies to Brennan and then to Rehnquist. If we can satisfy 
them, I am confident the large "silent" segment of the Court 






TO: Mary DATE: May 27, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Your editing of my rider A, page 8 has improved 
it. 
I also have made some changes in Parts III-B and 
IV. I think the change included in my rider A for page 15 -
though a major one - is necessary for consistency with what 
we say in the basic change set forth in our long rider, page 
8. At this point (i.e., p. 15, 16) we are stating general 
rules rather than addressing Romeo's situation. We come to 
Romeo's case on page 18. There, I would omit the reference 
to training per se. Again the language in the first 
paragraph of p. 18 will be of general application. It is 
limited significantly by what we have said with respect to 
reasonableness being determined by the appropriate 
professional. If we can put a Court together on an opinion 
along the lines we are now discussing, we do leave questions 
open for the future. But I believe our emphasis of 
deference to a professional judgment - not the best 
available such judgments - adequately protects a state's 
legitimate interest. 
If you and David are content with these changes, I 
suggest that you ask the print shop to incorporate them in 
what we might call either a second chambers draft or a 
· .... ~ . ... 
-' 
' . .,· ... , .... , 
2. 
tentative fourth draft, giving us only a half a dozen copies 
for us to review in Chambers. Possibly, I would submit 
copies to Brennan and then to Rehnquist. If we can satisfy 
them, I am confident the large "silent" segment of the Court 






.June 2, 1982 
Dear Bill: 
I am delivering a fourth draft of Youngberg in 
view of your kindness in bei.ng willing to take a 
precirculation look at it. 
Our correspondence has prompted me to make 
substantial changes on page 8 and 9, and particularly pp. 
10-16. As you will see, I have - as you suggested - drawn 
primarlly on Chief Judge Seitz's opi.nion. Further 
consideration of the case also persuades me that I was 
tryi.nq to write too broadly. In this case, in view of 
Romeo's extremely unfortunate condition, he can never be 
released from an institution and the minimally adequate 
training that he seeks is related to his safety (from self 
abuse as well as by others), and to minimize physical 
restraints. No other specific training is sought in his 
complaint. 
In sum, my opinion as revised decides this case 
only, and on its rather special facts. I have left open t.he 














































June 17, 1982 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
This case is here from CA3. 
Respondent is a profoundly retarded perso~ 
involuntarily committed to a state institution. He argues 
that he is entitled to safety ~freedom from restraints,~nd ~ 
4~~/tA.-~. 
trainingA He seeks monetary damages/ from three of the 
_jnstitution's adminis~a~. 
Amendment, 
rather than the Eighth, provides the proper basis for the 
asserted rights. 
Although we agree as to the applicability of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ~we disagree with the standard 
articulated by the Court of Appeals. We therefore vacate 
that decision;land remand for further proceedings. 
We hol that respondent is entitled to reasonable 
safet and ~re~om~rom unreasonable restraints. Respondent 
also is entitled to training;/reasonably necessary to provide 
such safety and freedom from restraint; . 
FinallyJ we hold;fthat in determining whether these 
rights have been violated t'courts should give ~eference to 
decisions made by pr~ionals;fwithin the institution. 
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which 
.o\ ~ 
Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor joined. The Chief 
Justice filed an opinion
1
concurring in the judgment. 
2. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~ttttrttttt "Jllltrt d tqt ~ttittb .§ta:i 
Jlrurlrittgton, ~. <!}. 2ll~~~ 
June 15, 1982 
No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Harry, 
j 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
··~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~upr tmt <!}curl of f!rt 'Jllnfu~ ~tattg 
:.rur!rin¢cn.lB. OJ. 20~~~ 
June 15, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Harry: 




cc: The Conference 
/ 
meb 06/12/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
~-.!~ 
~a,_~ ~~z~ 
From: Mary p2.~~9~ 
.dt.-U vt, U/..e-. ~ 
~ tt-~ IAJ7Ut ~ 
In Re: No. 80-14 2 9 , _Y_o_u_n_.g'--b_e_r_g'---v_._R_o_m_e_o_ G k 
~*'' I have prepared the following footnote as a suggestion if 
you want to respond to the Chief Justice's contention that there is 
no way for the Court to avoid the right-to-treatment-per se issue on 
the basis of the record and pleadings before the Court. The 
footnote would be a new footnote 23, as marked at p. 11 (copy 
attached). 
note 23: In his concurrance in the judgment, the Chief 
k'~~~ Hu..~~ 
Justice gives two reasons the Court cannot avoid ~ issue.i~ tfiis 
~ ~ 
The first is that "[r]esporident asserts a right to 
'minimallly adequate' habilitation '[q]uite apart from its 
relationship to decent care.'" Post, at (quoting Brief for 
Respondent 23). But the argument made at 23 of respondent's brief 
is not related to the types of training ~ wfiie& Re is eRtitJed, but 
~ 
rather the sources of ~ right to training. At 23, respondent 
~ 
argues that the right to training arises directly from the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution, as well as from another source 
discussed at 12-23 of respondent's Brief (i.e., the State's duty to 
provide decent care to involuntarily confined retarded persons). 
7/c:i5=z:k,,..w a,;:;~ Lk. ~ ~t; 2. 
~~ ~ ;; t~jln the trial court, 
respondent asserted a broad claim to such treatment as [would] 
afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those 
life skills necessary to cope as effectively as [his] capacities 
permit." Pe!!e crt - rr M: {<1.f9e~i:R~ Ap~ a e tK> Petn. for Cert. 94). But 
H a... ~~-1:::1- ~LI-
this claim was droppe~ th~rear ter. In his brief to this Court, 
'\ ~.v-1-d-
respondent does not ~~s e±~im and, at oral argument, 
~ 
respondent's l~r explicitly disavowed any claim that respondent 
is constitutionally entitiled to such treatment as would enable him 
"to achieve his maximum potential." Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-48. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- --~ 
.. .iltpt'nttt <!fouri ttl tqt 1britt~ .itattg 
JfasJringht~ ~. <!J. 2llgi~~ 
June 9 , 1982 
Re: No . 80-1429 - Youngberg v . Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
in 
e simple solution wil 
judgment in this case . 
Justice Powell 
join 
.§u.prttttt Q}trurl of tqt ~ttitt~ .§tafts 
'JJagfringttrn. ~. (!}. 2llpJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 9, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 




As to n. 19, p. 9, the reference to "federal 
substantive right" is merely a claim by respondent. The 
note simply says that we do not address the claim. 
2. 
In sum, I personally liked my first draft because 
it 'o~ould have resolved more issues and - as you suggest. -
given more specific guidance. But r had no support for it 
from anyone except 1Hll Rehnquist. l!'ootnote 24, p. 11, 
assures, ho't1ever, that an "indentiftable 1 i.herty interest" 
must be found to support any particular type of training. 
The training approved in my opinion is limited to that 
related to the established liberty interests of safety and 
freedom from undue restraint. 
This means there will be other cases. But this is 
the way the system works. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
C H A MBERS OF 
T HE C HIEF J U STIC E 
J;u.prtutt atltltti of tqt ~b J;tzdtlt 
JfagJrin:ghtn. ~. ar. 2llp~~ 
June 8, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lew is: 
-
I am concerned about some of the revisions you have made in 
the 4th draft of your opinion in this case. I agreed with your 
earlier drafts, that "involuntarily-committed mentally retarded 
persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in training per se." 3rd Draft, at 13. Now, however, although 
you purport to avoid the issue, the opinion states that "[a] 
court properly may start with the generalization that there is a 
\/ right to minimally adequate training," 4th draft at 11, n. 24--
defined loosely as such training as is "reasonable in light of 
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the 
case ;r.-1 a • 5e"e" a :rsa- i a:-;-a t 14 • 
I fear that such a vague standard may subject numerous 
professional training and treatment decisions to intrusive 
scrutiny, and "second guessing," by the federal courts. You give 
some credence to this possibility when you suggest that Romeo's 
proffered expert testimony--indicating that "additional training 
programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce 
[his] aggressive behavior," 4th draft, at 10--might suffice to 
establish a violation of the "right" to "minimally adequate 
training." Although you later state that reviewing courts must 
"show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional," 4th draft, at 14, I think further clarification 
may be required at pages 10-11 of the 4th draft. 
Further explanation may also be in order as to why the case ~ 
is b~.in~ed, presumably for a new trial. 4th Draft~at 17. ' 
For examp e, t e District Court instructed the jury that it 
should find petitioners liable if they "were aware of and failed 
to take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo." See 4th Draft, at 4. Certainly if petitioners 
took "all reasonable steps" to prevent such attacks, they did not 
deprive Romeo of his rights to "reasonably safe conditions" and 
to such training as was necessary to achieve reasonable safety. 
/
While this instruction may have been undercut by the District 
Court's other instructions concerning the "deliberate 
indifference" standard, see id., this is never discussed in your 
op n1 n. ct that the trial court referred to the 
Eighth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment would not 
mandate a new trial if the jury was otherwise instructed on a 
proper theory of liability. I think the District Court deserves 
more guidance. 
Finally, I have the following more minor concerns: 
(a) At page 2, n. 3, you refer to Romeo as having been 
"incarcerated" in Pennhurst. This term seems inappropriate here~ 
he is not really "incarcerated." 
(b) At page 9, n. 19, you "decline to consider" respondent's 
claim that because state law creates a right to "care and J ~ 
treatment," he therefore has a federal substantive right to such 
"care and treatment" under the Due Process Clause. This loses ~ 
me. The claim to a federal right to have some state right 
enforced seems to me so obviously without merit that it should ~· 
either be rejected or not mentioned. 
If every state right is federally enforceable, the line 
between state and federal courts vanishes. 
Regards, 
Just ice. Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uvuuu <!Jltltrl o-f tlft ~ttitt~ ~brltlY 
'JJM!fittghtn. ~. <!J. 2llgt>!..;t 
June 8, 1982 
Re: 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 




Copies to the Conference 
/ 
,j;upum~ QJ~url ~f Ur~ .,nitt~ ~tatt.tr 
'Jla.trirhtghln. ~. QJ. 2ll.;t~.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 7, 1982 
Re: 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
If you can eliminate two sentences, neither of 
which is necessary to the decision, I will join your 
opinion. 
First, in footnote 18 you state that the Eighth 
Amendment "has no direct bearing on nonpenal 
institutions." Surely that statement is much broader 
than necessary because persons convicted of crimes may 
be kept in nonpenal institutions, at least temporarily, 
and, I should think, a state might provide for a system 
of punishment within a mental institution. Rather than 
trying to sort out the possible refinements, could we 
not simply omit the footnote. 
Second, on page 14 you state that the professional 
judgment standard is higher than the deliberate 
indifference formulation applied in the context of 
penal institutions citing Estelle v. Gamble. Again, 
could we not omit this sentence. Its only purpose, as 
I would interpret it, would be to lower the standard 
applicable in prisons. I should think a failure to 
meet the professional judgment standard in a prison 
context would almost invariably constitute deliberate 
indifference. Even if the Court disagrees, I see no 
reason to endeavor to be this precise because in either 
context, it is clear that the standard is lower than a 
common law malpractice standard. 
-2-












JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O' CONNOR 
~tt;trttttt ~curt cf t4 t ~nitt b ~ bdt,l\' 
Jla,sftiugtcu.~. ~· 2llbi,.~ 
June 7, 1982 
No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me in the 4th draft of your 
opinion of the Court. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
,jupunu <!Jonrl of tfrt ~b .§tattg 
Jfa,glfhtght~ ~. <!J. 21lbi~~ 
June 7, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your circulation of June 4. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
~nprtmt Qlttttrl of tlft ~tb ~taft.&' 
~~·~· "l· 20~~~ 
JUSTI CE BYRON R . WH ITE June 7, 1982 
Re: 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.Su:p:rmu Q}curi cf tift 'Jtnittb .Statt~ 
...-u~ ~. Q}. 2!1~~~ 
JUSTICEW .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. June 4, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
Thanks so much for your response. I am 
content. r•11 be happy to join the previewed 




.§u.prmtt <!Jcurl cf tfrt ~b .§tat.e.tr 
'Jifrurfri.ngLtn. to. <!J. 20c?~.;l 
JUSTICEW ... . J . BRENNAN,JR. June 4, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo 
Dear Lewis: 
~hanks so much for your response. I am 
content. I'll be happy to join the previewed 
draft when circulated. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
June 4 , 1982 
80-1429 Youngberg v . Romeo 
near Bill: 
Tt was typically good of you to review my 
uncirculated draft in this tiresome case. 
Chief Judge Seitz's language, that you quote , 
comes in the preliminary part of his opinion, prior to his 
considerinq the claim presPnted by respondent in this case . 
He quoted the broad psychiatric definition of 
"habilitati.on", used in some of the amici briefs , afte r 
emPhasizing the difference "between the mentally ill and the 
mentally retarded". Re did relate his use of the term 
•treatment" (synonymous in this case with "training") to the 
general definition. 
Several pages later (id., at 181) Chief Judge 
Seitz acldressed the merits of respondent's treatment claim . 
His earlier generalized definition was not a holding with 
respect to respondent. When he considered the merits, he 
did not identify any specific treatment beyond those 
considered in my draft opinion . In view of Romeo ' s 
condition , the allegations of his complai.nt, and the purpose 
of his commitment, I think it is appropriate - perhaps 
necessary - that we cecide this case narrowly on its fac ts 
as I have tried to do. No doubt other, and more difficult 
cases, will come to us later . 






."June 4, 1982 
80-1429 Younbgerg v. Romeo 
.Dear Harry: 
\' 
~he substantial changes I have made in this case 
are , responsive to the concerns Bill Brennan expressed, and 
which you also wrote me about. 
The opinion now focuses narrowly on the facts of 






.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.hprtmt C!Jcurt of tfrt ~b .ihttt.&' 
~u!pnghtu. ~. C!J. 2ll&i"'~ 
June 3, 1982 . 
No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo. 
Dear Lewis, 
This is a really hard case, but the changes in your 
most recent draft go pretty far towards meeting my prob-
lems. I expect to be able to join, but will be interested 
in what others may offer in the way of further refinements. 
One question: Chief Judge Seitz states at one point in 
his concurring opinion that "habilitation" 
"refers to 'that education, training and care required 
by retarded individuals to reach their maximum devel-
opment' •••. It is in this sense that I use the term 
'treatment' in this opinion." 644 F. 2d, at 176 (ci-
tation omitted, emphasis added). 
Your draft states that 
"Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise 
define--beyond the right to reasonable safety and 
freedom from physical restraint--the 'minimally ade-
quate care and treatment' that appropriately may be 
required for this respondent." Draft at 11. 
In light of Chief Judge Seitz' statement, do you think that 
your statement is quite accurate? 
Sinc~re,ly, 
~~ 
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od for weeks by -
,went to the jury 
o verdict was 
Ph hours 9f de-
\\'Omen and five · 
lUSe for the -day 
were taken by· 
's to an undis-
t they will be 
l reach a deci~ 
'r deliberations 
1e at 8:30 a.fn. 
'ore them is 
legally insane 
vhen he shot 
\ Reagan and 
1 Washington 
1entenced to · 
IVicted of the · 
roots campaign over the last 15 
months by civil rights groups work-
ing with a coalition of Democratic 
and moderate Republican senators. 
"This is another watershed In civil 
rights,'' said Sen. Robert J. Dole (R: 
Kan.), who joined Sens. Charles 
McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) and Ed-
ward M. ·Kennedy (D-Mass.) in au-
thoring .the final compromise. "It will 
stand the test of time and ease the 
fears" of its opponents, Dole said. 
-Reagan, who opposed the measure 
in its original form last year but em-
braced it in the face of its over-
See VOTING, A9, Col.1 
, ~~~ 1 de 
~liJ~tallCt: of lJ.S. policy" to \Vage 
"economic warfare" against the So-
viets. 
One option before the president 
would have allowed U.S. companies 
to go through with deals made with 
the Soviets prior to Dec. 29. This 
would have enabled Caterpi1l~r 
. Tractor to sell $90 million worth of 
pipelaying equipment and General 
Electric to sell more than $100 mil· -
lion worth of gas turbine rotors. ':) 
Officials said this possibility, · fa-
. vore9 by Haig, had beeri rejectelin 
favor of the "toughest" option. .~. 
"The objective of the 'Qnited 
States in imposing the sanctions has 
been and continues to be to advance 
See PIPELINE, AlO, Col. 1 - .. ·: 
Rega11 Sees Interest Rate.s Up~­
. With Policy Change Possihl~-~ 
.. - . ...,.. 
By John M. Berry rather quickly, [and) unemployme~t 
_ . Washington PostStafl\Vrller hangs high, the obviOUS COUrSe :'of 
Treasury Secretary Donald T. action [that] would be demanded, at 
Regan, predicting· that interest rates least, from us by the Congress wciu1d 
are headed higher, yesterday re- be, do something, don't just stand ' 
vealed that the Reagan administra- there," he continued. · :,.-~. 
tion has begun a study of ways to ' -. - "I have a study on my desk .. :·of 
change its economic policies if the : : what-other presidents did in similar . 
high rates short-circuit the expected circumstances .... We have to con-
-economic recovery. . sider what our actions might be.", ~ . 
"I don't think I'll talk about . . . Another administration source 
what our specific plans are, but ob- described the policy reexaminatu;n 
viously these are questions that we as "far-reaching," but said it was "9c· 
have addressed to ourselves over the curring within the framework ···of 
past three months. We are trying to present presidential policies." How- · 
come up with solutions," Regan said ever, the source added, "Some of tl)_e 
during an interview at The Wash- options are not so routine." -~':· 
· ington Post. , - Regan, as he has in the past, put 
"If interest rqtes don't come down See REGAN, A2, CoL 5 
' \ ' 
High Court . Est~blis~es Righ.ii 
·For Retarded in Institutions~~:.~~ 
-·:'. 
~ainst him. By Fred Barbash 
~rday that if _ Washington Post st,ar!'Wrlter 
I budgetary restraints of the i~stlt~~ 
tions and not require them to "ma'ke' 
each decision in the shadow." 9f P.os'-. 
sible lawsuits. . . :y 
~v' • 
t guilty by ~ The Su~reme Cour.t yesterday. for 
vill be com- the first time established constitu-
EJ' beths tional rights for people committed to 
·t 
1~a h ld institutions for the mentally retard-
0 e e ed, including unprecedented, but 
tnine if he 
luld be en- limited, guarantees of a minimum 








', for the 
11. 1 
The . court also said institutions 
have an obligation, enforceable in 
the courts, to provide a reasonable 
amount of physical freedom as well 
as safety for involuntarily committed 
patients. 
At the same time, Justice ~ewis F. 
Powell Jr., writing for the 8-to-1 ma-
jority, cau~ioned judges to respect 
the professional judgments and 
The opinion, carefully balancing 
· the competing interests in one of the 
.most publicized cases, of the current 
term, applies directly to hospitals ·for 
the mentally retarded but also is 
expected to affect inental hospitals. 
There are an estimated 150,000 ped: . 
pie in state institutions for the men-
tally retarded. . .. · ':.,' 
"Persons who have been involun-
tarily committed are .entit1ed .. (o 
more considerate treatment and con-· 
ditions of confinement than crimi-
nals whose conditions of confine-
. SPP ('()TlD"' • ~ -- -
I 
J 
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Court Grants ights to MCiiHill 
'1:;.. 
f- · COURT, From Al 'antees for patients to be free of physical re-
men'l are designed tO punish," Powell said. · straints, and guaranteed rights to comprehensive 
The decision left many questions unanswered, training and development programs. . 
such' as what constitutes reasonable freedom, and .. She lost at trial, but the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court 
many points unclear, in an apparent attempt to . of Appeals, in a divided ruling, ordered a: new trial 
alloV.• flexibility for professional judgments. It also · . because of misinterpretations 'of constitutional law 
allowed numerous defenses for hospital officials by the District Court. 
sued for mistreatment, including a defense that '· ~ Pennhurst appealed, but yesterday the Su-
the problems were caused by "budgetary re- · ~ preme Court agreed with the appeals court and 
straints." · · "·issued its own guidelines for these cases. The jus-
Nevertheless, the decision is a cornerstone in tices agreed unanimously that the case should be 
what has become a "patients' rights" movement returned to the lower court for a new trial. · 
comparable in many respects to the prisoners' and Chief Justice Warren E. Burger agreed with 
defendants' rights thrust of the '60s and '70s. much of the ruling, but dissented from any right 
Ne!!flY all the states face litigation in this field. · to treatment. . .. 
Twenty-one, fearing federal judges would soon Powell said that the patients should have at 
begin looking excessively over their shoulders, least the constitutional protections afforded pris- · 
asked the Supreme Court to resolve the issues, oners, such as a right to safe conditions and the 
prese:rving to the extent possibl~ maximum flex- right to be free from unnecessary physical re-
ibility for their state institutions.; . . straints. He noted that unlike prison inmates, the 
Y. esterday's case began with a suit brought on patients at issue in yesterday's case "may not be 
behalf of Nicholas Romeo, 33, a man with the punished at all." 
merital capacity of an 18-month-old child. The right to treatment is a more difficult prob-
Romeo's mother had him legally committed in . !em, Powell said, because the Constitution guar-
May, 1974, ·to the Pennhurst State School and · antees no substantive services to' anyone. He said 
Hospital near Philadelphia. That state-run insti- the least that could be demanded, however, was 
tution has been the subject of numerous suits. and ·: that the involuntarily committed receive the train-
complaints of mistreatment. . ·- , ing they need to function safely in the hospital, 
~he became concermid about her son's treat- . ~without hurting themselves or others. This would 
merit after learning that he had been injured at :- ~lso help them avoid the need for shackling and 
least 70 times both by his own hand and by others :~physical confinement. _ . 
reac,ting ·to his aggressive behavior. She also::~: Powell based his ruling ,on the due process 
learned that officials had repeatedly confined him ·:clause of the 14th Amendment, which protects the 
in physi9al arm restraints during portions of each· ~:personal physical liberty of individuals from un-
dayj' · r ,T • , · , · • •• :fair or unreasonable incursions by the states. The 
She sued the officials for damages under federal ~ .. qu~stion, he said, was how to determine what is 
ciVil rights laws, see~ing broad constitutional guar-" : .. fair in this situation. · 
~· . ~- .. :.. f 
;_ :-- . .~ ,..-.... . ' 
" 




































~· ~Upreme Couf~ ·Rules in Favor of 1 
s. . .•. 
- t~ · By Ruth Marcus 
~ Washln~ton Post St.atl WrltA!T 
.: ... Prosecutors who file more seri-
:6us charges .against defendants 
~ arter they request a jury trial are 
• not automatically subject . to a 
"'~presumption of prosecutorial vin-
: dictiveness," the Supreme Court 
:ruled yesterday. \ 
~: In an opinion written by Justice 
.. John . Paul Stevens, the court 
~:ruled, "6 to 3, that the risk of pros-
. ~cutors imposing a penalty of more 
~~evere ·charges on defendants who 
assert their right to a jury" trial is 
~loo low to make that presumption. 
.... .. u ~ • 
"' .,. ~ 
Filing of M~re Seri~rtts Charges Held Valid 
After a Defendant Reqiui~sts -~ Jury _Trial 
Th'e ruling came in the case of 
Learley Reed Goodwin, who at-
. tempted to flee police after being 
stopped for speeding on the Bal-
. timore-Washington Parkway 'and 
was charged with various misde-' 
' meanors and petty offenses. . 
· After Goodwin insisted on a 
, trial · by jury rather . than appear 
t.. ~ I' f' 1 1 • . 
William J. Brennan Jr. and 
Thurgood Marshall dissented, ar-
guing that prosecutors "would al-
. most always prefer'~ "that defen-, 
dants waive their "troublesome" 
right to jury trial, and that a pros-
ecutor's 'elevation of charges 
against a defendru1t who refuses to 
,1" en u......, n""':c ......... t ........ ....... _ ....... - -- 1~-4! .... _ 
k . -, . 
.... . : . 
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" ... In determining what is reasonable," he 
said, "we .emphasize that courts must show tlef-
erence to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional. By so limiting judicial review of chal-
lenges to conditions in state institutions, interfer-
ence by the federal judiciary with the internal op-
erations of these institutions should be minimized. 
Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
judges or juries are better qualified than appro-
pdate professionals in making such decisions." 
The decisions of the professionals should be 
considered generally valid by the courts, Powell 
said, unless there is "such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or 
standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on 
such a judgment." 
Experts in mental health law said yesterday 
· that even with its ambiguities, the ruling · in 
Youngberg v. Romeo was an important change in 
the law. · 
"It fs a positive step in the right direction," said 
Norman S. Rosenberg, director of. the . Mental 
Health Law Project. Rosenberg said it was the 
first time the court had said that such institutions 
·have to do anything besides basic maintenance for · 
patients, the first time any "affirmative right" to 
training had been granted. Joel Klein, who filed a 
friend of the court brief for the American Psychi-
atric Association expressing concern about main-
taining professional autonomy for hospital offi-
cials, said he felt that need had been satisfied. 
The court also disposed yesterday of a relat!ld 
case. The court said an intervening decision of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court required return · of 
Mills v. Rogers for further consideration in the 
lower courts . 
erne Couf.t'Ru es ,in Favor of Prosecutors 
Marcus 
C Stall Writer 
> file more seri-
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r subject to a 
>rosecutorial vin-
Supreme Court 
ITitten by Justice 
;ens, the court 
; the risk of pros-
a penalty of more 
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,hat presumption. 
· should remain 
to exercise the 
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· P.xtent of the so· 
.... ~ . ' 
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"' ~ ~ . 
Filhig of l\1~re Serious Charg~s ·Held yalid 
Afte* a Defendant Requests a Jury Trial 
Th'e ruling came in the case of 
Learley Reed Goodwin, who at-
tempted to ·flee police after being 
stopped for speeding on the Bal-
. timore-Washington Parkway and 
was charged with various misde-, 
meanors arid petty offenses. 
After Goodwin insisted on a 
trial by jury rather than appear 
before a federal magistrate, his 
case was transferred to a prosecu-
tor, who obtained a four-count fel-
ony and misdemeanor indictment. 
't - .. • .. .d. ~ ... -- ~- - •• : ....... ,.,..~ """ 
\ . 
William J. Brennan Jr. and 
Thurgood Marshall dissented, ar-
guing that prosecutors "would al: 
. most always prefer': that defen-
dants waive their "troublesome" 
right to jury trial, and that a pros-
ecutor's elevation of charges 
against a defendant who refuses to 
do so "manifestly poses a realistiq 
likelihood of vindictiveness." ' 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
agreed with the dissenters that 
there should be an automatic pre-
said, the government had ade-
' I quately "dispelled the appearance 
of vindictiveness" in the case. · ; 
In another action the court con· 
tinued a trend of deferring to · 
states by sharply limiting the 
power · of federal courts to declare 
state taxes unconstitutional. 
Justice Sandra D. O'Connor, in 
a 7-to-2 opinion, heid that the fed-
. eral Tax Injunction Act bars U.S. 
courts from declaring state taxes 
un'constitutional and from· enjoin-
ing their collection. · · · 
The opinion overturned a lower 
court ruling that California cannot -
constitutionally require. religio~s 
schools unaffiliated with a church 
to pay unemployment taxes. ' 
O'Connor avoided the issue of -
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JUstices Rule Retai-ded · 
Have Right to Training 
~ ,.. ;, - ' . 
Special to l'bt New Yorl< nm. 
"'wASHINGTON, Jl!ne 18- The Su-- will probably includ~ the new tnal that 
preme Court ruled today fll;at mentally the appeals-court originally ordered . . ' 
retarded people in state institutions are • Writing for the Court, Justice Powell 
constitutionally entitled to safe condi- dealt quickly with the first two issues in 
· tions, freedom from unreasonable the case, safety and f~edom from un-
physical restraint and at least "mini- reasonable physical restraint. Because 
malty adequate" training in caring for the Court has recognized that convicted 
themselves. · criminals have these rights, he said, it 
The decision was unanimous in most is evident that retarded people, "who 
respects and was immediately hailed as may not be punished at all," are enti-
an important legal victory by advocates tied to equivalent protection when they 
for the retarded. It was the Supre(Tle are · involuntarily committed to the 
Court's first rulmg on the constitutional · state's custody. · 
rights of the retarded, and it marked Justice Powell described as "more 
the second time this week that the Court troubling" the right-to-treatment isSue. 
took an ,expansive view of individual Pennsylvania, which, was joined in its 
rights under the 14th Amendment. appeal b)l 21 states acting as friends of 
, On Tuesday the Court ruled, 5 to 4, the court, had argued \rigorously that 
that illegal alien children are entitled to the retarded did not have a constitu- '· 
a free, -public education under the 14th tiona! right to a particular approach to 
.Amendment's equa.I protection gu.ar...n- treatment and that evaluating the ad- · 
tee. The decision today was based on equacy of tfeatment was not a proper 
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process orlaw. · ., · '· Justice Powell said, however, that 
. The Case was an individual suit for the case did not require the Court to de-
cide "the difficJ.!lt question" of whether 
damages against officials of the Penn- a mentally retarded person " has some 
hurst State sChool, a 'state. institution general constitutional right to training 
for the retarded 'in Pennsylvania. The per se" because .the traini.ng sou~t by 
mother of a profoundly retarded Penn- Mr. Romeo was considerably more lim-
hurst resident, Nicholas Romeo, ited.' · • . -
brought the $1.2 million suit on her son's Advanced ,._,,,.:1ft" •~ Q. uestion , 
behalf ;'1-fter . he suffered numerous in- • • .............,. .., 
juries and was 1tied to his tied for Lawyers for Mr. Romeo, who has an r 
months at a time. · intelligence quotient of no higher than 
. Fundiunenta.l Li~rty Interests 10, argued only that he was entitled to 
A Federal jury ruled for the officials enough training to enable him better to 
after the trial judge instructed the control his aggressive behavior so that 
jurors that Mr. Romeo's constitutional he could be allowed more freedom of 
rights had been violated only if the offi- movement Without hiuting himSelf or 
cials had been "deliberately indiffer- others. ' '. · · 
ent" to his needs~ On appeal, L'le United · : '\. : , t. ~· 
States Coiirt of Ap~ls for the Third . Tbe Supreme Court agreed .. Mr .. 
Circuiforderedanew'trial. , · . . Romeo's "liberty interests," Justice 
The appeals court said that retarded Powell said, "require the State to pro-
people who had been involuntarily com- vide minimally adequate or reasonable 
mitted to the care of the state, as Mr. training to insure safety and freedom • 
Romeo was, retained "fundamental lib- from 'undue restraint. " He added, "In 
erty interests" in personal safety 
1 
and view of the ld?ds of treatment sought by 
freedom of -movement. The state can respondent and the evidence of record, . ' 
justify limit,ing those _freeaoms, the.ap-. we need go no further in this case." · 
peals court said, only by demonstrating The decision, Youngberg v. Romeo, 
an "overriding" state interest.' The ap- No. 80-1429, therefore deferred to a fu-
peals court also ruled that the retarded ture case a decision on whether a re-
had a constitutional right to training tarded person is entitled to training for 
once the state accepted responsibility any other purpose, such as to achieve 
for their care · ' maximum potential. It was on this point 
· '• . '., that Chief Justice Warren E. Burger de- . Pennsylvania - appealed to the Su-
preme Court, arguing that the Constitu- parted from the rest of the Court. "I 
tion required it to do no ·f!lore than pro- would hold flatly that respondent. has no 
vide adequate food, clothing, shelter, constitutional right to training, or 'ha-
and basic medichl care. ' · bilitation,' per se," the Chief Justice 
In an opinion by Associate Justice said. He refused to sign Justice Pow, 
Lewis F. Powell , the Supreme Court ell 's opinion, concuning only in there-
adopted tlie appeals court's basic prem- sult. · 
ises and rejected the state's view that 
the Constitution did not also extend to 
.safety, freedom ~rom restraint, and 
some form of training. ,. · : 
Further _Proceedings Ordered 
But the Court diffefed with the a·p-
peals court on how to .decide whether 
these rights have been viqlated in a spe-
cific case. It therefore vacated the a~ 
peals cou.rt's decision and sent the case 
back for further p~. which 
In a concurring nprr;ion Associate 
Justices Harry A. Blackm~. William 
J . Brennan Jr., and Sandra Day O'Con-
nor, . all of. whom joined the majority 
opinion, said they would have gone be-
yond Justice Powell 's opinion to hold . 
that the retarded w~re also entitled to 
enough training to "prevent a person's . ' 
pre-existing self-care skills from de- · 
·teriorating ·because of his commit-
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Granting Rights to the Retarded (£~) 
In his 33 years, Nicholas Romeo has not been 
givw much. Recently, however, he, and ap-
proximately 135.000 persons similarly situated, 
acquired some rights. 
The word "landmark" is used too casually con-
cerning Supreme Court rulings. But in its ruling 
in Romeo's case, the court stepped, gingerly but 
unanimously, into new territory. For the first 
time it has affirmed substantive rights of involun-
tarily committed retarded persons in institutions. 
In this context, "involuntarily" does not mean 
against the individual's will, but rather that the 
individual's will was not engaged. 
Romeo is profoundly retarded. Since the death 
of his father seven years ago, he has been a resi-
dent of Pennsylvania's much-criticized Pennhurst 
institution. He cannot talk and lacks basic self-
care skills. When petitioning for his admission to 
Pennhurst, his mother said: "He becomes violent 
-kicks, punches, breaks glass. He can't speak-
wants to express himself but can't." 
In Pennhurst, he was injured 63 times, by his 
own violence or that of other residents, in the two 
years before his mother went to court. When in 
Pennhurst's infirmary for treatment of a broken 
arm, he was physically restrained in bed during 
parts of the day, with "soft" restraints on his anns. 
The staff said this was not for punishment but for 
his protection, a.'1d that of other patients. 
Now the court has held that there are consti-
tutionally required conditions of confinement, 
derived from the 14th Amendment. The ruling 
is a delicate assertion of judicial oversight, tern· 
pered by assertions of deference to profession-
als in the field of institutional care. 
The opinion, \Hitten by Justice Lewis Powell, 
affirms three rights: to safety, to freedom of 
movement and to training. The first two 
"needs" are rights conditioned by institutional 
necessities, and the right to training is defined, 
minimally, as training necessary for enjo:yment 
of the first two rights. But Romeo claimed only 
a right to "minimally adequate habilitation." 
The court calls even this claim "troubling," 
for several reasons. One is that "as a general 
matter, no state has a constitutional duty to 
provide substantive services for those within its 
border." The court says the term "habilitation" 
is defined neither precisely nor consistently in 
psychiatry. (Actually, it is unclear how such ha-
bilitation is a psychiatric matter.) The court 
also says that professionals differ "strongly" as 
tD whether effective training of all severely or 
profoundly retarded persons is possible. 
The court does not know what the experience 
of recent years proves: that pessimistic prog-
noses, even by professionals, concerning all 
kinds of retardation, are apt to be wrong (a]. 
though, alas, somewhat self-fulfilling). But the 
court knows that an institutionalized person re-
quires rights-enforceable claims-because he 
or she is wholly dependent on the state. 
All Romeo sought, and all the court affirmed, is 
a right to "training suited to" the two "needs" of 
bodily safety and minimum physical restraint. 
The court stressed that "This case does not pre-
sent the difficult question whether a mentally re-
tarded persDn, involuntarily committed to a state 
institution, has some general constitutional right 
to training per se." The court actually pruned a 
lower court ruling, which it considered so broad as 
to permit excessive judicial intrusiveness. The 
court said there is a "presumption of correctness" 
regarding the decisions of professionals, who 
"shall not be required to make each decision in 
the shadow of an action for damages." 
Nevertheless, this ruling will, like a hovering 
angel, cast a comforting shadow on the approxi-
mately 135,000 retarded persons in institutions, 
many of whom are li'ving in stomach-turning 
conditions. Furthermore, it expresses, and c 
thereby nourishes, a social sensibility important s 
to 6 million other retarded citizens. d 
The affecting surge of gratitude among 
friends of retarded citizens, including friends 
whose retarded friends are not institutionalized, 
is perhaps disproportionate tD the rights af. 
firmed by the ruling. But the satisfaction is 
commensurate \\ith the expressive, as distinct 
from the technical, power of the ruling. 
Americans are litigious, but not lawyer-like. 
American society is not animated by the dry dis-
tinctions that characterize judicial craftsmanship. 
Ruling:; like this one, and Broun u. Board of 
Education, the 1954 school desegregation deci-
sion, are examples of law's tutelary functions. 
In 1954, the elemental message was: blacks are 
full citizens. In 1982, the message is: retarded peo-
ple, too, are members of the community that the 
Constitution constitutes. The fact that these mes-
sages have had to be sent do\\n from t.he Supreme 
Court-the Mount Sinai of American government 
-i~ a measure of how bad things were then, and 
are in some places today. 
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CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1429 
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
NIC::HOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' is used to refer to programs for the mentally retarded because men-
tal retardation is ... a learning disability and training impairment rather 
than an illness .. . . [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon training and 
development of needed skills. " Brief of American Psychiatric Association 
as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1. 
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to control his violence. 
Within two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother 
sought his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania 
hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned about these 
InJUries. After objecting to respondent's treatment several 
times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged that 
"[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff has 
suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
80-1429--0PINION 
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and failed to institute appropriate pre-
ventive procedures, thus violating his rights under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment ~frograms for his mental re-
tardation." All claims for injUilctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 5 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief of Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 6 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior/ but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 8 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 9 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of his constitu-
tional rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also 
was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or de-
nied him treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," 
his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth 
Amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was in-
structed that if they found the defendants "deliberately indif-
ferent to the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
6 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
'2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
8 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
9 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment was 
the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the invol-
untarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
l~C!~a.:::"~l---:mentanibert~ be limited only by an "overrid-
ing," non-punitive state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. It 
further found that the involuntarily committed have a liberty 
interest in training or habilitation designed to "treat" their 
mental retardation. 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 10 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." ld., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
ld., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
10 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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has been administered, those responsible e liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light o present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." ld., at 16 167 and 173. 11 
Chief Judge Seitz, ~ting for the min ·tiJconsidered the 
standards articulate y the majority: as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 








11 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat- ~ 
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in ~  
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they c~n provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does PJ< ~ s J.e:t-
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
restrictive analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
12 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert critigi~~Qd....('"' 
(-1~lWI~· ~· ~Elf abandoning the common-law method of deciding the case 
at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts 
of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, on a 
pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those ad-
ministering state institutions would receive ~idance from the "amorphous 
constitutional law tenets" articulated by ~jo~J d., at 184. See 
id., at 183-185 · ~ 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to c~ticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 13 In this case, respondent has 
been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does 
not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that he 
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, 
freedom of movement, and training within the institution; 
and that petitioners infringed on these rights by failing to 
provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, the 
state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care. 14 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement}rtraining and, if so, under what circumstances 
these interests are infringed in violation of due process. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
13 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a state cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights, Brief of Respondent 13 n. 12. 
"Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief of Respondent 1~16. . 
See also Amici Curiae Brief of Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8. r 'r A.. ,l-I~ 




untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish-indeed, 
petitioners do not argue on principle to the contrary. 15 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 16 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. ( In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18--19 (1979) (POWELL, J., con-
curring). This interest survives criminal conviction and in-
carceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment proceedings. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a con-
stitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve 
15 See Brief of Petitioner 27-31. 
16 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
that amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. See 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U,S, 651,- (1977). But the Eighth Amend-
ment has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendmenmt. If prisoners in state institutions have a fed-
eral right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety implicates a 
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937). 
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
cedes that no amount of training will make possible his re-
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were 
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense 
of the state. See Tr. Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already 
have found constitutionally protected liberty interests in 
freedom from restraints and safety, some training 17 may be 
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those 
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only 
the narrow question of whether one who has been committed 
involuntarily has a right to additional training-other than 
that related to safety or the ability to function free of re-
straints-when such training might improve his capacity to 
function more independently within the institution, but can-
not make possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the state to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brief of Respondent 23. Respondent con-
cludes that the state therefore has a constitutional duty to 
provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing skills 
and develop new ones. In making this argument, respond-
ent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for 
which the state has quarantined the individual, and cannot 
then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, 
however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of a certain 
level of intellectual ability, 18 and the "habilitation" respondent 
17 We use the term "training'' as synonymous with "habilitation," with its 
"principal focifs"-certainly in a case like Romeo's--being on "training and 
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra. 
18 See A. Baumeister, American Residential Institutions, at 21-22, as 
printed in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (Baumeister, 
ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the 
United States, at 1 (1965). See also Brief American Psychiatric Associa-
tion as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra) 
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seeks, such as training to teach him for the first time skills he 
does not possess, correlates more closely to education than to 
medical treatment. 19 And we have never found a right to 
education under the Constitution. 20 
As a general matter, a state is under no constitutional duty 
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. McCrae, U. S. 297 (19 0) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977) (medical treat-
ment). When states do choose to provide services, they gen-
erally are given wide latitude in doing so. See Richardson 
v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83--84 (1971); Dandrige v. Williams, 
397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, states need not 
"choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not 
attacking the problem at all." !d., at 486--487. Here, the 
state has committed respondent who concedely cannot sur-
vive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, shelter, 
clothin~and medical care, as well l}.~e conditions of 
safety and reasonable freedom from fiodily restraint. The 
narrow question presented is whether it also must afford him 
training to develop particular skills, even though it is not 
claimed that any level of training could enable respondent to 
live outside~/i:nstitution. 
(7vA.I 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an 
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person. 
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and in-
crease Romeo's IQ. 
•• There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims 
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills. 
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any is-
sues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he 
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his 
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints 
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills 
(educational). 
20 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avail-
able to ot~ers ill[Pennsylvania institut~ 
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We hesitate to find a new liberty interest cognizable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this instance. As we noted in 
determining that there is no general right to education in San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." I d., at 
33-34. 
A similar restraint is seen in cases considering new "liber-
ties" under the cjue.J]rocesf In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 
(1976), we noted tliat th liberties protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for 
puposes of procedural due process--or in the guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to 
the states. /d., at 710-711. In addition, as noted earlier, 
some liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the 
meaning of that word itself, i. e., freedom from bodily re-
straint by the state. But a right to training fits none of 
these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due 
process. 21 Nor does he claim a right historically regarded as 
21 Respondent does argue that the Pennsylvania commitment statute pro-
vides a state-law basis for a federal substantive, not procedural, right. 
He maintains that he was committed for care and treatment under state 
law, and he therefore has a state substantive right entitled to substantive, 
not just procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in respond-
ent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was 
not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the trial 
court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any 
guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consider 
it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 3273 n. 1 (1977); 
Duigman v. United States, 274 U. S. 196, 200 (1927); Jordan Mining Co. 
v. Societe des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1921). 
lfl~ 
th... 1'r-o~~~~ 
f\L -n:...r d.(! J. , 
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within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." And re-
spondent points to no right to training either implicit or ex-
plicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process 
right. Only when an action of a state against an individual is 
sharply at odds with our common sense of "liberty and jus-
tice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 
-- (1937). 22 In deciding whether to provide individuals 
such as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must 
make a difficult decision regarding the allocation of its re-
sources. We cannot say that due process requires that such 
individuals must be given training in the development of 
skills that cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to 
commit scarce resources on programs to attempt to train ~ 
.....--~ . 23 or on other social and welfare programs of manifest ..___J __ ~-.---...~ ment, is a difficult one that state and federal governments 
./r .... must face. The Constitution does not dictate an answer, and 
~ 
this is not a decision that courts are competent to make. 
~t;"S ~ ~ 
22 See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, -- (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was 
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary 
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peo-
ples."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at, at-- (Under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state 
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our 
polity will not endure it."). 
23 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A 
Rational Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Re-
tarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 
(1981); Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the 
Substance of Things Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analy-
sis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981). 
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We therefore conc~e that involuntaily-committed men-
tally retar e o not have a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in training per se. As noted above, they do have 
constitutionally protected interests in safety and freedom 
from bodily restraints, and those interests may require some 
kinds of training. We turn next to consider ~ whether 
Pennsylvania may have viola;;; these two rights. ~ ~ 
A ~ 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty · terests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint that rvive his 
commitment. Yet these interests are not absolu , indeed to 
some extent they are in conflict. In operating institution 
such as Pennhurst, there are occasions in whi it is neces-
sary for the state to restrain the movement of esidents--for 
example, to protect them as well as others om violence. 24 
Similar restraints may also be appropriate in training pro--' r ilE '1h.( An<la;linstitution cannot protect its esidents from 
danger of violence if it is to permit them ny freedom of 
vement. The question then is not simpl whether a lib-
e y interest has been infringed but whether the extent or 
nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safe~ is such as to 
violate due process. -
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the state's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979), for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial de-
tainees' confinement conditions. We agreed that the detain-
24 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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ees, not yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be pun-
ished. But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were 
reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and 
not tantamount to punishment. 25 And we have taken a simi-
lar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to 
civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to 
state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental 
consent. In determining that procedural due process did not 
mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty in-
terest of the individual against the legitimate interests of the 
state, including the fiscal and administrative burdens addi-
tional procedures would entail. 26 I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against various state interests. If there is to 
be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balanc-
ing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a state.llilii adequatelyl protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessa idance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the state and the rights of 
the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
25 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 713, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). 
26 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing evidence." We reached this decision by weighing the individual's 
liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement. 
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safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." Z7 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. Persons who have been involuntarily 
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 
confinement are designed to punish. It is lower than the 
standard of "compelling" or "substantial" necessity consid- /_ 
ered necessary by the Court of Appeals ~ustify use of re-
straints or conditions of less than absolute safetyl'l/ We think 
that such a standard would place an undue burde~ on the ad-
ministration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also would 
restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judgment 
as to the needs of residents. 
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily commit-
ted mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate in-
terests of the state, including administrative and fiscal con-
straints, due process requires that (i) the state sub· ect these 
individuals only to reasonable physical stramts; (ii) it pro-
vide them reasonable safeQ1 conditions-;-ana (m) 1t affOrd 
them such training as is reasonably necessary to achieve 
these ends. 28 We recognize that this holding may impose 
Z1 W.e.--:~agre~th Chief Judge Seitz~=-~~ard 
to e exts en o per se. He finds that such a right 
does exist, whereas we fin no sue right cognizable as a liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at , 
'lJj We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in 
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz. 
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to 
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at-, we 
hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety and reason-
able freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that once such a 





some additional burdens on states. I determining what is 
"reasonable," however, we emphasiz that courts must show 
deference to the judgment ex cised by a qualified 
professional. 29 
By so limiting judicial review of hallenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference b the federal judiciary with 
the in~rnal operations of the institutions · be mmi-
mized~ Moreover, there ce ainly is no reason to think 
____ "'- n ent to a nght t at also can be character-
ized as procedural. that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v . 
.f.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra. 
30 See Parham v. J.R ., 442 U. S. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979) (In limiting judicial \.:=-
review of medical decisions made by professionals: "[l]t is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system . ... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees: 
"[C]ourts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional 
requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact 
rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); 
Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural 
due process claim in context of prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommo-
dation between institutional needs an~bjectives and the provisions of the 
Constitution of general application."), r ter v. a · ez, . . 
96, , (197 ) e pro ms of prisons in America are com-
lex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily suscepti-
ble to resolution by degree. Most require expertise, comprehensive plan-
ning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within 
rovince of the legislative and executive branches of the ove 
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judges or juries are better qualified than the appropriate pro-
fessional in making such decisions. 31 See Parham v. J.R., 
442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 544 
(1979) (Courts should not "second-guess administrators on 
matters on which they are better informed."). For these 
reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 32 is presump-
tively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision 
by the professional is such a substantial departure from ac-
cepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base 
the decision on such a judgment. In an action for damages 
against a professional in his individual capacity, however, the 
professional will not be liable if he was unable to exercise his 
professional judgment because of budgetary constraint 
such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability. 
ment. ') See also Townsend & Mattson, The Interaction of Law and Spe-
cia ducation, 1 Analysis and intervention in Developmental disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
/]A~ /) J.M _ 31 It may not be immediately apparent that decisions regarding safety 
r ~, ·1 conditions, the use of restraints, l}Bd re!at~d ~~~i~ng. pro~~ms involve the 
~ ~. exercise of professional judgmen~ But~ 
- professional judgment is exercised in determining whether a certain 9 
training program can reasonably be expected to facilitate a resident's ( 
J-o ~ interation with staff and other patients without violence. Similarly, pro-
- . _'T. fessional judgment is exercised in determining whether a resident, whose (' 
~ ~ • violent tendancies have not been entirely curbed, should be allowed to in-
L. ~~ ""'f teract with others or whether the risks of injury to self and others justify 
Jl,vc._ ~ ~ 
1
' isolation or even the use of restraints . 
• 
32 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
~~ whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
~ sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
tfi,A/' persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
. . J / f,.. in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
~ the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
· - . -rC AAAI decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
~,-- -.., many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 





n e mg is case, we have ghed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as · erty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fou enth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and e constraints under which most 
state institutions necessa ·1y operate. We repeat that the 
state. concedes a. duty to provide adequate food, shel~ 
1\ clothmg and medical care. The state also has the unq___:_ _ _ 
-------, tione · easonable safety for aifresidents 
~~~~within the institution. restrain resi-
dents · e hold, 
however, that there is no constitutional right to habilitative 
training per se. Yet we should not be understood to hold 
that the state is under no obligation to provide some training. 
'--.;:...;;.;;.;____.-~T::..!h~e:.;s:::.:t:::at.::e~is under a duty to provide respondent with such 
~r:ea~Bm as the appropriate professional considers reason-
able to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to func-
tion free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreason-
able not to provide training when training could significantly 
reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-re-
strictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be 
required by these interests. In determining whether these 
rights have been violated, decisions made by the appropriate 
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correct-
ness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions 
of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and under-
staffed-to continue to function. A single professional may 
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents 
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a 
normal day. The administrators, and particularly profes-
sional personnel, should not be required to make each deci-
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In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, were-
mand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
:C-f ' IS 
Justice Brennan /! To: The Chief Justice ~ t 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80--1429 
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the ppinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
1 The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of 
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1. 
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406, 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. (W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
7~ 78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
5 Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. ld., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
•1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170.U 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." !d., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
11 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, thought it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F . 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
/d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
? has been administere.d, those responsible are' liable only 1f1he 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." /d., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or J'tandards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
13 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
14 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). ~_j;;:a"f. 
~~ 
~ We consider here for the fir time the substantive rights 
""' ~ involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 15 In this case, respondent has 
been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does 
not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that he 
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, 
freedom of movement, and training within the institution; 
and that petitioners infringed on these rights by failing to 
provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined ·chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Canst., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 





whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether particular interferences with these 
interests offend due process. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
17 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
18 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. 
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977). But the Eighth 
Amendment has been applied to the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If prisoners in state institutions 
have a federal right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety im-
plicates a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937). 
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arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a con-
stitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve 
his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
cedes that no amount of training will make possible his re-
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were 
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense 
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we al-
ready have found constitutionally protected liberty interests 
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be 
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those 
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only 
~------.~ot<.l!h£e..!n~a~rr=._:o~w~question whether n..,..committed in-D V' voluntarilylhas a right to additional training-other than that 
related to safety or the ability to function free of restraints-
. when such training might improve his capacity to function 
more independently within the institution, but cannot make 
possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent 
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty 
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing 
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, re-
19 We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its 
"principal focus"--certainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and 
development of needed skills." See n. 1, supra. 
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spondent compares mental retardation to an infectious dis-
ease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and 
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retarda-
tion is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of 
a certain level of intellectual ability/0 and the "habilitation" 
respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first 
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to 
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never 
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22 
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty 
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). When States do choose to provide services, 
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States 
20 See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History 
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Re-
tarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychi-
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra) 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an 
IQ of S-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person. 
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and in-
crease Romeo's IQ. 
2
' There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims 
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills. 
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any is-
sues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he 
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his 
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints 
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills 
(educational). 
22 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avail-
able to others in Pennhurst. 
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need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all." I d., at 486-487. 
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely 
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable con-
ditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily 
restraint. 
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new lib-
erty interest in "training" in skills unlikely to lead to a pa-
tient's release from involumtary confinement. As we noted 
in determining that there is no general right to education in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
u. s. 1, 33-34 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving 
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we 
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of 
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States. 
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some 
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the 
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from 
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits 
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking proce-
dural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically 
23 Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled 
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of 
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regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." 
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit 
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process 
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is 
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such 
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a 
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources. 
We cannot say that due process requires that such individ-
uals must be given training in the development of skills that 
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit 
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the pro-
foundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of 
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, 
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the 
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of 
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to con-
sicler it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling 
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
"See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was 
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary 
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peo-
ples ... . ");Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state 
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our 
polity will not endure it."). 
20 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
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manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal gov-
ernments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an 
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent 
to make. 
We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed men-
tally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above, 
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety 
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may 
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider 
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights. 
III 
A 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
26 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600. 
27 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). 
28 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
terests in confinement. 
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Accordingly, whether respondent' nsti onal rights 
have been violated must be dete med by balancing his lib-
erty interests against -¥ari~ ate interests. If there is to 
be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balanc-
ing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
d, than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity test~ · 
~;¥·~ et ea Me@ealuu·-;· hy the Court of Appeals o JUS 1 y use o re-
~ straints or conditions ofless than absolute safety. We think
1
-
~t;fiat the fornttila ttdoptBd bj' tfie G6tirt of A:pJ5eals would place 
~ we do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a 
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we 
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treat-





an undue burden on the administration of institutions such as 
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise 
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents. 
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily commit-
ted mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate in-
terests of the State, including administrative and fiscal con-
straints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these 
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it pro-
vide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them 
such training as 1s ~setutbty necessary to achieve reason-
able safety and reasonable freedom of movement within the 
institution. 30 We recognize that this holding may impose 
some additional burdens on States. In determining what is 
"reasonable," however, we emphasize that courts must show 
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional. 31 
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the internal operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
30 We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in 
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz. 
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to 
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178, 
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety 
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that 
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment, courts will defer to it. 
31 Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. 
J.R ., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at--, supra, and in note 30, infra. 
32 See Parham v. J .R ., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is 
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system . .. . "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell , 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
33 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
to the supervision of qualified persons. 
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damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supra. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. The state also has the 
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all resi-
dents and personnel within the institution. And it may not 
restrain residents except when and to the extent professional 
judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety. We 
hold, however, that there is no constitutional right to 
habilitative training per se, though we should not be under-
stood as holding that the state is never under any obligation 
to provide training. The state is under a duty to provide re-
spondent with such training as an appropriate professional 
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facili-
tate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It 
may well be unreasonable not to provide training when train-
ing could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the 
likelihood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-re-
strictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be 
required by these interests. In determining whether these 
rights have been violated, decisions made by the appropriate 
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correct-
ness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions 
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of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and under-
staffed-to continue to function. A single professional may 
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents 
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a 
normal day. The administrators, and particularly profes-
sional personnel, should not be required to make each deci-
sion in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan t f (/ 
Justice White 1 
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The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
1 The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is . . . a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of 
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1. 
--
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. N everthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
5 Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. ld., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
'Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88', 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses--trained professionals--indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 




teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. !d., at 164-170.n 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." !d., at 15~160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
11 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, thought it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974) , the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
/d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." /d., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
'
3 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
14 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under j 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d. , 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
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further decide whether particular interferences with these 
interests offend due process. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes.'8 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
17 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
18 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. __/ 
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977). J But the Eighth ) 
Amendment has been applied to the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If prisoners in state institutions J 
have a federal right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety im-
plicates a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (19370 
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ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a con-
stitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve 
his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
cedes that no amount of training will make possible his re-
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were 
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense 
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we al-
ready have found constitutionally protected liberty interests 
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be 
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those 
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only \ 
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person, 
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional training-
other than that related to safety or the ability to function free 
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity 
to function more independently within the institution, but 
cannot make possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent 
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty 
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing 
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, re-
spondent compares mental retardation to an infectious dis-
ease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and 
'
9 We use the term "training'' as synonymous with "habilitation," with its 
"principal focus"-certainly in a case like Romeo's--being on "training and 
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra. 
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cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retarda-
tion is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of 
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation" 
respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first 
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to 
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never 
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22 
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty 
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). When States do choose to provide services, 
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States 
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all." ld., at 486-487. 
20 See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History 
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Re-
tarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychi-
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra) 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an 
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person. 
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and in-
crease Romeo's IQ. 
21 There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims 
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills. 
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any is-
sues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he 
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his 
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints 
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills 
(educational). 
22 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avail-
able to others in Pennhurst. 
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Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely 
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable con-
ditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily 
restraint. 
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new lib-
erty interest in "training" in skills unlikely to lead to a pa-
tient's release from involumtary confinement. As we noted 
in determining that there is no general right to education in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
u. s. 1, 3~4 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving 
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we 
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of 
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States. 
Id., at 71~711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some 
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the 
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from 
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits 
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking proce-
dural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically 
23 Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled 
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, 
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the 
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regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." 
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit 
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process 
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is 
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such 
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a 
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources. 
We cannot say that due process requires that such individ-
uals must be given training in the development of skills that 
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit 
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the pro-
foundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of 
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of 
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to con-
sider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling 
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
24 See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was 
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary 
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peo-
ples ... . ");Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state 
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our 
polity will not endure it."). 
25 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
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manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal gov-
ernments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an 
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent 
to make. 
We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed men-
tally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above, 
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety 
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may 
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider 
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights. 
III 
A 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
26 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
lfp/ss 05/23/82 Rider A, p. 14 (Romeo) 
ROME014 SALLY-POW ., 
This case differs in critical respects from 
Jackson, 
~~'/ 
a procedural due process case involving an 
A 
involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by 
a court on petition of his mother who averred that in view 
of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor 
control his violence. Ante, at 2. Thus, the purpose of 
petitioner's commitment basically was to provide 
reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to 
him outside of an instituion. 
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organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
27 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). 
28 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-




determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in. fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the- same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. 
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily commit-
ted mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate in-
terests of the State, including administrative and fiscal con-
21J We do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a 
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we 
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treat-
ment" rather than "training."). 
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straints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these 
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it pro-
vide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them 
such training as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and 
reasonable freedom of movement within the institution. 30 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable," 
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 31 
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the internal operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized.32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
00 We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in 
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz. 
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to 
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178, 
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety 
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that 
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment, courts will defer to it. 
31 Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. 
J .R ., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra, and in note 30, infra. 
32 See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S. , at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("(C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system . .. . ");Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 





judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed."'). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is 
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supra. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
33 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
to the supervision of qualified persons . 
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{< These conditions of confinement comport fully with 
the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S.715, 738 (1972} j )lee n. 27, ante , ~ n 
determining whether the state has met its obligations in 
these respects, 
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mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to rovi d uate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. The state also has the 
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all resi-
dents and personnel within the institution. And it may not 
restrain residents except when and to the extent professioJBl_ 
jud ent deems this necessary to assure such safetj - We 
hold, however, that there is no constitutional nght to 
abilitative training per se, though we should not be under-
stood as holding that the state is never under any obligation 
to provide training. The state is under a duty to provide re-
spondent with such training as an appropriate professional 
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facili-
tate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It 
may well be unreasonable not to provide training when train-
ing could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the 
like1ihood of violence. 
/ Respondent thus enjoys constitu~· ~··~··· 
ests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-re- J j rU ~~ 
strictive confinement condit · s, and such trainin as rna be ,.:7 i]3 
required by these interests. ~~~~~fHij~~~~~~~+--I~ 
~~.w.;;;....w~~..u~o:t:.U....lU,I,.Uiil~, decisions made by the appropriate 
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correct-
ness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions 
of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and under-
staffed-to continue to function. A single professional may 
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents 
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a 
normal day. The administrators, and particularly profes-
sional personnel, should not be required to make each deci-
sion in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
80-1429-0PINION 
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ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
I 
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APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of 
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1. 
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21- 23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 




programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 ,Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 1 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i . e. , 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
'
0 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. n 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that i1 can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." Id., at 15:1--160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
11 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F . 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171- 172. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
!d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
13 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss !this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
14 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
80-1429-0PINION 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. Id., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
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further decide whether particular interferences with these 
interests offend due process. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at ail-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a con-
stitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve 
17 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
'
8 1t is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. 
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977). 
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
cedes that no amount of training will make possible his re-
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were 
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense 
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we al-
ready have found constitutionally protected liberty interests 
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be 
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those 
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only 
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person, 
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional training-
other than that related to safety or the ability to function free 
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity 
to function more independently within the institution, but 
cannot make possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent 
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty 
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing 
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, re-
spondent compares mental retardation to an infectious dis-
ease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and 
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retarda-
tion is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of 
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation" 
'
9 We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its 
"principal focus" --certainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and 
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra. 
20 See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History 
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Re-
tarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychi-
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra) 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an 
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respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first 
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to 
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never 
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22 
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty 
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). When States do choose to provide services, 
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States 
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all." Id., at 486-487. 
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely 
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable con-
ditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily 
restraint. 
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new lib-
erty interest in "training'' in skills unlikely to lead to a pa-
tient's release from involuntary confinement. As we noted 
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person. 
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and in-
crease Romeo's IQ. 
21 There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims 
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills. 
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any is-
sues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he 
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his 
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints 
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills 
(educational). 
22 See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avail-
able to others in Pennhurst. 
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in determining that there is no general right to education in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
u. s. 1, 33--34 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving 
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we 
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of 
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States. 
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some 
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the · 
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from 
bodily restraint by the State. But a ·right to training fits 
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking proce-
dural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically 
regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." 
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit 
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
23 Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled 
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, 
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the 
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of 
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to con-
sider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling 
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
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The right respondent claims is a substantive due process 
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is 
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such 
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a 
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources. 
We cannot say t.hat due process requires that such individ-
uals must be given training in the development of skills that 
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit 
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the pro-
foundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of 
manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal gov-
ernments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an 
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent 
to make. 
24 See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (In order to detennine whether the defendant was 
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary 
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . 
. . . "); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has 
"subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our pol-
ity will not endure it."). 
25 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
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We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed men-
tally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above, 
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety 
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may 
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider 
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights. 
III 
A 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
2<1 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 59~00. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
-n See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment basically was to provide rea-
sonable care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an 
instituion. 
28 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
terests in confinement. · 
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jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. 
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily commit-
ted mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate in-
Z!J We do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a 
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we 
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treat-
ment" rather than "training."). 
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terests of the State, including administrative and fiscal con-
straints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these 
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it pro-
vide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them 
such training as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and 
reasonable freedom of movement within the institution. 30 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable," 
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 31 
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the internal operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
MWe have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in 
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz. 
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to 
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178, 
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety 
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that 
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable 
professional judgment, courts will defer to it. 
31 Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra, and in note 30, infra. 
32 See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .. . . "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at" 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed."'). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is 
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supra. 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
33 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 




In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. ..> 
~ The state also has the unquestioned duty to provide rea-
sonable safety for all residents and personnel within the insti-
tution. And it may not restrain residents except when and 
to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to 
assure such safety or to provide needed training. We hold, { 
however, that there is no constitutional right to habilitative 
training per se, though we should not be understood as hold-
ing that the state is never under any obligation to provide 
training. The state is under a duty to provide respondent 
with such training as an appropriate professional would con-
sider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his abil-
ity to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be 
unreasonable not to provide training when training could sig-
nificantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of 
violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. These conditions of con-
finement comport fully with the purpose of respondent's com-
mitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715, 738 (1972); 
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met 
its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appro-
priate professional are entitled to a strong presumption of 




stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision .of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
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DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. 
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APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 a · three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
. rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of 
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1. 




in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. N everthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53--55. 
6 Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
be\s to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record ~90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
'1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
'"The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. ld., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170." 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." /d., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
11 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 16&-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178.'4 
18 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
14 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. /d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
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further decide whether artiCYlar iB~srfurenc8B ~R ~'Rese 
int9r8sts 9t:ieH6 dt2e pi seees. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a con-
stitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve 
17 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
18 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penai institutions. 
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-668 (1977). ;r-:--cr=-~ 
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
cedes that no amount of training will make possible his re-
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were 
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense 
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we al-
ready have found constitutionally protected liberty interests 
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be 
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those 
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only 
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person, 
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional training-
other than that related to safety or the ability to function free 
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity 
to function more independently within the institution, but 
cannot make possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent 
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty 
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing 
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, re-
spondent compares mental retardation to an infectious dis-
ease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and 
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retarda-
tion is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of 
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation" 
19 We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its 
"principal focus"-eertainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and 
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra. 
20 See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History 
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Re-
tarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychi-
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted inn. 1, supra) 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an 
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respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first 
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to 
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never 
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22 
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty 
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). When States do choose to provide services, 
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States 
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking the problem at all." Id., at 486-487. 
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely 
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, 
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable con-
ditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily 
restraint. 
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new lib-
erty interest in "training'' in skills unlikely to lead to a pa-
tient's release from involuntary confinement. As we noted 
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person. 
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and in-
crease Romeo's IQ. 
21 There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims 
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills. 
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any is-
sues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he 
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his 
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints 
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills 
(educational). 
zz See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). 
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avail-
able to others in Pennhurst. 
A ' h' 
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in determining that there is no general right to education in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
u. s. 1, 33--34 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving 
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we 
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of 
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States. 
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some 
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the 
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from 
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits 
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking proce-
dural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically 
regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." 
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit 
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights .. 
1
. 1 1• ~ to "-o. I,, • ·r~.:t10'J\. 
.. ~ Cl-lso :s ' ~ r 23 Responden!J._~ argu!tl that he was committed for care and t eatment 
) 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive righ entitled 
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process ause of 
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, 
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the 
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of 
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to con-
sider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling 
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
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The right respondent claims is a substantive due process 
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is 
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such 
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a 
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources. 
We cannot say t.hat due process requires that such individ-
uals must be given training in the development of skills that 
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit 
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the pro-
foundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of 
manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal gov-
ernments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an 
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent 
to make. 
usee also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was 
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary 
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and 
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . 
. . . "); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has 
"subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our pol-
ity will not endure it."). 
25 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
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We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed men-
ally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above, 
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety 
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may 
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider 
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two right.=_) 
III 
A 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent the are in 
conflicU n opera mg an ms 1 ut10n sue as Pennhurst, 
~re occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
'" In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 





for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did.not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 28 ld., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
27 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
I. 
tion she could neither care for him nor control his vio~le~n!!;c!:.:e .~AWJ:.~.a~o..-..._-rr-.._ 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide rea-
sonable care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an 
mstitdion. 
28 Se~ also Addtngton v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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In this case, we agree that the minimally 
adequate training required is such training as may be 
reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints~jn 
determining what is "reasonable" - in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state - we emphasize 
that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised 




terests of the State, including administrative and fisca 
straints, due process requires that (i) the S ~ect these 
individuals only to reason cal constraints; (ii) it pro-
vide them reas afe conditions, and (iii) it afford them 
such t · · g as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and 
freedom of movement within the institution. 30 
e recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable," 
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference t 
- ..w-t"'" · udgment exercise b lified ofes · 
-------'\ By so · ng J 1cial review of challenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the internal operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
'¥) We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in 
somewhat different language from that used by Chief J eitz. 
Rather than stating that the involuntarily commit JOY the right to 
have certain decisions made by profes · , see 644 F. 2d, at 178, 
18~181 , we hold that they ar · ed to conditions of reasonable safety 
and reasonable fre om bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that 
once sue c1sion is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable 
o es iona 'ud t o will e 
31 Our olding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. 
J .R. , 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra, and in note 30, infra. 
32 See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is 
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supra. 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
33 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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t.)dul J 
sider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his abil-
1 
~~~ 
ity to function free from bodily restraints. It RlftY wei..W5~-e-- -- ----- \. 
unreasonable not to provide training when training could sig-
nificantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of 
violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests . ...!:phes con 1tions of con-
finemenfkomport fully with the purpose of respondent's com-
mitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715, 738 (1972); 
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met 
its obligations in these respects, decisions made b the a r -
priate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
8(}-1429-0PINION 
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stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1429 
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. 
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 imt three administrators of the institution, claim-
ing damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional 
rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of 
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 






in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
7~ 78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
8 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. Id., at 164-170.u 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." Id., at 15~160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
11 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173.'3 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
lB Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
14 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 





We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. Id., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
18 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 




Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at ali-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
.... ~"'·~ndent's remaining claim is more troubling: a co -
stitutiona · ht to "habilitation," i. e., training to im o 
17 Petitioners do not appe 
tioners 27-31. 
te.r I tU!.L. 
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent con-
e s that no amount of training will make possible his 
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if h ere 
still at me, he would have a right to training at th7' xpense 
of the Sta: e. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, smce we al-
ready have und constitutionally protected t~~y interests 
in freedom fro restraints and safety, some _7 a.ining 19 may be 
neccesary to a oid unconstitutional infri gement of those 
rights regardles of whether responden also enjoys a con-
stitutional right to raining per se. W therefore decide only 
the narrow questio whether a me ally retarded person, 
committed involunta y, has a righ to additional training-
other than that related o safety or he ability to function free 
of restraints-when su trainin might improve his capacity 
to function more indep ndentl within the institution, but 
cannot make possible his ele se. 
Respondent argues tha ce a person has been confined, 
he has "no one but the Sta to turn to for help in gaining ad-
ditional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and 
abilities" he has. Brie £ Respondent 23. Respondent 
concludes that the Sta th efore has a constitutional duty 
to provide reasonabl trai g, both to preserve existing 
skills and develop ne ones. In making this argument, re-
spondent compares ental re rdation to an infectious dis-
ease, for which the State has qu rantined the individual, and 
cannot then deny: appropriate t atment. Mental retarda-
tion is not, howe er, a disease. ther, it is a description of 
a certain level f intellectual abilit , 20 and the "habilitation" 
1'We use the erm "training'' as synonymous "th "habilitation," with its 
"principal foe "-certainly in a case like Romeo being on ''training and 
developmen of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra. 
00 See A aumeister, The American Residential stitution: Its History 
and C acter 21-22 in Residential Facilities for th entally Retarded 
(Ba eister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for he Mentally Re-
ded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for erican Psychi-
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. supra) 
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, R eo has an 
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respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for. ~st 
t1 ~ skills he does not possess, correlates mo closely to 
educat ' n than to medical treatment. 21 An e have never 
found a · ht to education under the Con tution. 22 
As a gen al matter, a State is under constitutional duty 
to provide se ices for those within i borders. See, e. g., 
Harris v. Me e, 448 U. S. 297, 3 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Mah v. Roe, 432 U. . 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). WH n States do oose to provide services, 
they generally ar given wide latitude in doing so. See 
Richardson v. Belc er, 404 U. . 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige 
v. Williams, 397 U. . 471, 8 (1970). Specifically, States 
need not "choose bet een tacking every aspect of a prob-
lem or not attacking t e oblem at all." I d., at 486-487. 
Here, the State has co 'tted respondent, who concedely 
cannot survive on the ou side. It is willing to provide food, 
shelter, clothing, and m dical care, as well as reasonable con-
ditions of safety an r~asonable freedom from bodily 
restraint. \ 
Under these circu stance , we hesitate to find a new lib-
erty interest in "tr ining'' in kills unlikely to lead to a pa-
tient's release fro involunta confinement. As we noted 
crease Romeo's I . 
erefore classified a profoundly retarded person. 
ay in which to correc the chemical imbalance and in-
21 There may be cases in which it is difficult distinguish between claims 
to medical treat ent and claims to training in he development of skills. 
This is not, ho ver, such a case. Indeed, Ro eo does not raise any is-
sues related t /medical care-for example, he doe not complain that he 
received inad quate medical treatment in the infirrri ward. And his 
claims to tr · 'ng are either related to safety and freed from restraints 
or purely e cational, i. e., training to make him less vio nt (related to 
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in se are skills 
(education l). 
22 SeeS n Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 9J3). 
Respon ent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avlit~ 
able others in Pennhurst. -....______; 
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determining that there is no general right to education · 
San tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez U1 
u. s. 1, (1973): 
"It is no the province of this Court to create stantive 
constituti al rights in the name of guar eeing equal 
protection o the laws. . . . Rather, th answer lies in 
assessing whe her there is a right~o e cation explicitly 
or implicitly gu an teed by the Con itution." 
A similar restraint i seen in this C 's cases involving 
claimed "discoveries" o new "libe~s" under the Due Proc-
ess Clause. In Paul . Davis,,.t2~ U. S. 693 (1976), we 
noted that the liberties p otecte by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have their origins e'the in state law-for puposes of 
procedural due process--o n the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights that have been "in orated" to apply to the States. 
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some 
liberty interests are · plici in our historic notion of the 
meaning of that w. rd itse for example, freedom from 
bodily restraint the State. But a right to training fits 
none of these ategories. Re ondent is not seeking proce-
dural du rocess. 23 Nor doe he claim a right historically 
r ed as within the meanin of the concept of "liberty." 
And respondent points to no rig t to training either implic· 
or explicit in the guarantees of t e Bill of Ri ht 
~ =s 
. ~Responden arguilihat he was o · ted for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has tate ubstantive rightfenbtled 
to substantive, not procedural, protection er th ue Process -cfause of 
the Federal Constitution. But this argum for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not Yanced the courts below, 
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals a ground reversing the 
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsyl nia law a the lack of 
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal 
sider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. 
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); 
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 2 
((qf~ 
-+~ / 
0 fl!t/Z tj (;,..!:> 
80-1429--0PINION } 
12 YOUNGBERG v. ROMEO 
The right respondent claims is a substantive due p cess 
Only when an action of a State against an indiv,'dual is 
sharp t odds with our "fundamental principles liberty 
and justic' will the Due Process Clause of the · ourteenth 
Amendme~~ ~the action. Palko v. C onnecti t, 302 U. S. 
319, 328 (1937) oting Herbert v. Louisiana 72 U. S. 312, 
316 (1926). 24 In de 'ding whether to provid individuals such 
as Romeo with habil tive training, the tate must make a 
difficult decision regar · g the allocajion of its resources. 
We cannot say t.hat due p cess re~es that such individ-
uals must be given training 1 the Jievelopment of skill~ that 
cannot lead to freedom. The e'cision whether to commit 
scarce resources on program o ttempt to train the pro-
foundly retarded, 25 or on oth social d welfare programs of 
manifest merit, is a diffic t one that te and federal gov-
ernments must face. e Constitution es not dictate an 
answer, and this is n 
to make. 
on v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 947) (Frank-
furter, J., con · g) (In order to determine whether the de ndant was 
accorded d process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is ecessary 
"to asce n whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of de ncy and 
fairne which express the notions of justice of English-speaking oples . 
. . . " ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due cess 
Cl se of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state 
" bjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our po -
i y will not endure it."). 
,A Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 







We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for et ample, to protect 
them as well as others from violenceJ~t-- Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
V _ef in Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate ~overnment objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment;~see id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did.not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entaiL1"; 1 Id., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
z.6 ...I See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
V incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitmen~ was to provide rea-
sonable care and safety, conditions not avail~ble W him outside of an 
L-:=--..J--~in;...st,;.,.It~. on. 
.8 ee also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431--432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of . ~tJ . 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been ~~ 
made.'it/ 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than .hJ z-'1 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling'' or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents . 
..JHe :hald that wllen the rights of the involuntarily._commit-----G 
.ted-mentally-retarded are-weighe<hlgainst-the-legitimate in- o 
•we do disagree with Chief Judge SeiU's view as to th~ofa ~. zJf 
n training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we 1""" "'f"1'U' ...-
find no such right..cogpizable as ajiberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See-644 F: 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses ''treat-
ment" rather ti}an-''ttaining."). 
~ 
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) 
\?$ 14 z? (:,. 7j..-----13y so limiting judicial review of challenges to co~ditions in 
{it~.cJ,.q.;& ~ stafe institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with "2--'t 
-t, 11 r\eW t n, Z. ~) the internal operations of these institutions should be mini- V 
mized.<lfz.~ Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
7 ' . /P Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra, and in note 30, infra. 
J# See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed."'). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is 
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supra. 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
f(P By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 




In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
7
\ ( NO~~\ 
of the care that the state must provide. _ __:.;;.-----
The state also has the unquestioned duty to provide rea-
sonable safety for all residents and personnel within the insti-
tution. And it may not restrain residents except when and 
to the extent professional judgment deems=~ 
assure such safety or to provide needed training. 
bawever, that Hlere is-ne-constitutional rig · · · 
~ning-pel:- se , though- ~ve should-n&t-be-unae1 ~tood as hold-----
~ng that the state is never under any.-ooligaiion to provid~ 
r--=:l~m11~l l"he state is under a duty to provide respondent 
'---------- with such training as an appropriate professional would con-
sider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his abil-
ity to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be 
unreasonable not to provide training when training could sig-
nificantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of 
violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
1 wo"'-!d j may be required by these interests. con 1 1ons o con-
~::::..=~~------::fin-e..:o:.m-e!ill;-,t""' omport fully with the purpose o respondent's com-
mitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972); 
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met 
its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appro-
priate professional are entitled to a ~resumption of ~ 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
80-1429-0PINION 
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stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
In this case, we agree that the minimally 
adequate training required is such training as may be 
reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In 
determining what is "reasonable"--in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state--we emphasize 
that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised 








e.g., description of complaint at ____ , 
also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the 
Appeals for te Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, & 
V /chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as 
synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, 
at __ (petn 65a-67a, end of Seitz's opinion). 
2--{ 
vf $ It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of 
language and formulations in the opinions below and the 
various briefs here, to define or identify the type of 
training that may be required in every case. A court 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a 
right to minimally adequate training. The basic 
requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar to courts, 
may be stated as that training which is reasonable in 
light of identifiable liberty interests and the 
circumstances of the case. A federal court, of course, 
must identify a constitutional predicate for the 
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state. 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. 
In his words, he asserts a "constitutional right to 
minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This 
is a substantive due process claim that is said to be 
grounded in the liberty component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 / The term 
"habilitation", used in psychiatry is not defined 
precisely or consistently in the opinions below or in the 
J 
briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, 
at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and 
development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that 
the right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief 
of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and 
extent of training to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis "in light of present medical or other scientific 
knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we 
start from established principles. As a general matter, a 
State is under no constitutional duty to provide 
substantive services for those within its border. See, 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 {1980) {publicly funded 
2. 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment) • When a person is institutionalized--and 
wholly dependent on the State--it is conceded by 
petitioner that a duty to provide certain services and 
care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 u.s. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 u.s. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between 
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all." Id., at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of 
his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will 
make possible his release. Nor does he argue that if he 
were still at home, the State would have an obligation to 
provide training at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
The record reveals that respondent's primary needs are 




clearly claims training 
As we have recognized 
related to these 
that there is a 




freedom from restraint, ante at __ ; training may be 
necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those 
rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite 
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or 
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily 
restraints. In his brief to this Court, he indicates that 
even the self-care programs Romeo seeks are needed to 
reduce his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of 
Respondent at 21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the 
trial court, respondent repeatedly indicated that, if 
allowed to testify, his experts would show that additional 
training programs, including self-care programs, were 
needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior. Petition for 
"2,2.-
Certiorari 98a-104a.~VIf, as seems the case, respondent 
seeks only training related to safety and freedom from 
restraints, this case does not present the difficult 
question whether a mentally retarded person involuntarily 
committed to a state institution has some general 
consitutional right to training per se, even when no type 
or amount of training would lead to freedom. 
4. 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted 
by respondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a 
constitutional right to minimally adequate care 
and treatment. The existence of a 
constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F.2d, 
(Pet. 54a) • 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define--
beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from 
physical restraint--the "minimally adequate care and 
treatment" that appropriately may be required for this 
Z-) 
respondent.~In the circumstances presented by this case, 
and on the basis of the record developed to date, we agree 
with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty 
interests require the State to provide minimally adequate 
or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from 
undue restraint. In view of the kinds of treatment 
sought by respondent and the evidence of record, we need 
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SUPREl\1E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1429 
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. 
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, pAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under tbe Due Process Clause 
of tbe Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and Jacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, responoent lived ·with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death .of-his father 
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Withi:Q 
'The American Psychiat1ic Association explains that "lt]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally- retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus 
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
Ame1ican Psychiatric Association as Anticns Curiae, at 4, n. l. 






two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo . or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§ 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo \vas injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Cow"t of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent- Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak- \\·ants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my hu sband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18a. 
' Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supen·isory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,'" . 
' · 



























that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing la'\:v suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a seeond amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The seeond 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April 1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See B1ief for Respondents 21-23. 
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (19&1) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions.9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11 Oa. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
'Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44- 56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48 . 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162- 166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
' 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short pe1iods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
wThe District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals- indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the adYantages of alternative form s of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 













teenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at Ilia. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157- 158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164--170. 11 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded tl1at it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." Id., at 159- 160. A somev.·hat dif-
ferent standard \Yas appropriate for the failure to provide for 
"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally r etarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualifi ed immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this rl efense, App. 
76a, and it was not chall enged by r espond ent. 644 F . 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After ci t ing Pierso11 v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. R hodes, 
416 U.S. 232 (1974) , the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171- 172 .. 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
\Vas "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
13 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that 1w treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on indiYidual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
"Judge Alclisertjoined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but \vrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
- ---·--------- ·- -------- - ,-·- - ------- -------- - ---------·-·---·---·-- ---____ ,..-........... - -~-· __ ,_ ·--........ -~--- ' - ... ....,. --.......... ----:. . .::._·-~~-:.=.-~i::~·;;.: . ...!.: 




We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. !d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and \Vrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 ln pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See B1ief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
•• Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; B1ief for Respondent 15-16. 








whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case. 1 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingmham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed- who 
may not be punished at ali- in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. ·Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Imnates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
"Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
)@It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. 



















Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
~ - '"Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive 1ight to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the first time in respondent's b1ief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as 
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of 
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the 
lower fedei"al courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dotha1·d v. Ra.w-
linson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duig1wn v. United States, 274 U. S. 
195, 200 (1927); Old JoTdan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 
164 U. S. 261, 264--265 (1896). 
0 - "'Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly r etarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Id entify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
~ - --:-.. "':'--: "':""'""'"- :-w -·-;:-~• -~- -:· ___ , -~-·f':~~ 
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In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464_, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized- and wholly dependent on the State-it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dand1'idge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." Id., at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
tion, concedes that no amount of training v.rill make possible 
his release. Nor does he argue that if he were still at home, 
the State ·would have an obligation to provide training at its 
expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals that 
respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum 
of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims training 
related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized that there is 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety and 
freedom from restraint, ante at --Otraining may be neces-
sary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those rights. 
On the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncertain 
whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training un-
related to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his 
brief to this Court, he indicates that even the self-care pro-
grams Romeo seeks are needed to reduce his agressive be-
havior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. And 
in his offer of proof to the trial court, r espondent repeatedly 
indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would show 
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that additional training programs, including self-care pro-
grams, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior. 
Petition for Certiorari 98a-104a. 22 If, as seems the case, re-
spondent seeks only training related to safety and freedom 
from restraints, this case does not present the difficult ues-
tion whether a mentally retarded person nvo untarily com-
mitted to a state institution some g ner cons1 utwnal 
right to training per se, even when no type or amount of 
training would lead to freedom. 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re-
spondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, -- (Pet. 
54a). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define- be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint- the "minimally adequate care and treatment" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree v,rjth his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests r equire the State to 
provide minimally adequate or r easonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 24 
"" See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, at 11- 14, 20-21, and 24. 
23 Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as svnonvous with train-
ing or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 1 (pstJ:l 65:. 67a, si'IEI ef beitz::b 
~not feasible, as is evident from~e variety of language and for-
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 
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We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "tbe demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that trainirig which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state. 
'/ 2; In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra . 
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But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In PaTlwm v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that pmceduml due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entaiJ.Z' I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting tl1ese interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider tl1e proper standard for 
determining whetl1er a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
211 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely \\ithout either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the Yalidity 
of an involunta1·y commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither ca1·e for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
care and safety, conditions not aYailable to him outside of an institution. 
Z7 See also Addingt.on v. Te.ra.s, 441 U. S. 418 (1979) . In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for tommitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431--432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
terests in confinement. 
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14 YOUNGBERG v. ROMEO 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the 
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of 
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement ':vould place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. ·---- n this case, ~the minimally adequate training 
"l- -....::::E=---,,..-., 
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of re-
spondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from un-
reasonable restraints. In determining what is "reason-
able"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training 
by a state-we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 28 Ndit~ 
( 
28 0 r holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized Js procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professinoal exercising h~~ 





We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the 
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of 
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less tl1an absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
\\'ould restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. 
In this case, we agree that the minimally adequate training 
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of re-
spondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from un-
reasonable restraints. In determining what is "reason-
able"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training 
by a state--we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the juc1gment exercised by a qualified professional. 21' Ncs:it:.) 
""Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be character-
ized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled 
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professinoal exercising hi? 
professional judgment- a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parhanu .. v_. · 







































YOUNGBERGv. ROMEO 15 
<.-By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in · 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the internal operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized. 29 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 30 is 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text 
at --, supra, and in note 30, i1~(ra. 
""See Parham v. J.R ., s11pra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("l C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the climinal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommoclation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
30 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 











presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note 10, supm. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have' weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquestioned duty to provide reasona]Jie safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to tl1e extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety ~ 
or to provide needed training. {In this case, therefore, the 
state is under a duty to provide respondent v;rith such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
decisions that must be made without delay- necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are sutdect 






















non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully v.rith the purpose of respond-
ent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715, 
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the ·appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
stitutions of this type--often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents \Vith v.ridely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 






' -.... ~ 
~~ ~C./f~ ~ 
~~ ~~ ~~~;?,~'u,u~~ 
~~~, kls~~~ 
9/ ..4:, ~ z.,~, p!Z...) ~ ~ 
, 
















J USLH:e Dl ell nan 
Justice White 





~ "'-,t./~S/ ~ 91- /Z.) Jy..-j~ From: Justice Powell 
0 ($ lt/t-C( 6- Y' 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: _______ _ _ 
4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1429 · 
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. 
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, pAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May -·-, 1982] 
JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is wl1ether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, l1as substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Withi:Q 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "(t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally- retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than· an illness ... . · [T]he principal focus 
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Cw'iae, at 4, n. 1. 
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two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21( 22t"'and 28;(29/: On June 11, 1974, the 
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 
§ 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
V,/vt/ 
' Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my / 
hu sband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent- Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak- wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18;:--- . 
' Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley \\'as Unit Director for the urut in which respondent was 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administraior.e;- . 
- ~- -- - -:---..: -~~~--:--··:. -- - - ·-----·--:.- ·--- -- - ·- -:: -~-:-- - ·- --- -----. - ~ • <:..• - .... • 






















that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infinnary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions ·of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing la\v suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
,vjth appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
'Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See B1ief for Respondents 21-23. 
'Pennhurst State School and Ho spital'"· Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (19~!-) 
(remanded for fw-ther proceedings) . 
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110~ The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants sl1ackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this la\vsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were p olated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 73(-75(.' Finally, the jury was instructed 
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
'Prior to his transfer to Pennhw·st's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
in programs dealing \\ith feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program proYiding interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44- 56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48 . 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162- 166, Rec:ord 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Recorcl 45. 
'2 Record 7, 5 Rec:ord 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200- 203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for sh01't ]Jeriods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
"1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
'"The District Juclge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals- indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that eYidence of the ad\'antages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a c-onstitutional claim 




























teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111{. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new triaL 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 11 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it t:an be justified only by 
"compe1ling necessity." I d., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accw·ate in describing 
t1·eatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After citing Pier:;on v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer Y. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F . 2d, at 171-t72 .. 
,, 
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178.'4 
"Act.ually, the court diYided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not. discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court. considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on indi,idual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 16~166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
"Judge Aldisertjoined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Junge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected \Vith the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182--183. And, 
-, -- ··--·---:---------------··: ----- ...... - --- --:---~----------
~- ·- . ---=-----·. 1- .. -. ... __ ..... _ ........ 





















We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed ~these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491---494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering. state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. !d., 
at 184. See id., at l 83--185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and ·wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, v.rithout due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, ~ 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 











whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. N ebmska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
"Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
1e It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. 






















Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry/ 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
'
9 Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the flrst time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as 
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of 
Pennsy!Yannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the 
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dotlta.rd v. Raw-
linson, 433 U. S. 321, 323n. 1 (1977); Duig1w.n v. United States, 274 U. S. 
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 
164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
20 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Eoucability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 



















In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464J 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richa1·dson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83--84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
alL" I d. , at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
l A nJ '-a l tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible 
-D..:!::..---,..---,:b:"!'I:::-s O::r :::-elr:::e':::'a:::-se:::"' . .,l~&r does htargue that if he were still at home, 
t e a e \VOU 1ave an obligation to provide training at its 
expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals that 
respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum 
of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims training 
related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized that there is 
a constitutionally protected liberty )interest in safety and 
freedom from restraint, ante at - ..Ltraining may be neces-
sary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those rights. 
On the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncertain 
whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training un-
related to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his 
bne to this Court, indicates that even the self-care pro-
~~mea,. seeks are needed to reduce his agressive be-
. havior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. And 
in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly 
indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would show 
2
















that additional training programs, including self-care pro-
grams, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior. 
Petition for Certiorari 9¥-104, .22 If, as seems the case, re-
spondent seeks only traming related to safety and fre 
from restraints, this case does not present t · cult ques-
tion whether a mentally retarded pers<@-nvoluntarily com- ~ 
mitted to a state instituti s some general con~tional 
r.l.ght-to-tra· mg per se, e when no type or amount of 
___-----training would lead to freedom. 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re-
~pondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, -- (Pet. 
s;:). . 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree ·with his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 24 
""See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, at 11- 14, 20-21, and 24. 
23 Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous v.ith train-
ing or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 
··~ 
~tis not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and for-
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 




































We have established that Romeo retains · er-ty-interests 
in safety and freedom from b · s raint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolu~ndeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operatin~n institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but \Yhether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause l1as been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "tl1e liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the indiYidual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convkted of the crime charged, could not be puru shed. 
properly may start ·with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state . -l 
"' In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra . 
' · . 
























But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Padwm v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor ·with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 2; I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded . 
2f> See also Ja ckson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; clue proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical J"e-
spects from Jackson, a procedural clue process case involving the \'alidity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
care and safety, conditions not a\'ailable to him outside of an institution. 
27 See also Addington v. Tc.ra.s, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for <:ominitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
terests in confinement. 
- - ---------- ·---.. --~- - ·:. --~~----- --:;:: ------ ~~ -.. _- ;-- ._-::_-- --.-
~:"'~!!"": ;::;;;:c:_;;: 
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We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the 
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of 
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Ganz,ble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
~ ~~~. 
I r-.t~ f~~-~- 'S 
e. ... ~i~ 1-u 4o 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. 








t rc...A. V\ ,·t'\ · 
~-""' In this case, wo agre;g, that the minimally adequate training 
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of re-
-------;lssnp~on7feP:nt's liberty interests in safety and freedom from un-
by -t-hA.. reasonable restraints. In determining what is "reason-
/ able"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training 
ConsJ; -k.11'~ by a state--we emphasize that courts must show deference to 















<.-By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in 
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with 
the interpyl operations of these institutions should be mini-
mized jf\'t.Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think 
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate profes-
sionals in making such decisions. See Pa1·ham v. J.R., 442 
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supm, 441 U. S., at 
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert adminis-
trators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). 
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professionat~ is 
J .R ., 442 0. S. 584 (1999, , a piaeeEIHral c:ltHo proce~~ ease-di'S"cussed 1~ 
z_. ~ ~ , s up1 a, and i11 nst9 SO, in.£ra .»---
V ~See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system ... . ");Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wo~ff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
'2-f well as positive effects on social change). 
V ~By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
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presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the person respo~.ble actually did 
not base the decision on such a judgment.<7In an action for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable 
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of bud-
getary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity 
would bar liability. See note , supm. 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state inst)tutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat tl1at the state concedes a duty to prov)de adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquest1oned duty to provide reasona"Qle safety for all 
residents and personnel within the inst1tution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to the extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety 
or to prov1de needed train1ng. In this case, therefore, the 
state is under a duty to provide respondent ·with such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in cond1tions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
decisions that must be made without delav-necessarilv will be made in 
many instances by employees without for~al training b~t who are subject 

















































non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully \Vith the purpose of respond-
ent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 
738 (1972); see n. 27, ante. In determining whether the state 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
stitutions of this type--often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered . 
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I Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancin his lib-erty interests against s ate mterests. If there is to \ be any uniformity in protec mg these interests, this balanc-
~ ~ ing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
~'\:J jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
~ rights of the involuntarily-co:mtted mentally retarded. 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than 
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context 
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard_i~ lowe1;~ 
than the "compelling'' or "substantial" necessity tesfi'~. " .J.. 1 
~ er ed fteeessary };)y the Court of Appeals o JUS 1 use o re- t.~c. LO .... ,.l o-...r 
<"' straints or conditions of less than absolUte safety. We think woeJ..J.. 
~thit U:u~ f1Pm'11a adopted by the Court ofJ\ppe~would place r~CJ(.U,.~ o..... 
awe do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a 
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we 
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses ''treat-
ment" rather than ''training."). 
c;~ 4-t,~ 
'foo-h-to ~ [~ C'")f1 ,..~n u.m b-t..rt-J. 
I . z.t./717 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES tp (j/8 ~ 
No. 80--1429 ~ 4-
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC. ·, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. 
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS 
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most 
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with 
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father 
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within 
1 The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus 
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1. 
80--1429-0PINION 
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two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought 
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Rome<J was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary 
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health 
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was 
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, 
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat-
80--1429-0PINION 
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed- alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
thews are no longer at Pennhurst. 
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les ," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospi tal v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 





behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 7~ 75. Finally, the jury was instructed that 
if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to the 
medical and psychological needs of Nicholas 
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at 111. The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judg-
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200--203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101. 
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ment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These. were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. !d., at 164-170. 11 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity." !d., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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I d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 13 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 14 
13 Actually; the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, ·id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
1
' Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d. , 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
80-1429-0PINION 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case. 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
15 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
16 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 





Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by pnor decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
17 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
tioners 27-31. 
18 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. 




component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry, 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
--19 Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as 
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of 
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the 
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Raw-
linson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States , 274 U. S. 
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
------:"';;;;Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree I f 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
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U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." Id., at 486--487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible 
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at 
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training 
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals 
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a mini-
mum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims 
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized 
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
safety and freedom from restraint, at --, trammg may .._s_u __ --Y 
be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those 
rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite un-
certain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or train-
ing unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. 
In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that even the self-
care programs he seeks are needed to reduce his agressive 
behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. 
And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeat-
edly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would 
show that additional training programs, including self-care 
programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behav-
ior. Petition for Certiorari 98--104. 22 If, as seems the case, 
21 See, e. g., description of complaint at 
2
; 
3 , supra. / 
22 See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
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respondent seeks only training related to safety and freedom 
from restraints, this case does not present the difficult ques-
tion whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily com-
mitted to a state institution, has some general constitutional 
right to training per se, even when no type or amount of 
training would lead to freedom. 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re-
spondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, -- (Pet. 
54). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 24 
23 Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with train-
ing or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181. 
" It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and for-
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state. 






We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the 
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court 
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental 
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that] 
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F. 2d, at 
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the 
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the ab-
sence of an appropriate record ... and without the benefit of analysis, ar-
gument or briefing'' on such issues. I d., at 186. 
25 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail.27 I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
26 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution. 
27 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the 
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of 
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are 
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of con-
finement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower 
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the 
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use 
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We 
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the 
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also 
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional 
judgment as to the needs of residents. 
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to mini-
mally adequate training. In this case, ~the minimally ad-
equate training required by the Constitution is such training 
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In 
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that 
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a 
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of chal-
lenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the 
80--1429---0PINION 
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federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
tions should be minimized. 28 Moreover, there certainly is no 
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
propriate professionals in making such decisions. See 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess 
the expert administrators on matters on which they are bet-
ter informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by 
a professional, 29 is presumptively valid; liability may be im----28 See Parham v. J .R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell , 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
29 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 




posed only when the decision by the professional is such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg-
ment. 30 In an action for damages against a professional in his 
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be lia-
ble if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional stand-
ards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, 
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to the extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety 
or to provide needed training. <fin this case, therefore, the 1/ 
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
30All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert 
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the 
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with 
the view that the evidence was admissible. It appears relevant to 
whether petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from accepted 
professional practice. 
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Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully with the purpose of respond-
ent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.715, 
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
2 SCHMIDT AND POLLARD v. OAKLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(1966). 
We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. · 
So ordered. 
\ 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child, with an I.Q. between 8 and 10. He 
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he 
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia. 
But after the death of his father in May 1974, his mother was 
1 The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the 
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus 
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1. 
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unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence} 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary 
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health 
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Petitioner Richard \ 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent 
lived. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, not medi- I 
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All clajms for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are 
no longer at Pennhurst. 
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
5 Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 




behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,S but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 73-75. Finally, the jury was instructed that 
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo 
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. 11 The jury re-
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200--203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101. 
11 The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners' \ 
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was 
entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. Id., at 164-170. 12 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth ~ 
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gam-
ble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference 
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112. 
12 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
13 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense , App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F . 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 14 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 15 
14 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment , 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
15 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries north( ' e 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amJr-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
16 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . 
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
17 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
£ ...-----18 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti-
(U tioners 27-31. 
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due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry, 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
19 Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as 
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of 
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this. issue from the 
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Raw-
linson, l3 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 
195, 20(J (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
""Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
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297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State--it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." ld., at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible 
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at 
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training 
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals 
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a mini-
mum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims 
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized 
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at --, training 
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of 
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite 
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or 
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily re-
straints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that 
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce 
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, re-
spondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his 
experts would show that additional training programs, in-
cluding self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's 
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as 
21 See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra. 
22 See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to 
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not 
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded 
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has 
some general constitutional right to training per se, even 
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re-
spondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, -- (Pet. 
54). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 24 
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24. 
23 Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with train-
ing or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181. 
24 It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and for-
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 






We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients 
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the 
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court 
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental 
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that] 
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F . 2d, at 
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the 
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the ab-
sence of an appropriate record . . . and without the benefit of analysis, ar-
gument or briefing'' on such issues. I d., at 186. 
25 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 27 I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the. unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
26 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution. 
27 See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
terests in confinement. 
---------- ----
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determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178.f(Persons who have been involun-
tarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose condi-
tions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this 
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" ne-
cessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to 
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than ab-
solute safety. We think this requirement would place an un-
due burden on the administration of institutions such as 
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise 
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents. 
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to mini-
mally adequate training. In this case, the minimally ade-
quate training required by the Constitution is such training 
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In 
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that 
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a 
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of chal-
lenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the 
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
80-1429-0PINION 
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tions should be minimized. 28 Moreover, there certainly is no 
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
propriate professionals in making such decisions. See 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess 
the expert administrators on matters on which they are bet-
ter informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by 
a professional, 29 is presumptively valid; liability may be im-
posed only when the decision by the professional is such a 
28 See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U.S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C)ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
29 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
to the supervision of qualified persons. 
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substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg-
ment. 30 In an action for damages against a professional in his 
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be lia-
ble if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional stand-
ards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, 
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to the extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety 
or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the 
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
30 All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert 
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the 
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with 
the view that the evidence was admissible. It appears relevant to 




Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully with the purpose of respond-
ent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.715, 
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal clay. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
RECEIVED 
SUPREt1E COURT. U.S. 
PU8L!CV ~.,,~ 11: T 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training 
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child, with an I. Q. between 8 and 10. He 
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he 
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia. 
But after the death of his father in May 197 4, his mother was 
'The American J?>ychiatric Associat}on explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' /. .. / is./ commonly vfrsed v to .,tefer vto t/'programs / forvthe 
mentallifetarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability 
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus 
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of 




unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary 
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health 
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him." App. 18. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility . Petitioner Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent 
lived. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators , not medi-
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospita~,ue to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 an l 7. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amende complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are 
no longer at Pennhurst. 
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
53-55. 
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 
7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated 
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behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
·gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. I d., at 73--75. Finally, the jury was instructed that 
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo 
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. ll The jury re-
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and thex., 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. _j 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 8~90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
' 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101. 
11 The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners' 
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was 
entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 12 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth 
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gam-
ble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference 
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112. 
12 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
13 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer (\V. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172J 
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 14 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to ~ medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 15 
"Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
" Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib- . 
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See,~ 
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. 8. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide 
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
16 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process~ 
.. . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
17 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 1fr-16. 




whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this cas~ 7 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (197$). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
'




due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry, 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 2Q As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
19 Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Qourt of Appeals as 
a ..t!: d . ./for vfeversing vthe vtrial / court. ,/Given vthe/ uncertainty v6f 
Pen s I nn· law. and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the 
ow ~ Cleral courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Raw-
linson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896). 
20 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 




297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." I d. , at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible 
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at 
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training 
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals 
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a mini-
mum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims 
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized 
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at --, training 
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of 
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite 
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or 
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily re-
straints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that 
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce 
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, re-
spondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his 
experts would show that additional training programs, in-
cluding self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's 
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as 
" See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra. 
22 See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to 
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not 
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded 
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has 
some general constitutional right to training per se, eve!l2.. ~~ 
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. {t- J 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re- -
spondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, --(Pet. 
54). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatmeJlt" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent.~ '\}"In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. It In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 2>€.- 2-5-
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24. J-
;9 Chief Ju ge e1 z use the term "treatment" as synonyous with train-
't..~ng or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181. 
\7 )S it is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and for-
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 









We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence.~u.Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients 
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the 
case before a c3:urt. Judge Aldisert, in his djssenting opini9n in the court 
belqw V was LCritical vOf vthe V'_t'majority's ;ilbandonmentvf>f Ji{cremental 
djF,:isforT-ta~g in favor of pl®lulgation of broad standards . . . [that] 
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision. " 644 F. 2d, at 
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the 
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the ab-
sence of an appropriate record ... and without the benefit of analysis, ar-
gument or briefing" on such issues. I d. , at 186. 
'2-- <, t<J In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
V necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
80-1429-0PINION 
YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO 13 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment;4lt-?See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail~~ I d., at 599-600. 
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must oe determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
'111 
V .P'See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
c-l care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution:,] 
7,-l -Psee also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. Persons who have been involun-
tarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose condi-
tions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this 
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" ne-
cessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to 
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than~· 
solute safety. We think this requirement would place any n-
due burden on the administration of institutions sUcli as 
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise 
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents. 
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to mini-
mally adequate training. In this case, the minimally ade-
quate training required by the Constitution is such training 
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In 
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that 
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a 
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of chal-
lenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the 
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
80--1429-0PINION 
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tions should be minimized.'ll~,;t7'Moreover, there certainly is no 
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
propriate professionals in making such decisions. See 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess 
the expert administrators on matters on which they are bet-
ter informed."') '?'> For these reasons, the decision, if made by 
a professional,~ 1s presumptively valid; liability may be im-
posed only when the decision by the professional is such a 
z.j BSee Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal ~with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes ~ v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & M tson ..The-
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the E or r's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental D ilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
~0 
v 
well as positive effects on social change). ;x:> 
70 '!By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, V 
V whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
to the supervision of qualified persons. 
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substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person re- . / 
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg- rJ V 
men~In an action for damages against a professional in his 
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be lia-
ble if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional stand-
ards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, 
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supr~j 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to the extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety 
or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the 
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
'; l ;J All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert 
v testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the l ~ f 
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with -.L.-~---t_:. +--IQ....L.---'/ 
the view that the evidence was admissible. It a~ant to 
whether petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from ~WJeef'Jtiee.. 
~~~ ~~--------~ 
~ t1v... r4..-r:J''s,'tt 
T> "*ss,'¢")/Lo.l J 'vtef[ 1-k~ +. 
S' e.L- f~ JJI. B; / 
SLLpr.CL Q 
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Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully with the purpose of respond- ~ 
ent'~ommitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.)p5, ~ 
738 uv72); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the dtate 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
G~~<!.-S ; II> /~ . 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether respondent, involun-
tarily committed to a state institution for the mentally re-
tarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment .to (i) safe conditions of con-
finement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) train-
ing or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming dam-
ages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Al-
though 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month old child, with an I. Q. between 8 and 10. He 
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he 
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia. 
But after the death of his father in May 197 4, his mother was 
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habili-
tation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the mentally-
retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability and train-
ing impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of habili-
tation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1. 
-----·------- ------------
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unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on 
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that 
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2 
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by 
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that re-
spondent was severely retarded and unable to care for him-
self. App. 21-22 and 28r29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary 
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health 
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions, 
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other resi-
dents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about 
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment 
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff 
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged 
2 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my 
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks, 
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't. 
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care 
for him. " App. 18. 
3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he 
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Petitioner Richard 
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent 




that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo 
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appro-
priate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his 
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in 
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically re-
strained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints 
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect 
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in trac-
tion or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned 
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pend-
ing law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Neverthe-
less, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was 
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respond-
ent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to com-
pensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him 
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental re-
tardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners 
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several 
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive 
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are 
no longer at Pennhurst. 
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shack-
les," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record 
5~55. 
5 Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or 
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23. 
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981) 
(remanded for further proceedings). 




behavior-modification program was designed by staff mem-
bers to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,8 but that pro-
gram was never implemented because of his mother's objec-
tions. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and 
of conditions in his unit. 10 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that 
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to 
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon 
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional 
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was in-
structed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him 
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his con-
stitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amend-
ment. ld., at 73-75. Finally, the jury was instructed that 
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to 
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo 
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. 11 The jury re-
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-
trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56, 
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they 
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. 
8 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit 
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other res-
idents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time, 
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
"1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
10 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's wit-
nesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefit-
ted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be 
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim 
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101. 
11 The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners' 
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was 
entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980). 
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel 
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not 
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the invol-
untarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment pro-
vided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the 
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of 
movement and in personal security. These were "funda-
mental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding, 
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote 
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed 
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat" 
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 12 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant 
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights 
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a 
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by 
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth 
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gam-
ble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference 
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112. 
12 The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synony-
mous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing 
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n. 
40. 
13 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on ap-
peal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App. 
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1. 
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such 
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat dif-
ferent standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for 
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a fail-
ure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity." 
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment 
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or 
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 16&-167 and 173. 14 
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered 
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable 
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In 
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that 
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact 
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of 
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, 
at 178. 15 
14 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat-
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in 
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if 
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the insti-
tution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explana-
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F . 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does 
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be 
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least 
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual 
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id., 
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present 
in this case. 
15 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately 
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought 
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the 
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the 
80-1429---0PINION 
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the im-
portance of the question presented to the administration of 
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982 
(1981). 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights 
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this 
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Penn-
sylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training 
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these 
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required condi-
tions of confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, 
e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, 
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide 
facts of the case an,1 of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, 
on a pragmatic leve., Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those 
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d., 
at 184. See id., at 183-185 
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote sepa-
rately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts 
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186. 
16 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot de-
prive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct 
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12. 
17 Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16. 
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8. 
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must 
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests rec-
ognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The 
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has 
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "his-
toric liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due 
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confine-
ment, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to 
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be un-
constitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who 
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily re-
straint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest 
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]ib-
erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the 
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from 
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incar-
ceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary 
commitment. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his 
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally ade-
quate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive 
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests. 
'





due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry, 
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below 
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previ-
ously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and devel-
opment of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the 
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Re-
spondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of 
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of 
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from 
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for 
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 
'
9 Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment 
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to 
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is 
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not ad-
vanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as 
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsyl-
vania law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the lower federal 
courts, w~ decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 
(1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 
261, 264-265 (1896). 
20 Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree 
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We 
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Interven-
tion in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational 
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Anal-
ysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman & 
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things 
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981). 
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297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is 
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is 
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services 
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily 
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attack-
ing every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." Id., at 486--487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retarda-
tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible 
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at 
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training 
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals 
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a mini-
mum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims 
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized 
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at --, training 
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of 
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite 
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or 
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily re-
straints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that 
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce 
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, re-
spondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his 
experts would show that additional training programs, in-
cluding self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's 
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as 
21 See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra. 
22 See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24. 
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to 
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not 
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded 
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has 
some general constitutional right to training per se, even 
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. 23 
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re-
spondent, observed: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence 
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, -- (Pet. 
54). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-be-
yond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physi-
cal restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment" 
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 24 In 
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of 
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and con-
clude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to 
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure 
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the 
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of 
record, we need go no further in this case. 25 
23 In the trial court, respondent asserted that "state officials at a state 
mental hospital have a duty to provide residents ... with such treatment 
as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those 
life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities permit." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 94-95. But this claim to a sweeping per se right was 
dropped thereafter. In his brief to this Court, respondent does not repeat 
it and, at oral argument, respondent's counsel explicitly disavowed any 
claim that respondent is constitutionally entitled to such treatment as 
would enable him "to achieve his maximum potential." Tr. of Oral Arg. 
46--48. 
24 Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with train-
ing or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181. 






We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these in-
terests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in 
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, 
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to 
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect 
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints 
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an insti-
tution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence 
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement. 
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has 
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the re-
straint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due 
process. 
In determining whether a substantive right protected by 
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or 
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court 
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to mini-
mally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms 
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable 
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumst~ ces of the case. 
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the 
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state. 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients 
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the 
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court 
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental decision-
making in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that] lack[] utility 
for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F. 2d, at 183-184. 
Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the case re-
quires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of an 
appropriate record . . . and without the benefit of analysis, argument or 
briefing" on such issues. I d., at 186. 
2<l In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was 
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra. 
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the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to 
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an 
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in 
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest 
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reason-
ably related to legitimate government objectives and not tan-
tamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a 
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process chal-
lenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a chal-
lenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with pa-
rental consent. In determining that procedural due process 
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the lib-
erty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests 
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600. 
27 See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an 
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held 
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due proc-
ess requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and 
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical re-
spects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity 
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a 
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condi-
tion she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2. 
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable 
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution. 
2Jl See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we 
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and con-
vincing'' evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by 
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his lib-
erty interests against the relevant state interests. If there 
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this bal-
ancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or 
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for 
determining whether a State adequately has protected the 
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded. 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz af-
fords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights 
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of 
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would 
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts 
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer-
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. Persons who have been involun-
tarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose condi-
tions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this 
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" ne-
cessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to 
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than ab-
solute safety. We think this requirement would place an 
undue burden on the administration of institutions such as 
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise 
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents. 
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to mini-
mally adequate training. In this case, the minimally ade-
quate training required by the Constitution is such training 
terests in confinement. 
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as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests 
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In 
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case 
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that 
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a 
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of chal-
lenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the 
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
tions should be minimized. 29 Moreover, there certainly is no 
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than ap-
propriate professionals in making such decisions. See 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not '"second-guess 
the expert administrators on matters on which they are bet-
ter informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by 
a professional, 30 is presumptively valid; liability may be im-
29 See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial 
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult 
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, --
(1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials 
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function 
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539 
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees, 
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional re-
quirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather 
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due proc-
ess claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation be-
tween institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitu-
tion that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emperor's New 
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75 
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as 
well as positive effects on social change). 
30 By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent, 
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posed only when the decision by the professional is such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judg-
ment. 3' In an action for damages against a professional in his 
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be lia-
ble if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional stand-
ards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, 
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commit-
ment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legiti-
mate state interests and in light of the constraints under 
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We re-
peat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food, 
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials 
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has 
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may 
not restrain residents except when and to the extent profes-
sional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety 
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular deci-
sion at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training 
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of 
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including 
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject 
to the supervision of qualified persons. 
31 All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert 
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the 
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with 
the view that the evidence was admissible. It may be relevant to whether 
petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from the requisite pro-
fessional judgment. See Part III B, supra. 
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or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the 
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such train-
ing as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable 
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function 
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not 
to provide training when training could significantly reduce 
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence. 
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected inter-
ests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of con-
finement would comport fully with the purpose of respond-
ent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 
738 (1972); see n. 27, ante. In determining whether the 
state has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made 
by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption 
of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable 
institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded 
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single profes-
sional may have to make decisions with respect to a number 
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the 
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particu-
larly professional personnel, should not be required to make 
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously in-
structed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-
ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we va-
cate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
So ordered. 
meb 02/19/82 
Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
The question presented is whether respondent, a 
retarded adult involuntarily committed to a state 
institution, has a claim for damages against petitioners, 
the director and two supervisors of the institution. 
Respondent brings suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983, claiming 
that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights 
£,...1~ e:;.. ~ 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
I\ 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. 
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 
eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the 
most basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent 
lived with his parents in Philadelphia. But after the 
( 
death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable 
2. 
to control his violence. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility 
on a permanent basis. Her petition to the Court explained 
that she was unable to care for Romeo or control his 
violence. 1 As part of the commitment process, Romeo was 
examined by a physician and a psychologist. They both 
certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable 
to care for himself. Joint A ppendix (J .A.) 2la-22a & 
~IU.<4,..._ 
28a-29a. The doctQr also described Romeo's self-
destructive behavior. 2 On July 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
1Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common 
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to 
handle him. He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks 
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't. 
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable 
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a). 
2 J. A. at 22A: 
"Physican and mental findings at time of 
examination: Pt. [patient] is nonverbal-
restrained in bed. Recognizes examiner by 
rolling his eyes and banging his head against 
bedrail." 
3. 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 50 §4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous 
~ 
occa sions, both by his own violence and by the reactions 
of other inmates to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned 
about these injuries: when she visited him in July of 
1976, for example, she observed that his eyes were black 
and his lip had been lacerated. After objecting about 
respondent's treatment several times, she filed this 
complaint, as his best friend, alleging that "[d]uring the 
period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff has suffered 
injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The 
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief 
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3 : it alleged 
that these officials knew, or should have known, that 
3Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent 
of Pennhurst: he has supervisory authority over the entire 
facility. Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of 
Resident Life at Pennfurst. Respondent Marguerite Conley 
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was 
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical 
doctors or psychologists. Youngberg and Matthews are no 
longer at Pennhurst. 
4. 
Romeo was suffering injuries and failed to institute 
appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his 
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transfered 
from his ward to the hospital for treatment for a broken 
arm. While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained 4 during portions of each day. 
These restraints were ordered by a Dr. Gabroy, not a 
defendant here, to protect Romeo and others in the 
hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being 
~ 
treated with intervenious tubes. 7 R. 40, 49, 76-78. 
A 
ca-~~-~ 
A W~ l'CSfl'el'l:d~n~ arm.. wa.s healed, b~ normally would have 
~ k,_ A•:::~~-~~. 
returned to l11s ward~),~e parties.(. loy thei t cauAoeJ y 
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the 
pending litigation. 5 R. 248, 6 R. 57-58 & 137. 5 
Nevertheless, in December of 1977, a second amended 
complaint was filed alleging that the defendants were 
restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine 
4
n oft" restraints, for the arms only, were 
genera ly u~ed. 7 Record (R.) 53-55, 59. 
5Three of petitioners' witnesses so testified at 
trial; respondent offered no evidence to the contrary. 
5. 
basis. 6 The second amended complaint added a claim for 
damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to 
provide him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay 
at Pennhurst. The claims for injunctive relief were 
dropped prior to trial because respondent is a member of 
the class seeking such relief in another action. 7 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April of 
1978. Petitioners introduced evidence of the training 
programs provided respondent both before and after his 
transfer to the hospital ward: he participated in several 
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 8 ~omprehensive 
• ... i.- j..~ '19?1.) 
6Although the first amended complaint ~filed ~ 
after respondent's hospitalization , it did not add any 
restraint-related allegations. Paragraph 16 of th~ ..... 
original complaint had stated that defendants "did not 
have the staff, resources, training, or compassion to 
implement such policies and procedures as are required to 
assure plaintiff a reasonable degree of physical safety." 
Paragraph 16 of the first amended complaint ,.- £ilea in tr 
Jai.'H~a.k¥ ef 1977 stated that "[d]efendants have failed to 
institute such policies and procedures as are required to 
assure plaintiff a reasonable degree of safety." 
7Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, U.S. (1981) (remanded for further 
proceedings). 
8Prior to hospitalization, Romeo participated in 
programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, 
dressing, attention, self control and toilet training. 
Defendants' exhibit 10: 3 R. 69-70, 5 R. 44-56, 242-250, 6 
R. 162-166: 7 R. 41-48. 
Programming continued while respondent was in the 
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256: 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 41-
48, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive 






behavior-modification progr.am , was designed by staff 
members to reduce his aggressive behavior9 , but that 
program was never implemented because of his mother's 
objections. 10 
Respondent introduced evidence of ·his injuries 
and of the conditions in his "unit." But the judge 
r e fused to allow testimony of experts proffered by Romeo. 
They would have testified that Romeo could have been more 
~?· effectively treated under other programs and that the lack 
~.~A~· of programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive 
~~ vi . 
~( jill behavior. These experts ~also J.. have stated that 
~~£~ '  · ~ ~W)ychologists are ethically bound to choose methods that 
~~ ? 
( ~ do not use restraints and that there is no dispute in the 
%~­r literature on this point. The trial judge disallowed this 
9 2 R. 7, 5 R. 88-90; 6 R. 88, 200-203; Defendants' 
Exhibit 1, at 9 (the program called for short periods of 
separation from other residents and for periodic use of a 
"muff" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time 
(i.e., 15 minutes), to prevent him from attacking himself 
and others) . 
101 R. 53; 4 R. 25; 6 R. 204. Yet, at oral 
argument, when asked to explain "the difference between 
the parties in this litigation, "counsel for respondent 
stated that "[t]he difference is that our feeling is that 
Petitioners are obligated to use behavioral programming to 
prevent violent people -- to reduce violence and prevent 
aggression." Transcript at 47. See also id. at 41 ("We 
concede that psychologists can use restraints as part of 
behavior modification programs. We want programming for 
our clients.") 
/ ' v 
7. 
testimony. He explained that it might be relevant to a 
malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional 
claim under §1983. Appecdix -t:o--Pe-t::K.iofh.. fm; Ge.t:t:i.orar:i { 
(Petn. App.) 94a-95a. 
At the close of the trial, the judge instructed 
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware 
of and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," such failure 
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Petn. App. 
~ 
73a. The jury was instructed that if the defendants 
" 
shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat 
him, tr n his rights had been violated. Ibid. Finally, 
the jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment 
"as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if 
defendants were "deliberately indifferent to the medical 
and psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his 
constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth 
Amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. 11 
11The trial judge denied certain jury instructions 
proposed by respondent. The judge refused to instruct the 
jury that Romeo had a right to "such treatment as will 
afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to acquire and 
maintain those life skills necessary to cope as 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
~~~~4-L. __ 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. -~ . 
.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
sitting en bane, vacated jur~ and 
remanded for a new trial. 6 44 F. 2d 14 7 ( 1980) . All of 
the judges agreed that repondent's expert testimony should 
have been admitted. Id., at 164 & 173. They also agreed 
that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not an 
appropriate reference for determining the constitutional 
rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, 
respondent's Fourteenth Amendment liberty right was 
implicated by the conditions under which he was confined. 
Id., at 156-59, & 173. The en bane Court of Appeals did 
not, however, agree on the relevant standard to be used in 
determining whether Romeo's constitutional rights had been 
violated. 12 
effectively as [his] capacities permit." Appendix to 
Petition for Certiorari 94a-95a. The judge also refused 
to instruct the jury that Romeo had a right to treatment 
"under the least restrictive conditions consistent with 
the purpose of the commitment." Id., at 95a. 
12The existence of a qualified immunity defense 
was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received 
an instruction on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not 
challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After 
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
The court's m-ajority opinion began its analysis 
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment 
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty." Id., at 157 
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). As 
a consequence, noted the court, involuntary commitment is 
circumscribed with due process protection. Ibid. The 
Court then held that commitment does not extinguish all 
aspects of an individual's liberty interest; the power of 
locomotion without restraint and the right to personal 
security and freedom from punishment are fundamental 
liberties that can be limited only by an overriding, non-
punitive state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. 13 
v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majora2Y of the court 
of Appeals noted that: 
"when this matter is remanded for a new trial, 
the trial judge should instruct the jury 
regarding the possibility of immunity with the 
caveat that the defendants' reasonable belief is 
to be judged at the time their actions wre 
taken. The jury should further be charged that 
the defendants are not responsible for 
unfor seeable developments in the law." 6 4 4 F. 
2d, at 171-172. 
13The court identified three legitimate state 
justifications for confinement of the mentally ill and 
mentally retarded: (~) the protection of society pursuant 
to the state's police power; (21 the protection and care 
of the individuals themselves pursuant both to the state's 
parens patriae and police powerd; and (8t' rehabilitation 
or treatment. Id., at 158. ~ 
Despite the-uncontroverted evidence in this record of 
Romeo's dangerous behavior, see text and notes at 
, supra, the court rejected dangerousness to others as a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
~~, 
In light of ~s ~~iAe~le, the court considered 
-<. 
Romeo's three claims: (1) the right to be free of physical 
,.u,. 
restraints; (2) the right to safety and protection; and 
·~ 
(3) the right to treatment. Id., at 159. Because 
physical restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive 
sanction," it can be justified only by compelling 
necessity. Id., at 159-160. And the failure to provide 
for a patient's safety~ must be justified by a showing 
of substantial necessity. Id., at 160. 
The court divided the treatment claim into 
three categories. If a jury finds that no treatment has 
been administered, it may hold the institution's 
administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling 
explanation for the lack of treatment. 644 F. 2d at 165, 
173. If some treatment has been administered, those 
responsible are liable only if the treatment is not 
legitimate reason for Romeo's commitment, relying on 
findings in another case. Id., n. 18 (citing Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State School & HOspital, 613 F. 2d, , 91 
(19 ) , subsequently reversed and remanded, u.s. 
(19--). The court t~ stated that "[t]he absence of any 
dangerousness to others only strenthens the state's 
obligation to provide treatment to such non-threatening 







"acceptable in light of present medical or other 
scientific knowledge." !d., at 166-167 & 173. The court 
considered a third treatment standard appropriate to 
justify severe intrusions on individual dignity, such as 
permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention. 
noted that "least restrictive analysis" would be 
~~-
appropriate here for the reasons h demand such 
~~-~­
L'.J.. ~1./.-
p-7 LJ_ _ justification of shackling. !d., at 165-166, & 173. t.v-.r- , 





Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four, 
.1\ 
considered the standards articulated by the majority as 
indistingj uishable from medical malpractice in many 
respects. In Judge Seitz' view, the Constitutiton "only 
requires that the courts make certain that professional 
judgment in fact was exercised." He concluded that the 
appropriate standard was whether the defendents' conduct 
was "such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards in the care 
and treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the 
defendants did not base their conduct on a professional 
judgment." 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of 
12. 
the importance of the question presented to the 
admin 'tration of state institutions for the involuntarily 




~ We consider here for the first time the substantive 
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment 14 to the Constitution. 15 In the case at bar, 
respondent has been committed pursuant to the laws of 
~~u c lZt., ;,.,....,f-. 
Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the ~ 
c~ti-t at ttmalrty of tl:lese pt ucedt:J: r-es. Nor aoes l:l e-oa::argue f 
th.a.t · Penn5ilyl~ -er..r~ ... n...._.-f ...... i.J.un ...... d;i~ l:li ._ -eofMT!"i'tment 
necessar:¥. The ~I\ question res:t'It#ent present~ is 
whether, under the Due Process Clause, petitioners have 
14under that A mendment, a state cannot deprive 
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law .... " U.S. Canst., Amend. XIV, §1. 
13. 
infringed a post-commitment liberty interest by failing to 
provide constitutionally adequate conditions of 
confinement. 
A 
Respondent's commitment proceeding did not ~ 
deprivef him of all liberty interest. See, e.g., Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-494 (1980). And the conditions 
under which respondent is confined in a state institution 
implicate the entirety of his remaining liberty interest. 
The question therefore becomes ~y what standard do we 
determine whether conditions at Pennhurst inpermissibly 
infringe that residuum of liberty of which respondent 
~ 
should ~r be deprived. 
1 
~ 
Due process represents the balance wMeh we, as a 
nation, have sruck between "the liberty of the individual" 
and "the demands of an organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 
367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In seeking this balance in somewhat similar cases, the 
Court has weighed the individual's interest in liberty 
14. 
against the restraints on state action. In Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979), for example, we 
considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, ~ 
~ ~ ~ ;.tt..ul ) 
~ not yet ~ convicted of .c at'l7' crime -4 could not be 
punished. But we upheld those restrictions on liberty 
J1.w/-
w~h were reasonably related to legitimate government 
objectives and not tantamount to punishment. And in 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 713, 738 (1972), we held that 
an incompetent pre-trial 
competency hearing, be 
detainee could not, after a 
,~ "" r·~tt '1. 
held ~ fer ever without either 
criminal process or civil commitment . ~ca1o1ee .:que process 
requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the 
tA... 
nature and duration of commitment and ~ purpose ~ 
\ 
coouni Llfteftt. See also Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 
(1979) (in determining burden of proof in civil 
commitment, individual's liberty interest weighed against 
legitimate state interests in confinement). 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), provides more 
specific guidance. There we considered a challenge to 
state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental 
15. 
consent. In determining that 
I~, f 
not mandate an adver sari sal hearing, 16 we ~eee e&e Court 
~j; 
has 1:::1tM~Irt'~~"'t! ~~ fal8l'e9PB ~ in determining whether 
~ ~k.GI--6--
are adequate ~ ORQQ a Bro~t-ah J..e liberty state procedures 
1. n teres t hfh-_*~c:~~ ..... i11''ol"t-,....!.;lofl'l-~1"111......_~-t"'iic""•.,.nC111f1 •• ~ 'CI. .... -,;:.l <::~ ~<:: .IT\.. I:' .L C'U 
"'First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards, and fin ally, 
the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.' 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), 
quoted in Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families, 431 u.s. 816, 848-849 (1977) ." !d., at 
599-600. --
factors are determinative in cases identifying the 
scope of procedural protection to be afforded a liberty or 
property interest under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendme~~17~ In the case at bar, the question 
16under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began 
with an application for admission signed by the parent. 
The super in tend en t of a hospital was then authorized to 
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis." If, after 
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental 
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment" 
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such 
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by 
law." 442 u.s., at 588 n. 5. In Parham, the Court 
sustained the statute. 
{\ 
\} 
· s ..__ . .the . _precis.e extent of substantive protection 
accorded in the context of a state institution. 
conclude that the balance to be achieved in 





were initially applied in 
a-~~~ 
u.s. 3{9: - 33S (1976) '1\ --w ~~ 
..---.--- .. -
de~-wrr~~~~rocedural due process had been 
' by the failure to provide an adjud•catory hearing 
the cessation of certain social security payments under a 
program administered by both state and federal _..6 
The Court began by noting that, as in the case at bar, 
agreed that the plaintiff had asserted an 
protected by due process. The dispute was over the 
of procedural due process protection appropriate. In the 
/ 
case at bar, ,Romeo also has asserted a protected interest 
.1' 
/ 
tho~~ dispute is over the degree of substantive du 
process protection apprfrpriate. 
state's procedures properly balance the liberty interest 
_M_o_n_t_r_y_m_,--4-4-3-~ (1979). 
individual against the legitimate interests of the 
~
~eJal~present wh~n the question is the degree of 
) 
ubstantive protection to be accorded I~ · d' ·d 1' an 1n 1v1 ua s 
interest in .an institutional settinf. In both 
the state's fiscal and administrative 
constraints must be balanced against the interests of the 
individual. The imposition of additional burdens on the 
state, whether substantive or procedural, should be 
justified by the incremental benefit to the individual. 
In determining the degree of protection to be 
.-( 
accorded respondent's liberty interestJ m ~=t:iteP!""aHde 'fr"" 
~ t9 il-<l , we therefore consider the following • ~: the 
individual's interest in decent, adequate food, shelter, 
and medical care, which the state agrees it should 
~
provide, the incremental e of additional comforts, 
programs, training, or activities, and the government's 
legitimate fiscal and administrative concerns. 
In considering these factors, it must be remembered 
does not extend a federal constitutional right 
~-1'~~vP~ LA.-a-~~ ~ 
t:..~, AA- ;,._ J2~. 
~ 
18. 
is in a state institution turn medical malpractice 
into a constitutional violation. See Estelle v. Gamble, 
u.s. 97' 106 (1976). the need to reserve the 
A 
Constitution for appropriate issues is especially 
compelling in the context of a challenge to conditions at 
a facility such as Pennhurst. Constitutional principles 
cannot direct day-to-day administration of a large 
H.-~ ~~ ~ ~···ilei/; 
institution operating within • filted" bu~. ~/L 
~'*'d ...... tfa••.l 
~- ... $ 
18 See , e • g ., Parham v • J • R • , 4 4 2 U • S • 58 4 , 6 0 8 n • 16 
(1979) (In limiting judicial review of medical decisions 
made by professionals: "it is incumbent on courts to 
design procedures that protect the rights of individuals 
without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts to the 
states to deal with difficult soc\16 problems); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (In context of 
conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees: "Courts 
must be mindful that these inquiries spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to 
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of 
how best to operate a detention facility); Wolf v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (in considering 
procedural due process claim in context of prison: "there 
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs 
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution of 
general application"); Procunier v. Marttinez, 416 u.s. 
396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he problems of prisons in 
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the 
point, they are not readily susceptible to resolution by 
degree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, 
and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of the government.") 
' ~-' :kls ~~~ 19. 





Respondent has a strong interest in conditions at 
Pennhurst. He is totally dependent on the institution, 
a~s treatment of him will determine the quality of his 
life. Respondent would, of course, prefer optimal 
conditions, including, not only decent housing, food, and 
medical care -- all of which the state agress should be 
provided but also training, and interesting and 
rewarding recreational activities. His interest in 
adequate food, shelter, and medical care and treatment 
decisions made by professionals is certainly strong. His 
interests in additional activities or training, though 
strong, is less compelling. 
The state has limited resources which it must 
allocate among competing, worthwhile, programs and 
institutions. Respondent does not argue that the state is 
obligated to accept responsibility for Romeo's life; 
respondent concedes that the state need not provide for 
him at a11. 19 The state has a strong fiscal interest in 
--~ 
Footnote (s)C:: wil~ appear on following pages. 
20. 
being able to afford individuals such as Romeo a place 
where they can survive in humane conditions without 
promising them optimal care and treatment, such as they 
would receive at private institutions. If too-high a 
standard is imposed on the state whenever it assumes 
responsibility for someone unable to survive on his own, 
many states will be unwilling or unable to provide for all 
those needing such care. 20 
If respondent were in a private institution, he 
would be entitled to recover from respondents in a medical 
~ ~7/f.C-41(,... ,flf!&.-,~••""< 
malpractice action if ~~¥ fa:i~a to exercise reasonable 
/\ 
care in accordance with sound hospital practice to protect 
the health and safety of their patients. Respondent would 
be entitled to treatment and conditions at the standard 
generally considered appropriate by other administrators 
of institutions for the retarded. See, e.g., Darling v. 
19Transcript of Oral Argument, at 33. 
20 In the context of equal-protection challenges to 
welfare classifications, we have recognzed that that the ..-(.. 
Equal Protection Clause "does not requ'\re that a State 
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or 
not attacking the problem at all.... It is enough that 
the State's action be rationally based and free from 
indivious discrimination." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
u.s. 471, 486-487 (1970). See also Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 u.s. 78, 83-84 (1971). 
21. 
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326 
(1965), cert. denied 383 u.s. 246 (1966). This standard, 
which would use the Constitution to protect patients in 
state institutions from ordinary torts, we reject as too 
high: it would interefere with the both the 
administration of state institutions and with the 
allocation of scarce resources by states. Although 
respondent would naturally prefer this standard, his 
preference cannot easily be distinguished from the 
interests of others in a wide variety 1 state 
and subsidies, not all of which can be provided. 
services 
We also reject the standard used by the District 
Court, i.e. the standard applicable to prisoners, as too 
low. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u. S. (1976), we held that 
the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners are not infringed 
unless there is deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needness. Prisoners are, of course, punished by being 
confined under conditions which deprive them of much that 
makes life worth while. Provided that it is not "cruel 
and unusual punishment," such confinement is not, however, 
unconsitutional. The deliberate-indifference standard 
22. 
identifies "cruel and unusual punishment" in the context 
of a medical-treatment decision. 21 In the past, 
confinement conditions varied with the extent to which 
d d . bl 22 cures were regar e as poss1 e. Today, at a minimum, 
the incompetent should be treated humanely -- the state, 
after committing these individuals without their consent, 
cannot be indifferent to their need byond bare 
subsistence. 
We think that the standard adopted by Judge Seitz 
in his concurring opinion reflects a sensitive balance of 
21 In a footnote, 429 u.s., at 96 n. 10, the court 
cited four lower court decisions illustrating cruel and 
unusual punishment. in the context of medical care: 
"Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2 1974) ' 
(doctor's choosing the 'easier and less 
efficacious treatment' of throwing away the 
prisoner's ear and stitching the stump may be 
attributable to 'deliberate indifference 
rather than an exercise of professional 
judgment')~ Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 
(CA7), cert. denied sub. nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 
419 U.S. 879 (1974) (injection of penicillin 
with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and 
refusal of a doctor of treat allergic reaction)~ 
Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973) 
(refusal of paramedic to provide treatment) ~ 
Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970) 
(prison physician refuses to administer the 
prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery 
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand 
despite contrary instructions of surgeon)." 
22see relevant history, comparing 18th, 19th, 20th 




the interests of the involuntarily committed and the 
interests of Pennhurst and of the state of Pennsylvania. 
Judge Seitz held that, to accord those it has 
involuntarily committed substantive due process, the state 
must place the involuntarily committed under the care of 
professionals. An individual's constitutioal rights are 
violated only if professional judgment is not, in fact, 
exercised in making a decision about his treatment or his 
living conditions, including the need for constrahts. But 
the fact that a decision departs from accepted 
professional conduct--the malpractice standard--will not 
~
uswally indicate a denial of constitutional rights. Only 
"\ 
if the departure is so substantial that it demonstrates 
that the challenged conduct was not actually based on a 
professional judgment, will there be a constitutional 
~ 
violation. Although mucR --b~fi.9r than the standard of 
malpractice, this standard is no more than that demanded 
by our concept of "humane" in the context of an 
institution for the incompetent. 23 
23Brief note on how "living tradition" as limit on 
substantive due process, quoting Harlan; citing Moore v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
( 
24. 
This standard should not be unduly burdensome on 
institutions. Professional judg~ments will not be second-
guessed by either courts or juries and institutions need 
not provide all the treatment and activities a private 
institution would offer. As a general matter, Pennhurst 
appears to commit its treatment and care decisions to 
professionals, 24 as do most, if not all, modern 
institutions for the incomptent. 
III 
A 
The state argues that, when a person is committed 
to a state institution for care, by which it means decent 
food, shelter, clothing, reasonable safety, and medical 
attention, "it is sufficient that [such] care be 
provided." Brief of Petitioners at 12 & n. 10. The state 
maintains that there is no additional obligation to 
provide "both care and treatment or forego commitment. 
City of Eastlake, and discussing current standards and 
attitudes. 
24Footnote on expert testimony, discretion, Rhodes 
v. Chapman, etc. 
) 
7 
entirely, leaving the mentally disabled to their own 
devices." Id., at 12. 
Although professionals in this field do not agree 
that effective treatment of ~ all severely or profoundly 
~
retarded persons is possible, 25 we cannot hold that due 
J\ 
process is satisfied when individuals involuntarily 
. 
. 4A..,. .. 'I'-JA 1 
committed to state institutions are ~  kept 
~··<- .. ~~ AA-4 .... 1-...&....t.- .,...A •• --t ~.......,- A -~l 
~ee~iiAQ.S ffi e-~refl~-khat ar-e. ;b€(!!S tha:n AI=IHlaR-e. 
alive,. 
A.+« .. :¢«," .f 
We do 
. + 
no~w@ sugge;;;, that the state has arj obli;,tion to 
~~ 
provide optimal treatment and conditions 9 = it is sufficient 
" ~k~ 
if a professional makes a judgment weet~er a ce~ain 
~~ 
1\ treatment Q£ 
~ 
a-GHvity: should .... be provided. 
standar w1ll be satisfied 
u,rlo 
~  ~ 25Brief illustration of variety of approaches in 
7 
~. r#llf ,.)' ·J: . 
~~~~ 
26. 
the Court of Appeals' standard. That court held that 
restraints can be justified only by "compelling necessity" 
and if the "least restrictive" method of dealing with a 
patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. R~ondent prefers a 
standard proscribing "unnecessary custodial shackling." 
at 
See Brief of Respondent 18-21. But, oral argument 
respondent indicated that there is little difference 
between these formulations; restraints would be 
unnecessary if a less restrictive alternative were 
available. Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56. 
This standard appears to be even higher than the 
standard that would obtain in a malpractice action. 
"Least restrictive means" and "compelling necessity" are 
concepts developed in reviewing legislative 
classifications infringing express First Amendment 
freedoms. We see no reason to assume that they are 
appropriate standards for judging decisions regarding the 
proper care and treatment of the profoundly retarded in a 
state institution. 
The Court of Appeals also held that for severe 
intrusions on personal liberty, such as permanent physical 
27. 
alterations by surgical intervention, the "least 
restrictive means" and "compelling necessity" standards 
would be appropriate. In their brief, respondents note 
that this standard is not presented by the case at bar and 
need not be addressed. Brief of Respondent at 10-11. We 
agree. 
Respondent does support, however, the general 
treatment standard adopted by the Court of Appeals: the 
involuntarily committed are entitled to treatment that is 
"acceptable of present medical or other 
scientic 644 F. 2d, at 173. This is 
precisely the standard of medical malpractice; under it, 
malpractice would become a constitutional violation 
whenever the patient was is in a state institution for the 
involuntarily committed. For the reasons given earlier, 
we consider such a standard too high. 
26The court also held that a failure to provide any 
treatment requires a ·"compelling explanation." 644 F. 2d, 
at 173. Respondents do not appear to have addressed this 
precise standard in their brief. (Add additional 
information about their arguing that he received no 
treatment and clarify this footnote - respondents assert 
no separate standard for non-treatment situation.) 
28. 
c 
Finally, respondent argues that, as a matter of 
state law, he was committed for "care and treatment." 27 
From this, he maintains that he has a state substantive 
right entitled to substantive, not procedural, due process 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. To support the proposition that his state-
created liberty interest is entitled to substantive due 
process protection, respondent cites Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980) and Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 557-58 (1974), but these cases afford procedural due 
process protection to state-created liberty interests. 
27 Respondent did not raise state law as relevant 
to this proceeding in any way prior to his brief to this 
Court. In his appellate brief, for example, he cited 
neither any state statute nor any state case, even as 
relevant to his federal rights under the Due Process 
Clause. See Respondent's Brief to the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit. Moreover, state law is by no means 
as clear as respondent suggests. The statute itself is 
ambiguous. It provides that a judge may order commitment 
"for care and treatment" after finding that the person is 
"in need of care." Pa. Stat. Annot. tit. 50, §4406 (b). 
But such an order is apparently appropriate for any 
individual in need of "care or treatment." Pa. Stat. 
Annot. tit. 50, §4406(a). The addition of "treatment" to 
"care" in the description of the commitment order itself 
may simply indicate that no additional procedure is 
necessary prior to the provision of treatment as well as 
care. 
29. 
Respondent has received federal procedural due 
process. When a person is involuntarily committed, due 
process requires a hearing to determine whether the facts, 
as shown by clear and convincing evidence, warrant the 
deprivation of liberty. Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 
{1979). Under Addington, a state can constitutionally 
commit to provide necessary care or to protect others. 28 
28 In Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 {1979), the 
Court considered the question of the appropriate standard 
of proof and adopted the clear-and-convincing standard: it 
did not expressly hold that only care or protection {not 
treatment) would justify commitment. But in reaching 
just the need for conclusion on the burden of proof, the 
Court considered discussed the legitimate, conflicting 
interests of the state and the individual whose commitment 
is sought. 
The commitment statute provided for commitment for an 
individual's own "welfare and protection or the protection 
of others." Id., at 420 {quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. -ss47-51 {Vernon 1958)). The state's 
psychiatrists, testifiying as experts, stated that 
Addington needed hospitalization in order to obtain 
treatment for his mental illness because he would 
otherwise refuse treatment. Addington contested neither 
his mental illness nor his need for hospitalization to 
secure treatment. Instead, he attempted to show that 
there was no substantial basis for concluding that he was 
dangerous to himself or others. Id., at 421. 
In considering the interests relevant to determining 
the appropriate burden of proof, the Court recognized only 
two state interests as legitimate: as parens patriae, the 
state has a legitimate interest "in providing care to its 
citizens who are unable •.. to care for themselves:" and, 
in the exercise of police power, the state can "protect 
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who 
are mentally ill." Although the Court did not explicitly 
reject treatment as a justification for involuntary 
commitment, its remand for further proceedings when 
Addington had conceded his illness and his need for 
treatment in the state hospital suggests that the need for 
treatment alone cannot justify involuntary commitment in 
the absence of a finding that the individual is either 
unable to care for himself or is dangerous to others. 
30. 
As a rna t ter of federal procedual due process, Romeo 1 s 
commitment itself did not deprive him unconstitutionally 
of liberty because his commitment was justified, as 
respondent himself concedes, by his own need for care and 
to protect others. 29 
Whether or not respondent has a post-cornrni trnent 
substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of federal constitutional 
law and entirely distinct from and independent of the 
reasons that may have motivated Pennsylvania during the 
earlier cornrni trnent proceedings. 30 In arguing otherwise, 
respondent relies on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715 
(1972}. There the Court stated that due process requires, 
at a minimum, terms and conditions of confinement that 
bear a rational relation to the purposes of confinement. 
29Add footnote on CA 1 s crazy finding of no danger 
based on record in another case. 
30 In the past, this Court has indicated that 
whether there is a federal substantive due process right 
at all is an entirely different question from whether 
there is a liberty interest for procedural due process 
purposes. See Srni th v. Org ani za tion of Foster Families, 
431 u.s. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977} (recognition of a liberty 
interest in foster families for purposes of procedural due 
process would not necessarily require that such families 
be treated as biological families for purposes of 
substantive due process under cases such as Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 493 (1977}}. 
31. 
In Jackson, however, the Court was only considering the 
need for a relationship between the one and only reason 
that justified confinement as a matter of federal 
procedural due process (temporary confinement pending 
competency to stand trial) and the "terms and conditions" 
of confinement. Romeo could, as a matter of federal 
procedural due process, be confined solely to protect 
those in his community. See n. 1, supra. Respondent was, 
of course, confined for care, and possibly treatment, 31 
under the relevant Pennsylvania statute. But respondent 
is not asking for another procedure, in which Pennsylvania 
would commit him solely because he is dangerous to others. 
31state law is not entirely clear. Respondent's 
argument is that the commitment provision, §4406, 
authorizes commitment only for both care and treatment. 
And under Jackson, continues respondent, he is therefore 
entitled to treatment as well as care (conditions of 
confinement must be reasonably related to purposes) • It 
is true that in In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631 (Pa. 19801), 
the court found a right to treatment under the Mental 
Health and Retardation Act of 1966, tit. 50. § 4101, et 
~· But §4406, the involuntary commitment provision, was 
not the source of this right. Instead, the court relied 
on other, more specific, statutory provisions and even 
more detailed regulations implementing them. Id., at 632-
637 (section 4406 is mentioned only in the opening 
paragraph in reporting an argument made by one of the 
parties). Of the other two cases cited by respondent, 
neither addresses the meaning of §44406. The first, In re 
Joyce Z., 4 Pa. D&C. 3rd 596. (Pa. Com. Pl. Ct. Allegheny 
County 1969), deals with the rights of a child in a foster 
home and the other, In re Guzman, 405 A. 2d 1036, 1038 
(Commonwealth ct. 1979) appears to have reached its result 
as a matter of federal constitutional law without 
construing §4406. 
32. 
And if he were given such a procedure, respondent would 
not then argue that due process requires no more than that 
he be kept behind high walls, since he was confined only 
to protect those outside Pennhurst. Yet, had 
Pennsylvania, as a matter of state law, committed petr 
solely to protect others, respondent's reading of Jackson 
v. Indiana would require that result. As a matter of 
federal substantive due process, there is no reason 
someone involuntarily committed to protect others should 
receive less treatment and inferior conditions than a 




In'-""voluntary commitment nei tifr extinguishes all 
constitutionally-protected libery nor entitles the 
committed to the optimal care and conditions they would 
receive in private institutions. Instead, the Due Process 
Clause balances the interests of the involuntarily 
committed against legitimate state interests and the 
we conclude that the involuntarily 
33. 
committed are entitled, at a minimum, to humane treatment: 
adequate food, decent living conditions, and medical and 
~ 
/treatment decisons made by professionals. 
lfp/ss 03/27/82 Rider A, p. 18 (Romeo) 
ROME018 SALLY-POW 
Note to Mary: I suggest moving the definition of 
professionals (now n. 24, p. 22) to be keyed to the word 
"professionals" in the "holding" sentence on page 18. 
Also, what do you think of revising your draft of the note 
to read along the following lines: 
"By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a 
person competent, whether by education, training or 
experience, to make the particular decision at issue. 
Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by 
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with 
appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical 
therapy, or the care and training of the retarded. Of 
course, the day-to-day care - including immediate 
decisions - necessarily will be made in many instances by 
employees without formal training but who are subject to 
the supervision of qualified persons." 
£ .1-: tF . 
meb 03/19/82 
Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
The question presented is whether respondent, a 
retarded adult involuntarily committed to a state 
institution, has a claim for damages against petitioners, 
the director and two supervisors of the institution. 
Respondent brings suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming 
that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. 
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 
eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the 
most basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent 
lived with his parents in Philadelphia. But after the 
death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable 
2. 
to control his violence. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility 
on a permanent basis. Her petition to the~urt explained 
that she was unable to care for Romeo or control his 
. 1 1 v1o ence. As part of the commitment process, Romeo was 
examined by a physician and a psychologist. They both 
certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable 
to care for himself. Joint Appendix (J.A.} 2la-22a & 28a-
29a. The physician also described Romeo's self-
destructive behavior. 2 On July 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
1Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common 
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to 
handle him. He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks 
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't. 
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable 
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a}. 
2 J. A. at 22A: 
"Physican and mental findings at time of 
examination: Pt. [patient] is nonverbal-
restrained in bed. Recognizes examiner by 
rolling his eyes and banging his head against 
bedrail." 
3. 
School Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania 
Mental He lth and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous 
occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions 
of other i to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned 
about these injuries. After objecting about respondent's 
treatment eral~e~:~~;:raint~ 
allegin~ that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 
~r 
best friend, 
to the present, plaintiff has suffered injuries on at 
least sixty-three occasions." The complaint originally 
sought damages and injunctive relief from Pennhurst's 
director and two supervisors 3 ~ it alleged that these 
officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo was 
suffering injuries and failed to institute appropriate 
preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under the 
3Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent 
of Pennhurst~ he had supervisory authority over the entire 
facility. Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of 
Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent Marguerite Conley 
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was 
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical 
doctors or psychologists. Youngberg and Matthews are no 
longer at Pennhurst. 
4. 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transfered 
from his ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken 
arm. While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained 4 during portions of each day. 
These restraints were ordered by a Dr. Gabroy, not a 
defendant here, to protect Romeo and others in the 
hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being 
treated intravenously. 7 R. 40, 49, 76-78. Although 
respondent normally would have returned to his ward when 
k~~~ 
his arm healed, the parties agreed that he should 
"' 
remain 
in the hospital due to the pending litigation. 5 R. 248, 
6 R. 57-58 & 137. 
Nevertheless, in December of 1977, a second amended 
complaint - was filed alleging that the defendants were 
restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine 
basis. 5 The second amended complaint added a claim for 
4Although the Court of Appeals described these 
restraints ~s "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms 
only, were generally used. 7 Record -(R.) 53-55, 59. ~1-
5~ he first amended complaint was fi fed in 
January 1977, after respondent's hospitalization,}it ~ 
~ addd a.R¥~restraint-related allegations. Compare 
jlfr iginal ~omplaint ,116 and /irst _)(mended _96mplaint ,[16 




damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to 
provide him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay 
at Pennhurst. The claims for injunctive relief were 
dropped prior to trial because respondent is a member of 
the class seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April of 
1978. Petitioners introduced evidence that respondent 
participated in several programs teaching basic self-care 
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was 
designed by staff members to reduce his aggressive 
behavior 8 , but that program was never implemented because 
of his mother's objections. 9 
(change related to safety claim, not use of restraints) • 
6Pennhurst 
---Halderman, proceedings) . 
State 
u.s. 
School and Hospital v. 
(remandedror further (1981) 
7Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital 
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding, 
showering, drying, dressing, attention, self control and 
toilet training. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R. 
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48. 
Programming continued while respondent was in the 
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 41-
48, and this programming reduced
1 
respondent's aggressive 
behavior, 7 R. 45. Llo~~~ 
8 2 R. 7, 5 R. 88-90; 6 R. 88, 200-203; Defendants' 
Exhibit 1, at 9~e program called for short periods of 
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on 
plaintiff's hands for short periods of time (i.e., 15 
minutes), to prevent him from ~ himself and 
other1.  
Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages. 
~ ,. Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries 
~~ 
and of conditions in his "unit," though the jna§e refused 
to allow testimony of two experts he proffered . 10 The 
trial judge explained that evidence of the advantages of 
alternative forms of treatment might be relevant to a 
malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional 
claim under §1983. Petn. App. 94a-95a. 
~r-
At the close of the trial, the jndge instructed 
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware 
of and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," such failure 
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Petn. App. 
73a. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants 
shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat 
him, his rights had been violated. Ibid. Finally, the 
91 R. 53; 4 R. 25; 6 R. 204. 
" 10The first of these experts was a psycholog~ 
c7 Ct" --spo.oia-lcy i-n. in treating the mentally retarded. He 
would have testified that Romeo could have been more 
effectively treated under other programs and that the lack 
of programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive 
behavior. Respondent's other expert was a physician with 
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of 
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would 
have testified that residents at his private institution 
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar 
problems of aggression or injury. 
7. 
jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as 
a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if defendants 
were "deliberately indifferent to the medical and 
psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional 
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 
73a-75a. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, 
on which judgment was entered. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, vacated 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 
(1980). All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert 
testimony should have been admitted. Id., at 164 & 173. 
They also agreed that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting 
cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, 
~ 
was not an appropriate r~fereRCe for determining the 
constitutional rights of the involuntarily committed. 
Rather, respondent's Fourteenth Amendment liberty right 
was implicated by the conditions under which he was 
confined. Id., at 156-59, & 173. The en bane court did 
not, however, agree on the relevant standard to be used in 
determining whether Romeo's 
8. 
violated. 11 
The court's majority opinion began its analysis 
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment 
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty." Id., at 157 
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 u.s. 504, 509 (1972)). As 
a consequence )c. n6-ted the court' involuntary commitment i.s-p-
~~~~4AM'~~ 
c · · · due process p.~<eteot ion. Ibid. The 
'\. .. 
;tourt ~d that commitment does not extinguish all 
aspects of an individual's liberty interest; the power of 
locomotion without restraint and the right to personal 
security and freedom from punishment are fundamental 
liberties that can be limited only by an overriding, non-
punitive state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. 
In light of these views, the court considered 
Romeo's three claims: (i) the right to be free of physical 
restraints; ( i i) the right to safety and protect ion; and 
(iii) the right to treatment. Id., at 159. Because 
11The existence of a qualified immunity defense 
was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received 
instructions on this defense, J .A. 76a, and it was not 
challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After 
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court 
of :Kppeals noted that such instructions should be given 
again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
9. 
physical restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive 
sanction," it can be justified only by compelling 
necessity. Id., at 159-160. And the failure to provide 
for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of 
substantial necessity. Id., at 160. 
The court divided the treatment claim into 
three categories. If a jury finds that no treatment has 
been administered, it may hold the institution's 
administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling 
explanation for the lack of treatment. 644 F. 2d at 165, 
173. If some treatment has been administered, those 
~ ~ .t..c.-
responsible are'\ liabley if the treatment is not 
"acceptable in light of present medical or other 
scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 & 173. The court 
considered a third treatment standard appropriate to 
1 
justify severe intrusions on individual dignity, such as l '7 
• , f/1.,(_ "'0 
~ 
permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, 
noting that "least restrictive analysis" would be 
appropriate. Id., at 165-166, & 173. 
Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four, 




from medical malpractice maO¥ 
1 
~- In Judge Seitz' view, the Constitutiton "only 
requires that the courts make certain that professional 
judgment in fact was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at He 
concluded that the appropriate standard was whether the 
defendents' conduct was "such a substantial departure from 
accepted professional judgment, practice or standards in 
the care and treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate 
that the defendants did not base their conduct on a 
professional judgment." 644 F. 2d, at 178. 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of 
the importance of the question presented to the 
administration of state institutions for the involuntarily 
committed. u.s. (198 __ ). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive 
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment12 to the Constitution. 13 In the case at bar, 
Footnote(s) 12,13 will appear on following pages. 
11. 
respondent has been committed pursuant to the laws of 
Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
The broad question presented is whether, under the Due 
Process Clause, petitioners have infringed a post-
commitment liberty interest by failing to provide 
constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement. 
Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive 
him of all substantive liberty interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 u.s. 
480' 491-494 (1980). And the conditions under which 
respondent is confined implicate the entirety of his 
~
1G,· Az~-·
1 SA ' 
liberty interest. The question t'herefore 
i\ 
remaining 
becomes by what standard do we determine whether 
conditions at Pennhurst inpermissibly infringe that 
residuum of liberty of which 
Amendment cannot deprive 
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law •••. " U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, §1. 
13The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth 
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights, 
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies 




Due process represents the balance wh>:io.h .W..e..,.___jLS a 
between "the liberty of the 
individual" and "the demands of an organized society." 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In seeking this balance in other cases, the 
Court has weighed the individual's interest in liberty 
against the restraints on state action. In Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979), for example, we 
considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were 
reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and 
not tantamount to punishment. And in Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 u.s. 713, 738 (1972), we held that an incompetent pre-
trial detainee could not, after a competency hearing, be 
held indefinitely without either criminal process or civil 
commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some 
rational relation between the nature and duration of 
commitment and its purpose. See also Addington v. Texas, 
4 41 u.S. 418 (1979) (in determining burden of proof in 
13. 
civil commitment, individual's liberty interest weighed ' 
against legitimate state interests in confinement}. 
Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979}, provides more 
~k J.t-l-~~~ 
specific guidance/\ There we considered a challenge to 
state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental 
14 consent. In determining that 
does not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we again 
identified the factors 15 that this Court has considered in 
determining whether state procedures are adequate to 
protect a liberty interest: 
"'First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards, and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.'" Id., at 599-600 (quoting Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976} (additional 
c1tat1on omitted}. 
14under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began 
with an application for admission signed by the parent. 
The superintendent of a hospital was then authorized to 
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis." If, after 
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental 
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment" 
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such 
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by 
1 a w • " 4 4 2 U • S . , at 5 8 8 n • 5 . In Parham , the Co u r t 
sustained the statute. 
15These factors were initially articulated in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976}, a procedural due 
process case. 
e < ~ 
14. 
In this case, the question is whether respondent's 
substantive liberty interests are ~qu~telf}protected)(in 
~ 
Pennhur st State School and Hospital. We fel ie-ve")- hc;mover, 
~ the factors considered in determining ~;:t(~tt;'""""f ~.a... 
t.~:>·t:.~k... 
state's procedures Pf-GPO.r...l.¥-~alag,c~ ---tl:;}e--..l.;ib~C-rty _jnte.rest 
of-t'argo~ t'ae legj timal:e4-ntereoto 91' Hto 
~ also are relevant in determining, as a matter of 
federal law, the constitutional adequacy of the state's 
substantive protection of federal liberty interests. 16 
16Respondent also argues that the 
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for hi 
·~ federal substantive right. He maintains thaca:,~~~~~~::t;:r-
/..~~ e was commmitted for care and treatmen 
~· and he there o~e has a state substantive right entitled to 
~ substantive, not just prqcedural, protection under the Due 
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we 
note that this argument is made for the first time -----
respondent ' s br i e f to this Cou r t ; (R:Q::::a:i:G:::l:i:Gl~~:t=s:e:==-@fa~-l '-/-~ 
l~~~~~~~~~~Y'~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ 
Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 _ J . _ , 
u.s. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process 
requires, at a minimum, terms and conditions of 
confinement that bear some rational relation to the 
purposes of confinement. In Jackson, however, the Court 
was considering only the need for a relationship between 
the single reason justifying confinement as a matter of 
federal law--temporary confinement pending competency to 
stand trial--and the "terms and conditions" of 
confinement. Romeo could, as a matter of federal law, be 
confined to protect others. See text and notes at n. 1 & 
n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418, ___ (1979); 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563, 573 (1975). Although 
respondent may have been confined for care and treatment 
under the relevant Pennsylvania statute, he is not seeking 
another state procedure, one which would commit him solely 
because he is violent. ~~
As a matter of fed ral substantive due process, there 
is no reason a men ally retarded person involuntarily ~ 
committed to protect others should receive less treatment ~ 
inferior conditions than one involuntarily commi tted..r; " 
care and treatment. Cf. Smith v. Organization of_ 1....._ /r7.J #. ~ 
Footnote continued on next page. -~ 
15. 
"-determining the degree of substantive 
to be accorded respondent's liberty interest, 
we therefore consider the following: the individual's 
interest in decent, adequate food, shelter, and medical 
pt....cf 
care, wi:H:-ch the state agrees 
.1\ 
incremental importance of 
In considering these factors, 
~ 
fiscal 
~ the need to reserve the Constitution for appropriate 
1\ 
issues i~ QB~~e~a±ry eompe±±ift§ in the context of a 
challenge to conditions at a facility such as Pennhurst. 
Constitutional principles cannot direct day-to-day 
administration of a large institution operating within the 
inevitable constraints of finite human and fiscal 
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977) (whether ? 
tfiere is federal substantive due process right is distinct 
question from whether there is federal procedural due 
process right). 
If respondent were arguing that his state-law 
substantive rights entitled him to certain procedural 
protections, state law would then be relevant. See, e.g., 
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Wolf v. McDonnell, 
418 u.s. 539, 557,-558 (1974). This argument 1s not, 
however, presented by respondent. 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider, Romeo 
ROME03 SALLY-POW 
III. 
The parties agree that the state must provide 
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19 The remaining 
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to 
additional training for his disability, less restrictive 
treatment, and safer conditions. In a sense, each of 
these claims relates to an element of the care that a 
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution. We think the standard 
articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance 
of the Matthews factors. He would have held that "the 
Constitution only requires that the courts make certain 
that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is 
2. 
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several 
professionally acceptable choices should have been made." 
644 F.2d, at 178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for 
which the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as lower than the standard applicable 
under state law in a tort suit for medical malpractice. 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo) 
ROME016 SALLY-POW 
We reject, of course, standards at inappropriate 
extremes. The standard of medical malpractice, imposing 
liability for any unjustified departure from established 
norms of medical practice, 18 is not applicable in this 
institutional setting. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 
97, 106 (1976). Nor is the standard applicable to prison 
conditions appropriate, as in penal institutions punitive 
conditions are permissible unless cruel and unusual. 
Persons detained involuntarily in a state institution 
because of mental retardation are not committed for any 
crime or fault on their part and cannot be punished at 
all. 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 22 (Romeo) 
ROME022 SALLY-POW 
Mary, we use the term "professional" in the standard 
without qualification or definition. This leaves quite a 
wide range of persons authorized to make judgments: from 
nurses (practical and graduate), physical therapists (like 
E. J. Shegonee downstairs), interns, resident physicians, 
psychologists and the entire spectrum of medical 
specialists. I appreciate the hazard of getting into 
definitions, but what do you think of something along the 
following lines as a footnote on page 22: 
"We undertake no definition of the term 
'professional', and recognize that it may encompass a 
2. 
range of persons who by their training and experience 
fairly may be viewed as possessing the requisite 
professional skill for the decisions they make for the 
welfare of patients and the treatment prescribed. 
Normally, a state determines the qualifications of and 
licenses various categories of professionals. In view of 
the spectrum of specialization in medicine and in the care 
of patients, we do not suggest that a state institution 
must be staffed with every category of specialists as few 
if any state institutions could afford this level of 
staffing. It is reasonable to expect, however, that where 
a state undertakes the care and involuntarily commits a 
mentally retarded person, its duty includes the reasonable 




Mary: It is evident that all sorts of problems arise from 
the foregoing type of definition. I have not looked at 
the briefs. Do we get any help at all from them or the 
opinions below? 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 24 (Romeo) 
ROME024 SALLY-POW 
In view of the facts of this case, the need for 
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. Mrs. 
Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's 
propensity for violence (J.A. 18a), and his complaint 
alleged during a specified period that respondent had 
suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions. It therefore 
is clear that the state, in discharging its duty to 
respondent himself as well as to other patients and staff 
personnel, that he be appropriately restrained at times 
when violence was evident or reasonably could be expected. 
We do not think that either a "least restrictive"* or a 
"compelling necessity" type of analysis is appropriate to 
the types of decisions that must be made in an institution 
4 
2. 
like Pennhurst - frequently and often with little or no 
warning - to restraint violence that may endanger the 
patient or others. All that the Constitution requires is 
that these decisions be made by a professional reasonably 
competent to make them. 
* There is professional judgment to the effect that "least 
restrictive treatment is not always preferable from a 
medical standpoint. See Amicus Curiae brief of the 
American Psychiatric Association, 20. 
' . ,, 
. 
~ . 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 26 (Romeo) 
ROME026 SALLY-POW 
IV 
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all 
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitled 
those committed to optimal care and conditions. The 
substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must 
be weighed against letigimate state interests and the 
constraints under which most state institutions 
necessarily operate. The state concedes a duty to provide 
adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. Nor 
does the state dispute that it has a duty to provide 
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within 
the institution. As indicated above, we hold that the 
state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for 
2. 
a patient such as respondent. The decisions made by the 
appropriate professional, whether on the staff or 
retained, are entitled to a strong presumption of 
correctness. Without such a presumption, it is difficult 
to see how institutions of this kind - unfortunately often 
overcrowded and understaffed - can function. Multiple 
decisions with respect to patients with widely varying 
needs and problems may be made in the course of a normal 
day. The administrators, and particularly the physicians 
and specialists should not be required to make these 
decisions in the shadow of damage suit liability. This is 
not to say, of course, that the liberty interests 
identified above are not to be protected or that judicial 
review is not to be available in appropriate cases. 
3. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was 
improperly instructed on the assumption that the proper 
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. 
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
I jL 
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 24 (Romeo) 
ROME024 SALLY-POW 
In view of the facts of this case, the need for 
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. Mrs. 
Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's 
propensity for violence (J.A. 18a), and his complaint 
~ 
alleged~during a specified period~ respondent had 
suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions. It therefore 
is clear that the state, in discharging its duty to 
respondent himself as well as to other patients and staff 
~~-~~~ 
personnel ')tha-t be.. \3Q...~~e:t.Ql:-"; re-s-treil"':e6 at times 
~ ~ 
when violence~ evident or reasonably~~ be expected. 
We do not think that either a "least restrictive"* or a 
(Ac..~ 
"compelling necessity" type of analysis is appropriate!\,~ 
the types of decisions that must be made in an institution 
, .. 
2. 
like Pennhurst - frequently and often with little or no 
warning - to restraint violence that may endanger the 
patient or others. All that the Constitution requires is 
that these decisions be made by a professional reasonably 
competent to make them. 
* There is professional judgment to the effect that "least 
restrictive treatmentL\is not always preferable from a 
medical standpoint. See Amicus Curiae brief of the 
American Psychiatric Association, 20. 
24. 
/\ ,/ We 
reject respondent's argument for "least 
~~r restrictive" 
A-
analysis in the context of a treatment 
decision such as this one. Such analysis would be too 
great an interference with professional decisionmaking. 
Indeed, the "least restrictive" treatment might not even 
preferable from a medical standpoint. See Amicus 
Curiae Brief of the American Paychiatric Association 20. 
~ ;;£c_, ,....,___,., 
It is clear that the State owes other patients ..-1 
~--~-~ 
protection from respondent's violence, and the St~e owes 
1 
respondent himself protection from his own self-
destructive behavior. When a professional makes a 
~,.,... 
reasonable decision that restraints are appropriate for 
A 
these reasons, there is no constitutional violation. We 
therefore accept the State's argument that restraints may 
be a reasonable and permissible way of dealing with a 
patient, though we require that the decision be made by a 
profess~ { 
c 
Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would 
25. 
impose liability for any injury to respondent in the 
absence of "substantial necessity" or "sustantial 
explanations" based on the State's interest in providing 
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional 
order needed to provide that care and treatment. 644 F. 
2d 1 at 163-164 & 
Petitioner argues that the proper standard was articulated 
in the jury instructions: there is no constitutional 
violation in the absence of "deliberate indifference" to 
respondent's safet~ See B£~ of J2@titiGRere ~ ~ J .A. 
7 3a (jury instruction cited by petitioner) . 26 Thus, the 
~ 
State would adept the "deliberate indifference" standard 
" 
of Estelle v. Gamble, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (standard of 
liability for prison doctors in treating prisoners), for 
determining whether the failure to ensure respondent's 
26speci fically, petitioner cites the instruction on 
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the 
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable 
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," 
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A. 
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent 
himself, see Petn. App. 93a, the trial judge also 
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence 
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo's needs under the 
standard of Estelle v Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976), 
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment 
could have prevented injury. 
., .~ . 
·-
lfp/ss 03/20/82 Rider A, p. 26 (Romeo) 
ROME026 SALLY-POW 
IV 
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all 
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitled 
those committed to optimal care and conditions. The 
substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must 
be weighed against letigimate state interests and the 
constraints under which most state institutions 
necessarily operate. ~he state concedes a duty to provide 
adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. Nor 
does the state dispute that it has a duty to provide 
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within 
the institution. As indicated above, we hold that the 




a patient such as respondent. The decisions made by the 
appropriate professional, whether on the staff or 
retained, are entitled to a strong presumption of 
correctness. Without such a presumption, it is difficult 
to see how institutions of this kind - unfortunately often 
overcrowded and understaffed - can function. Multiple 
decisions with respect to patients with widely varying 
needs and problems may be made in the course of a normal 
day. The administrators, and particularly the physicians 
and specialists)should not be required to make 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
decisioni in the shadow of damage suit liability. This is r . 'c4. 
not to say, of course, that the liberty interests 
identified above are not to be protected or that judicial 





In this case, we conclude that the jury was 
~ructed on the assumption that the proper 
'\ 
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. 
3. 
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
26. 
safety v i olated the Constitution. 
!lfl,~~~~~ /t fhe/ State owes respondent a duty to tak 
steps to ensure his physical safety. the standard 
• 
urged by respondent~liability in the absence of 
"substantial necessity" or a "substantial explanation•:.....---y-
~~ 
also reject petitioners' e.taRaare as too low; 
/1 
s 
the State oan~t fulfil~ its constitutional obligation? by 
treating the involuntarily committed as though they were 
prisoners, i.e. , ~i~z~it~.~~ 
~ 
indifference" to their needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 427 
u.s. · 97 (1976). ~~ ~ ~ ~ 
~· r--· 
~ o-ther agcia ioRs iR an institution such as 
Pennhu~ ~~ ~1=-~~!::1!;'~ 
'Wlifl' ~~~to  
aeleq1:1ateocy protect the safety of inmates/~~~ 
~1\ ~ ~~~~~~D 
IV 
mmitment neither extinguishes 
onstitutionally-protected liberty nor entitles 
committed to the optimal care and conditions they 
27. 
eceive in private institutions. Instead, 
balances the interests of the involuntarily 
against legitimate state interests and the 
~ 
~it~n which state institutions operate. \ 
I 
"" 




entitled to adequate food, sh ter, clothing, ana 
care. In addition, w hold that the 
p tients are entitled to hav 
/ 
professional. Although the State need not 
or safety conditions which 
in a private institution, 
th se it has involuntarily committed the 
appropriate by a professional. Because 
was instructed that the proper standard was that of 
Eighth Amendment, we remand for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this decision. 
L 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider 17a (Romeo} 
Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16 
and 17, et seq. 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo} 
ROM17A SALLY-POW 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we 
reject standards at the extremes. The standard of medical 
malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified 
departure from established norms of medical practice, 18 is 
not applicable in this institutional setting. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976}. Nor is the standard 
applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as punitive 
conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless 
they are cruel and unusual. Persons detained 
2. 
involuntarily in a state institution because of mental 
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on 
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all. 
III. 
We think the standard articulated by Chief 
Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Matthews 
factors. He would have held that "the Constitution only 
requires that the courts make certain that professional 
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for 
the courts to specify which of several professionally 
acceptable choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 
178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for 
which the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as less demanding than the standard 
applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical 
malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the proper 
balance between the relevant interests. Persons 
involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the 
state. 20 In effect such persons, for no fault of their 
own, have become incarcerated. They therefore are 
entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of 
3. 
confinement more reflective of their status and needs than 
those imprisoned for a criminal offense. We therefore 
hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain 
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment, 
training, physical constraints, and safety considered 
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment. 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
4. 
burdens on states. We make clear, however, that judicial 
review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that 
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively 
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21 
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not 
delegated to professionals within or retained by the 
institution, or if the decision is such a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or 
standards as to demonstrate that the responsible persons 






F-.i:-tia~ur halA.n.r:e of th~se factors is ga-ided by ;:;--' 
W-!-~ i-; t>f ~~ o.A--
~eu---eo. avoid t.he" standards o.f twQfoapprop ·ate 




of medical malpractice, 
established 
~ J/kW 
See , e • g • , Parham v • J • R. , 4 4 2 U • S • n • 16 
(1979) (In limiting ]Ud1c1al review of medical decisions 
made by professionals: "it is incumbent on courts to 
design procedures that protect the rights of 'ndividuals 
without unduly burdening the legitimate effo ts ....M the 
states to deal with difficult soci.,;yrproblemsf"; Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (In context of 
conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees: "Courts 
must be mindful that these inquiries spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to 
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of 
how best to operate a detention facility); Wolf v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (in considering 
procedural due process claim in context of prison: "there 
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs 
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution of 
general application"); Procunier v. Marttinez, 416 u.s. 
396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he problems of prisons in 
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the 
point, they are not readily susceptible to resolution by 
degree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, 
and the commitment of resources, all of which are 
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of the government."). See also 
Townsend & Mattson, The Interaction of Law and Special 
Education, 1 Analysis and intervention in Developmental 
disabilities 75 (1981) (judicial resolution of rights of 
the handicapped can have adverse as well as positive 
effects on social change). 






~d-ed as tee~hl;l, At--......tl:l..e ~r .e..UtetJlQ.., the standard 
.1\ 
S .....,.t.e.'f(..ss=£ / 
::::::::::;0 p::~~::d c:jt:::::;z: ~ ::: 
unusual--is equally Those committed 
involuntarily mental retardation are not 




~~~~ A Respengent. -aRil tse State agree that the 
provide adequate food, shelter, and medical 
remaining questiorf ~spend is 
"" 
entitled 
additional training for his d' ability, less restrictiv~ 
W-L-~~u ~ 
treatment, ~ safe/ .n itions. The proper holding will 
balance 
/ 
'ent' s interests in these additional 
benefits / against the other Mathews factor, the State' 
,/ 
legitimate administrative and fiscal constraints, and wi 1 --
19Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 & n. 10; Brief of 
Respondent 15-16. See also Amici Curiae Brief of 
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8. 
18. 
avoid the extremes of medical-malpractice and Eighth 
Amendment standards. / 
We find that the standard articulated by Chief 
Judge Seitz reflects a sensitive and proper balance of 
these factors. He held that "the Constitution only 
requires that the courts make certain that professional 
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for 
the courts to specify which of several professionally 
acceptable choices should have been made." 644 F. 2d, at 
178. We hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily 
l. 
( the mentally retarded without providing the education and 
training, restraints or other conditions of treatment, and 
safety considered approriate by a professional exercising 
l his judgment. 
This standar~ avoids both inappropriate extremes--
it is somewhat higher than the standard applied in 
considering the constitutionality of prison conditions but 
lower than the standard applicable in a tort suit for 
medical malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the 
proper balance between the relevant interests. It is 
inherent in the nature of involuntary commitment that 
19. 
those committed must depend entirely upon the state. 20 If 
,. 
the state incarcerates the retarded without deleggting 
decisions regarding their treatment and the conditions of 
their confinement to the judgment of professionals, it has 
deprived a group of persons known to have special needs of 
their freedom without crimina! process, for no fault of 
their own, and with apparent indifference to whether their 
needs will be met. Such action offends the balance 
between the rights of the individual and the needs of 
organized society represented by due process. \) 
Although any holding that the involuntarily · 
committed have constitutional rights to confinement J 
cdnditions superior to those given prisoners will increase! 
I 
the drain on state resources and limit state , 
administrative decisions to some extent, our holding 
I 
limits the role of the courts to ensuring that the · state 
commits the decision regarding training, treatme t 
conditions or restraints, and safety, to the discretion f 
a professional, interference with administration of sta e 





lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider A, p. 20 (Romeo) 
ROM20 SALLY-POW 
The parties agree that the state must provide 
c~'l>) 
adequate food, shelter and medical care.l9 The remaining 
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to 
additional training for his disability, less restrictive 
treatment, and safer conditions. In a sense, each of 
these claims relates to an element of the care that a 
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution. 
. ' " 
20. 
. st. t. h ld b . . . d 21 1n 1tu 1ons s ou e m1n1m1ze . As a matter of 
federal CQnstitutional law, liability will exis~ ~y when 
/ 
these decisions are not delegated to pr fessionals within 
the institution or if the decision is, in the words of 
' 
Chief Judge Seitz, sucn a substantial departure from 
.,. 
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards 
\ as to dem defendands did not base , 
/ o uct on a 
~~
professional judgment." 22 644 F.2, a-t---- '-
~ 
We turn now to consider ~~fly respondent's 
specific claims in light of this standard. 
A 
21 Indeed, although respondent has claimed 
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles 
respondent to something that can as easily be 
characterized as a procedural, rather than a substantive, 
right. We hold that the involuntary committed are 
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a 
professional exercising his professional judgment--a 
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case d1scussed 
in text and notes at n. & n. ___ , supra. 
22All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that 
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted. 
This issue was not included in the questions presented in 
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to 
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible. 
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were 
such a substantial departure from accepted professional 






Respondent claims the right to training and education 
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and 
argues that such treatment should be provided under the 
general standard adopted by the Court of Appeals 23 : 
treatment "acceptable ••• in light of present scientific 
knowledge." 644 F. 2d, at 173. The State maintains that 
when it commits an individual such as Romeo for care, it 
need not "assume a constitutional duty to provide him with 
additional services such as treatment [in the form of] 
training and education necessary to maximize his 
developmental potential." lk-!!~e4:i:-ene:fs ~ 
a •. ~ ~r~~ 
We 'ft::Ot ag<e;t;:':'tther argument. As Rated by 
p~ ~ standard urged by respondent and adopted 
~k~~J:;< .. e~ 
by the Third Circuit · · · Pennsylvannia' s 
1\ 
medical malpractice standard. 
<J·~J 
~ 
 23of the three treatment standards adopted by the 
Court of Appeals, respondent supports only this one. The 
~ 
... ~AA-~~~· - Court of Appeals court also held that a fai,lure to provide 
,,-2~ tJ' any treatment requires 1a "compelling explanation," 644 F. 
2d, at 173, but respondent does not address this precise 
standard in his brief. 
~.! _ In addition, the Court of Appeals held that severe 
~~ intrusions on individual dignity, i.e., permanent physical 
;r
~r~v~~~ alteration or surgical intervent1on, would be reviewed 
~'-1~-~ under the least-restrictive standard. 644 F. 2d, at 265-
266, & 173. Respondent merely notes that this standard is 
not presented by the facts of this case. See Brief of 
Respondent 10-11. 
22. 
And, although professionals are far from agreeing that 
effective training or- edttea:timt• of all severely or 
profoundly retarded persons is even possible, 24 we 
~'J.Uf-
certainly ea.-nnGt hold that due process is satisfied when 
~ 
individuals involuntarily committed to state institutions 
are simply kept alive. When treatment or training might 
ameliorate a patient's suffering or improve his condition, 
such care should be cons ide red by a professional 
exercising his professional judgment in making the 
treatment decision. We do not suggest that the State has 
an obligation to provide optimal -s.a..re OP treatment. 
~- .-.. ·-:Z..c 414 ~ 
Normally, it is sufficient if a f!:u:A<8se ieRa:l: makes a 
B 
24see, e.g., Favell, Risley, Wolfe, Riddle, & 
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981): 
Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the Limiting 
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981): 
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for 
the Substance of Things Hoped for: The Evidence of Things 
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental 
Disabilities, 37 (1981). 
<2~~ 
23. 
~ ~espondent and the State ~gree ~a~ing 
1\ 
the use of restraints. Respondent maintains, and the 
Court of Appeals fo.r Cil"OI.lit held, that 
restraints can be justified only by "compelling necessity" 
and as the "least restrictive" method of dealing with a 
patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. 25 The basis for this 
holding was the ~O\H't -GE --AppeaJ sr perception that 
restraints are "not normally within the conditions of 




644 F. 2d, at 160 (footnote omitted). The 
that there is no ~tl:ial basis for this 
~~ 
profoundly retarde~S often}.. violent and restrainty~ 
~-· ~Tt:e s? 
a~~-t:~ttere-e-s;-...-.-t..t;+l:lh:aHt-:-......liHt::--...:.J.J~e:r-"""e~tl+:~tt:-::tt-'' -t~l:l,-,eea.d--6-bQO...,,...J;.T.~a:tc:Q. steps , 
~~
i~ 1.1-S(i.--- of restrel-4.nte.., te protectj its legitimate 
~~ ~· 
interest in~the welfare and safety of all)the residents in 
-Bf:.l&:n4~..+&'6-• ...... -t..&....; a 6 1 1 ~ 
its institutions. a-Kef ~ 2-8-. 
~ht YU.t_~~~ ~ 
~ ~-~- .n.c..., UA-L 
\j 25 In his br i f, repondent urges adoption of a standard .!lo7 ~~ 
proscribing "u ecessary custodial shackling." See Brief 
of Responden 18-21. But, at oral argument respondent's ~~-- ~ _ 1 
/;'/-~A i · there is little difference between thes-e -1-- --__.~ 
c.-r,---- ' formulations i:-n-- re.sp~FI.GeRt' s view, r9.Straifits w~e 
ullfteC'es-e'8:ry if ~ les.s restrictive alternative  
available. Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56. 
...... ., . 
I of'• I 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider 17a (Romeo) 
Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16 
and 17, et seq. 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo) 
ROM17A SALLY-POW 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we 
reject standards at the extremes. The standard of medical 
malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified 
departure from established norms of medical practice, 18 is 
not applicable in this institutional setting. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Nor is the standard 
applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as punitive 
conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless 




•, ' • c 
2. 
involuntarily in a state institution because of mental 
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on 
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all. 
III. 
We think the standard articulated by Chief 
Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Matthews 
factors. He would have held that "the Constitution only 
requires that the courts make certain that professional 
judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for 
the courts to specify which of several professionally 
acceptable choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 
178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for 
which the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
3. 
and may be viewed as less demanding than the standard 
applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical 
malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the proper 
balance between the relevant interests. Persons 
involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the 
state. 20 In effect such persons, for no fault of their 
own, have become incarcerated. They therefore are 
entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of 
confinement more reflective of their status and needs than 
those imprisoned for a criminal offense. We therefore 
hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain 
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment, 
training, physical constraints, and safety considered 
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment. 




burdens on states. We make clear, however, that judicial 
review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that 
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively 
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21 
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not 
delegated to professionals within or retained by the 
institution, or if the decision is such a substantial 
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or 
standards as to demonstrate that the responsible persons 
did not base their decisions on such a judgment. 22 
~- .. 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 RiderA, p. 17, Romeo 
ROME03 SALLY-POW 
III. 
The parties agree that the state must provide 
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19 The remaining 
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to 
additional training for his disability, less restrictive 
treatment, and safer conditions. In a sense, each of 
these claims relates to an element of the care that a 
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution. We think the standard 
articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance 
of the Matthews factors. He would have held that "the 
Constitution only requires that the courts make certain 
that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is 
., 
2. 
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several 
professionally acceptable choices should have been made." 
644 F.2d, at 178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for 
which the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as lower than the standard applicable 
under state law in a tort suit for medical malpractice. 
Moreover, this standard strikes the proper balance between 
the relevant interests. Persons involuntarily committed 
must depend entirely upon the state. 20 In effect such 
persons, for no fault of their own, have become 
incarcerated. They therefore are entitled to treatment 
and to conditions of confinement more reflective of their 
status and needs than those imprisoned for a criminal 
3. 
violation of the law. We therefore hold that the state 
cannot commit involuntarily and detain the mentally 
retarded without providing the education and training, 
constraints or other conditions of treatment, and safety 
considered appropriate by professional exercising their 
judgment. 
We recognize that our holding that persons 
involuntarily committed to mental institutions have 
constitutional rights to confinement conditions superior 
to those given persons imprisoned for criminal offenses 
may impose some additional financial burdens on states, we 
make clear that judicial review by courts is limited 
primarily to insuring that the decisions with respect to 
the training, treatment, and conditions of detention of 




when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21 As a matter 
of federal constitional law, liability will exist only 
when these decisions are not delegated to professionals 
within the institutions or if the decision is, in the 
words of Chief Judge Seitz, such a substantial departure 
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards 
as to demonstrate that the responsible presons did not 
base their decisions on an accepted professional 
judgment. 22 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider A, p. 20 (Romeo) 
ROM20 SALLY-POW 
The parties agree that the state must provide 
adequate food, shelter and medical care.l9 The remaining 
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to 
additional training for his disability, less restrictive 
treatment, and safer conditions. In a sense, each of 
these claims relates to an element of the care that a 
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution. 
/ 
lfp/ss 03/26/82 Rider A, p. 13 (Romeo) 
YOUNG13 SALLY-POW 
Although the foregoing cases have involved 
procedural due process, essentially the same type of 
analysis is appropriate in considering whether 
respondent's substantive liberty interests are protected 
adequately in the Pennhurst State School and Hospital: it 
is necessary to strike a balance - as Justice Harlan said 
in Poe v. Ullman - between the liberty interests at issue 
and the practicalities of operating an institution such as 
Pennhurst. We also must be mindful of a need to reserve 
the Constitution for appropriate issues, as there are 
limitations upon the extent to which constitutional 
principles may be relied upon in considering the adequacy 
of the care provided at a large institution operating 
2. 
within the inevitable constraints of finite human and 







lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider 17a (Romeo) 
/ 
~/ 
Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16 
and 17, et seq. 
lfp/ss 03/22/82 Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo) 
ROM17A SALLY-POW 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we 
reject standards at the extremes. The ' standard of medical 
malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified 
departure from established norms of medical practice,lB is 
not applicable in this institutional setting. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Nor is the standard 
applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as punitive 
conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless 
they are cruel and unusual. Persons detained 
2. 
involuntarily in a state institution because of mental 
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on 
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all. 
III. 
The parties agree that the state must provide 
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19 The remaining 
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to 
additional training for his disability, less restrictive 
treatment, and safer conditions. In a sense, each of 
these claims relates to an element of the care that a 
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily 
committed to a mental institution. We think the standard 
articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance 
of the Matthews factors. He would have held that "the 
Constitution only requires that the courts make certain 
3. 
that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is 
not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several 
professionally acceptable choices should have been made." 
644 F.2d, at 178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for 
which the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as less demanding than the standard 
applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical 
malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the proper 
balance between the relevant interests. Persons 
involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the 
state. 20 In effect such persons, for no fault of their 
own, have become incarcerated. They therefore are 
entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of 
4. 
confinement more reflective of their status and needs than 
those imprisoned for a criminal offense. We therefore 
hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain 
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment, 
training, physical constraints, and safety considered 
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment. 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on states. We make clear, however, that judicial 
review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that 
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively 
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21 
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not 
delegated to professionals within the institution or if 
the decision is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards as to 
demonstrate that the responsible persons did not base 
their decisions on such a judgment. 22 
5 • 
w~~ 
~_,_-_,. Wo~ -f ?eoiJOAt ''J a.-~ 
meb 03/24/82 
Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
The question presented is whether respondent, a 
retarded adult involuntarily committed to a state 
institution, has a claim for damages against petitioners, 
the director and two supervisors of the institution. 
Respondent brings suit under 42 u.s.c. §1983, cla iminn ~-_./ 
~r- __,., 
' 
that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. 
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 
eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the 
most basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent 
lived with his parents in Philadelphia. But after the 
death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable 
2. 
to control his violence. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility 
on a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained 
that she was unable to care for Romeo or control his 
violence. 1 As part of the commitment process, Romeo was 
examined by a physician and a psychologist. They both 
certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable 
to care for himself. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 2la-22a & 28a-
29a. The physician also described Romeo's self-
destructive behavior. 2 On July 11, 1974, the Court of 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
1Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common 
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to 
handle him. He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks 
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't. 
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable 
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a). 
2 J. A. at 22A: 
"Physican and mental findings at time of 
examination: Pt. [patient] is nonverbal-
restrained in bed. Recognizes examiner by 
rolling his eyes and banging his head against 
bedrail." 
3. 
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 50 §4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous 
occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions 
of other inmates to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned 
+o 
about these injuries. After objecting ab&Qt respondent's 
treatment several times, she filed this complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, 
plaintiff has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three 
occasions." The complaint originally sought damages and 
injunctive relief from Pennhurst's director and two 
supervisors 3 ; it alleged that these officials knew, or 
should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and 
3Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent 
of Pennhurst; he had supervisory authority over the entire 
facility. Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of 
Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent Marguerite Conley 
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was 
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical 
doctors or psychologists. Youngberg and Matthews are no 
longer at Pennhurst. 
4. 
failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, 
thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transfered 
from his ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken 
arm. While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained 4 during portions of each day. 
These restraints were ordered byf Dr. Gabroy, not a 
defendant here, to protect Romeo and others in the 
hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being 
treated intravenously. 7 R. 40, 49, 76-78. Although 
respondent normally would have returned to his ward when 
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that 
he should remain in the hospital due to the pending 
/wr ~WAi. 
~ 5 R. 248, 6 R. 57-58 & 137. Nevertheless, in 
December of 1977, a second amended complaint was filed 
alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent 
for prolonged periods on a routine bas is. 5 The second 
4Although the Court of Appeals described these 
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms 
only, were generally used. 7 Record (R.) 53-55, 59. 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
/ 
5. 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to 
compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide 
him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay at 
Pennhurst. All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
-
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April of 
1978. Petitioners introduced evidence that respondent 
participated in several programs teaching basic self-care 
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was 
designed by staff members to reduce his aggressive 
behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because 
5The first amended complaint was filed in January 
1977, after respondent's hospitalization, but it added no 
restraint-related allegations. Compare original complaint 
,116 and first amended complaint ,[16 (change related to 
safety claim, not use of restraints). 
6Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 
U.S. (1981) (remanded for further proceedings). --
7Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital 
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding, 
showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet 
training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R. 
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48. 
Programming continued while respondent was in the 
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 41-
48, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive 
behavior to some extent, 7 R. 45. 
8 2 R. 7, 5 R. 88-90; 6 R. 88, 200-203; Defendants' 
Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short periods of 
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced 
evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his "unit," 
though the District Court refused to allow testimony of 
two experts he proffered . 10 The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of 
treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was 
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983. Petn. 
App. 94a-95a. 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed 
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware 
of and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," such failure 
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Petn. App. 
73a. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants 
plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, i.e., 15 
minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 . 4 2 2 4 1 R. 53, R. 5; 6 R. 0 • 
10The first of these experts was a psychologist, 
specializing in treating the mentally retarded. He would 
have testified that Romeo could have been more effectively 
treated under other programs and that the lack of 
programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive 
behavior. Respondent's other expert was a physician with 
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of 
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would 
have testified that residents at his private institution 
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar 
problems of aggression or injury. 
7. 
shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat 
him, his rights had been violated. Ibid. Finally, the 
jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as 
a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if defendants 
were "deliberately indifferent to the medical and 
psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional 
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 
73a-75a. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, 
on which judgment was entered. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, vacated 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 
(1980). All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert 
testimony should have been admitted. Id., at 164 & 173. 
They also agreed that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting 
cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, 
was not an appropriate source for determining the rights 
of the involuntarily committed. Rather, respondent's 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty right was implicatP.d by the 
conditions under which he was confined. Id., at 156-59, & 
173. The en bane court did not, however, agree on the 
8. 
relevant standard to be used in determining whether 
Romeo's rights had been violated. 11 
The court's majority opinion began its analysis 
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment 
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty." Id., at 157 
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)). As 
a consequence involuntary commitment may be ordered only 
pursuant to due process. Ibid. The court further held 
that commitment does not extinguish all aspects of an 
individual's liberty interest; the power of locomotion 
without restraint and the right to personal security and 
freedom from punishment are fundamental liberties that can 
be limited only by an overriding, non-punitive state 
interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. 
In light of these views, the court considered 
Romeo's three claims: (i) the right to be free of physical 
restraints; ( i i) the right to safety and protection; and 
11The existence of a qualified immunity · defense 
was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received 
instructions on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not 
challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After 
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 41~ u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court 
of Appeals noted that such instructions should be given 
again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
9. 
(iii} the right to treatment. Id., at 159. Because 
physical restraint •iraises a presumption of a punitive 
sanction," it can be justified only by compelling 
necessity. Id., at 159-160. And the failure to provide 
for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of 
substantial necessity. Id., at 160. Finally, the court 
held that when treatment has been a~ministered, those 
responsible are liable only if the treatment is not 
"acceptable in light of present medical or other 
scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 & 173. 12 
Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four, 
considered the standards articulated by the majority as 
indistinguishable from those applicabble to medical 
malpractice claims. In Judge Seitz's view, the 
12Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment 
claim into three categories and adopted three standards, 
but only the standard described in text is at issue before 
this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if a 
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may 
hold the insti tut1on' s administrators liable unless they 
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of 
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not 
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not 
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case. In 
addition, the court considered "least restrictive 
analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on 
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration 
or surgical intervention, id., at 165-166, & 173, but 





Constitutiton "only requires that the courts make certain 
that professional judgment in fact was exercised." 644 F. 
2d, at He concluded that the appropriate standard 
was whether the defendents' conduct was "such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards in the care and treatment of this 
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 
2d, at 178. 13 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of 
the importance of the question presented to the 
administration of state institutions for the involuntarily 
committed. u.s. (198 __ ). We now reverse. 
13Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, 
but wrote separately to emphasize the nature of the 
difference between the majority opinion and that of the 
Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert 
criticized the majority for abandoning the common-law 
method of deciding the case at bar rather than 
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts 
~ of th~ case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at -
\~ And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned 
tli'at neither juries nor those administering state 
institutions would receive ...z:tt:41Y" JRe'8.~JiR-9fYl guidance from 
the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated by 
the majority. Id., at • ~ 
Judge Garth--also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion~ 
~aut alse-. wrote separately to criticize the majority for 
addressing issues not raised by the facts of this case. 






We consider here for the first time the substantive 
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth 
JLI ;( ~ 
Amendment 14 to the Constitution. 15 In -ehe case at ba F , 
) 
respondent has · been committed pursuant to the laws of 
Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
The broad question presented is whether, under the Due 
Process Clause, petitioners have infringed a post-
commitment liberty interest by failing to provide 
2~ 
constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement. ~ 
Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive 
him of all substantive liberty interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
4801 491-494 (1980) o And the conditions under which 
respondent is confined implicate the entirety of his 
14 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a 
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .•.. " U.S. Const., 
Amend. XIV, §1. 
15The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth 
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights, 
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies 
only in cases concerning punishment of persons convicted 
of crimes"). 
12. 
remaining liberty interest. The initial question 
therefore becomes by what standard do we determine whether 
H..,_.~ 
ooAaitiefts at Pennhurst inpermissibly infringe that 
residuum of liberty of which -respondent should not be 
deprived. 
Due process is a balance between "the liberty of ( 
the individual" and "the demands of an organized society." 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In seeking this balance in other cases, the 
Court has weighed the individual's interest in liberty 
against 
~~~~~ 
the restraints on state aeeion. In Bell v. 
~ 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979), for example, we 
considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' 
confinement conditions. We agreed that the d~tainees, not 
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. 
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were 
reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and 
~ not tantamount to punishment. And in Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 713, 738 (1972), we held that an incompetent pre-
trial detainee could not, after a competency hearing, be 
held indefinitely without either criminal process or civil 
lfp/ss 03/26/82 Rider A, p. 13 (Romeo) 
YOUNG13 SALLY-POW 
; ' 
Although [the foregoing cases have involved 
procedural due process, (Mary: is this accurate?) 
essentiall-¥ the same type of analysis is appropriate in 
(c-_ 
considering whether respondent's substantive liberty 
interests are protected adequately in the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital: it is necessary to strike a balance 
· - as Justice Harlan said in Poe v. Ullman - between the 
liberty interests at issue and the practicalities of 
operating an institution such as Pennhurst. We also must 
be mindful of a need to reserve the Constitution for 
appropriate issues, as there are limitations upon the 
extent to which constitutional principles may be relied 
upon in considering the adequacy of the day-to-day care 
provided in a large institution operating within the 





commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some 
rational relation between the nature and duration of 
commitment and its purpose. See also Addington v. Texas, 
441 u.s. 418 (1979) (in determining burden of proof in 
~ ~ 
civil commitment, individual's liberty interest weighed 
1\ 
against legitimate state interests in confinement) . 
• ~~ (' Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), provides 




we considered a challenge to state procedures for 
commitment of a minor with parental consent. 16 In 
determining that procedural due process does not mandate 
( 31/) 
an adversarisal hearing, we again identified the factors17 
that this Court has considered in determining whether 
state procedures are adequate to protect a liberty 
interest: 
16under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began 
with an application for admission signed by the parent. 
The superintendent of a hospital was then authorized to 
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis." If, after 
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental 
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment" 
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such 
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by 
1 a w • " 4 4 2 U • S . , at 58 8 n . 5 . In Parham , the Co u r t 
sustained the statute. 
17These factors were initially articulated in Mathews 















i ~ f. 
. . 
"'First, the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action: second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards, and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.'" Id., at 599-600 (quoting Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (additional 
c1tat1on omitted). 
14. 
In this case, the question is whether respondent's 
substantive liberty interests are protected adequately in 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital. But we find the 
factors relevant in determining the adequacy of a state's 
procedures also relevant in determining the constitutional 
adequacy of the state's substantive protection of federal 
liberty interests. 18 ( ""}Sl 
18Respondent also argues that the Pennsylvania 
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for his 
federal substantive right. He maintains that he was 
commmitted for care and treatment under state law, and he 
therefore has a state substantive right entitled to 
substantive, not just procedural, protection under the Due 
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we 
note that this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court: it was not advanced in 
the courts below. 
Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U.S. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process 
requires, at a minimum, terms and conditions of 
confinement that bear some rational relation to the 
purposes of confinement. Thus, respondent argues that the 
wording of the relevant Pennsylvania commitment statute 
and the purposes for which he was committed--care and 
treatment--create a state-created right to treatment 
entitled to federal protection under Jackson because due 
process requires some relationship between the conditions 
of confinement and its purposes. In Jackson, however, the 




In considering these factors, we are mindful of the 
special need to reserve the Constitution for appropriate 
issues in the context of a challenge to conditions at a f 
facility such as Pennhurst. Constitutional principles 
ro 
( 
cannot direct day-to-day administration of a large / 
l 
institution operating within the inevitable constraints of 
finite human and fiscal resources. 19 (f~) 
Court was considering only the need for a relationship 
between the single reason justifying confinement as a 
matter of federal law--temporary confinement pending 
competency to stand trial--and the "terms and conditions" 
of confinement. Romeo could, as a matter of federal law, 
be confined to protect others. See text and notes at n. 1 
& n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 u~s. 418, 
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975)':"" 
.) 
Although respondent may have been confined for care and ., 1 J_, 
treatment under the relevant Pennsylvania statute,~~
not seeking another state procedure, one w84eh~ would 
commit him solely because he is violent. 
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive 
right to treatment should vary with the wording of the 
relevant state commitment statute or with the precise 
reason given for commitment. For example, as a matter of 
federal law, why should a mentally retarded person 
involuntarily committed to protect himself and others 
receive less treatment or inferior conditions than one 
involuntarily committed only because he is unable to care 
for himself? It is true that state substantive rights 
implicate federal procedural due process. And it is also 
true that we have never y · he that state 
substantive rights cannot b~ for federA l ~ 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. ~,~n 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 u.s. 816, 
942 n. 49 (1977), we indicated that even when a federal 
procedural right exists, the existence of a related 
federal substantive right is not automatic, but is an 
entirely distinct question. 
If respondent were arguing that his state-law 
substantive right entitled him to certain procedural 
protections, Pennsylvania law would be relevant. See, 
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Wolf v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974). This argument is 
no€, however, presented by respondent. 
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~ J ~ 
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With the foregoing considerations in mind, we 
?~~ 
The standard of medical 
" 
reject standards at the extremes. 
malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified 
departure from established norms of medical practice, 20 is 
not applicable in this institutional setting. See Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) • Nor is the standard 
19 See, e.g . , Rhodes v. Chapman, __ u.S. __ , __ n. 
14 (198l) [f"[A] prison's internal security is peculiarly a ~ 
matter normally left to the discretion of prison ) 
administrators. "J1 id., at __ (" [C]ourts cannot assume 
that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to 
the perplexing sociological problems of how best to 
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal 
justice system •••• ") ~ Parham v. J .R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 
n. 16 (1979) (In limiting judicial review of medical 
decisions made by professionals: "[I]t is incumbent on 
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of 
individuals without unduly burdening the legitimate 
efforts of the states to deal with difficult social 
problems.")~ Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979) 
(In context or conditions of confinement of pre-trial 
detainees: "[C]ourts must be mindful that these inquiries 
spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial 
answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a 
court's idea of how best to operate a detention 
facility.")~ Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) 
(In considering procedural due process claim in context of 
prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between 
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of 
the Constitution of general application.") ~ Procunier v. 
Marttinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he 
problems of prisons in America are complex and 
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
susceptible to resolution by degree. Most require 
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province 
of the legislative and executive branches of the 
government."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and 
intervention in Developmental disabili 'ties 75 (1981) 
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have 
adverse as well as positive effects on social change). 
e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971). 
17. 
applicable to prison conditions appropriate. Although 
punitive conditions are permissible in penal institutions 
~· 
unless/cruel and unusual, persons committed involuntarily 
r 
to a state institution because of mental retardation are 
not detained for any crime or fault on their part and 
certainly cannot be punished at all. 
III. 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge 
Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Mathews factors. 
He would have held that "the Constitution only requires 
that the courts make certain that professional judgment in 
fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts 
to specify which of several professionally acceptable 
choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for which 
the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as less demanding than the standard 
applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical 
18. 
malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the proper 
balance between the relevant interests. Whether prisoners 
or patients, the involuntarily committed must depend 
entirely upon 
involuntarily in 
' 9 i.~ 
dependent1 sbte.. 
the state 21 ; yet those committed 
J..;fz:_~, ff),J_. a.~ .. 
civil proceedings are .A_6s.g pE--:;:;i; R t:bd s y 
through no fault of their own. They are 
therefore entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement more responsive to their status 
and needs than are prisoners. We hold that when the 
rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded 
are balanced against the legitimate restraints on state 
action, due process requires that the state provide these 
individuals with the treatment, training, physical 
constraints, and other safety conditions considered 
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment. 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on states. We make clear, however, that judicial 
review is limited to ensuring that decisions with respect 
to these matters are duly made by a qualified 
21see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 103-104 {1976). 
19. 
profesiona1. 22 The decision, if made by a professional, 
is presumptively valid~ liability may be imposed only when 
the decision has not been delegated to professionals 
within or retained by the institution, or when the 
decision is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not 
base the decision on such a judgment. 23 
We turn now to consider briefly respondent's 
specific claims in light of this standard. The parties 
agree that the state must provide adequate food, shelter 
and medical care. 24 The remaining questions concern 
22 Indeed, although respondent has claimed 
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles 
responaent to a right that can be characterized as 
procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are 
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a 
professional exercising his professional judgment--a 
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442 
u.s. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case aiscussed 
in text and notes at n. & n. ___ , supra. 
23All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that 
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted. 
This issue was not included in the questions presented in 
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to 
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible. 
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were 





of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 & n. 10~ Brief of 
15-16. See also Arnie i Curiae Brief of 
and Twenty Other States 8. 
20. 
respondent's claims to entitlement to additional training 
for his disability, less restrictive treatment, and safer 
conditions. In a sense, each of these claims relates to 
an element of the care that a state must exercise with 
respect to persons involuntarily committed to mental 
institutions. 
A 
Respondent claims the right to training and education 
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and 
argues that such treatment should be provided under the 
general standard adopted by the Court of Appeals: 
treatment "acceptable in light of present scientific 
knowledge." 644 F. 2d, at 173. The State maintains that 
when it commits an individual such as Romeo for care, it 
need not "assume a constitutional duty to provide him with 
additional services such as treatment [in the form of] 
training and education necessary to maximize his 
developmental potential." Brief of Petitioners 8. 
We are not persuaded by either argument. As noted 
by both Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Aldersert in their 
21. 
separate opinions, the standard urged by respondent and 
adopted by the Third Circuit is no different from the 
medical malpractice standard. 644 F. 2d, at & 
And, although professionals are far from agreeing that 
effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded 
persons is even possible, 25 we certainly would not hold 
that due process is satisfied when innocent individuals 
involuntarily committed to state institutions are simply 
kept alive. When treatment or training might ameliorate a 
patient's suffering or improve his condition, such care 
should be considered by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment in making the treatment decision. 
we do not suggest that the State has an obligation to 
provide optimal treatment. Normally, it is sufficient if 
the treatment chosen to improve the patient's condition is 
v 




25see, e.g., Favell, Risley, Wolfe, Riddle, & /U-IJ/..t 
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981); 
Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the Limiting 
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981); 
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for 
the Substance of Things Hoped for; The Evidence of Things 
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental 




Respondent and the State also disagree as to the 
use of restraints. Respondent maintains, and the Court of 
Appeals held, that restraints can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity" and as the "least restrictive" 
method of dealing with a patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. 26 
The basis for this holding was the perception that 
restraints are "not normally within the condi~ions of 
confinement contemplated in habilitative institutions." 
644 F. 2d, at 160 (footnote omitted). The State asserts 
that there is no basis for this conclusion, noting that 
profoundly retarded patients often are violent and 
restraints are ~necessary. The State emphasizes its 
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare and safety 
26 rn brief, respondent urges adoption of a 
standar proscribing "unnecessary custodial shackling" 
rather the "least restrictive means" standard adopted by 
the Court of Appeals. But at oral argument respondent's 
counsel conceded that there is little practical difference 
between these formulations: respondent would consider 
restraints unnecessary if a less restrictive alter'native 
were available. Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56. 
23. 
of all of the residents in its institutions. 
In view of the facts of this case, the need for 
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. 27 Mrs. -
Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's 
propensity for violence, J.A. 18a, and his complaint 
alleged that during a specified period respondent had 
suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions. It [s clear 
that the state, in discharging its duty to respondent 
himself as well as to other patients and staff personnel, 
must restrain respondent at times when violence is evident 
or reasonably f expected. We do not think that either 
"least restrictive" or "compelling necessity" analysis 28 
(!. 
27 It is true that the majority of the Cour wf of 
Appeals adopted a finding that there was an "absen{e of 
any dangerouness to others" among residents at Pennn urst. 
644 F. 2d, at n. 18. This finding was not, however, 
based on the record in this case ,__but on J£!fel.f inding in 
another case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital, 612 F. 2d , 92 . (19 ) , reversed and 
remanded, Pennhurst State-lfchool & Hos-Ttal v. Halderman, 
U.S. Z See F. , at n. 1 • 
MOr"'eover, the finding is inconsistent with t~Court of 
Appeals' own description of the facts of this case: "It is 
not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, Romeo was 
injured on over seventy occaisions. These injuries were 
both self-inflicted and the result of attacks by other 
residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive 
behavior." 644 F. 2d, at ~ 
28 In the judgment of at least one professional group, 
the least restrictive standard "is not always best from a 
clinical standpoint," and, "as a practical matter, it may 
not be possible to identify the least restrictive 
alternative at all." Brief of the American Psychiatric 
Association, at 20. 
24. 
is appropriate in reviewing that must be made in 
an institution like Pennhurs ~ fr equently~ such decisions 
-:;. ,. 
must be made quickly, with little or no warning, in order 
to restraint violence that would endanger the patient or 
others. The Constitution requires only that these 
decisions be made by a professional reasonably competent 
to make them. 
c 
Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would 
impose liability for any injury to respondent in the 
absence of "substantial necessity" or "sustantial 
explanations" based on the State's interest in providing 
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional 
order needed to provide that care and treatment. 644 F. 
2d, at 163-164 & 173. Petitioner argues that the proper 
standard was articulated in the jury instructions: there 
is no constitutional violation in the absence of 
"deliberate indifference" to respondent's safety. See 
J.A. 73a (jury instruction cited by petitioner) • 29 Thus, 
Footnote(s) 29 will appear on following pages. 
25. 
~~ 
the State {culd apply the "deliberate indifference" 
standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 427 u.s. 97 (1976) 
(standard of liability for prison doctors in treating 
prisoners), in determining whether the failure to ensure 
respondent•s safety violated the Constitution. 
It hardly need be said that the State owes 
respondent a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure his 
physical safety. But we find no basis for holding that 
the Constitution requires adoption of the standard urged 
by respondent: liability in the absence of "substantial 
necessity" or a "substantial explanation." We also reject 
petitioners• view that the State fulfills its 
constitutional obligation by treating the involuntarily 
committed as though they were prisoners, i.e., no 
constitutional violation in the absence of "deliberate 
29specifically, petitioner cites the instruction on 
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the 
Eighth Amendment•s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the 
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable 
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," 
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A. 
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent 
himself, see Petn. App. 93a, the trial judge also 
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence 
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo•s needs under the 
standard of Estelle v Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976), 
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment 
could have prevented injury. 
26. 
: 
indifference" to patients' needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976). Again, we think that an institution 
such as Pennhurst discharges its duty when decisions with 
respect to assuring the the safety of inmates are made by 
the appropriate professionals. 
IV 
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all 
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitles 
those committed to optimal care and conditions. The 
substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must 
be weighed against legitimate state interests and the 
constraints under which most state institutions 
necessarily operate. The state concedes a duty to provide 
adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. And 
the state does not dispute that it has a duty to provide 
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within 
the institution. As indicated above, we hold that the 
1 ' al 
r -.., 
state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for 
/3tJ-
a patient such as respondent. A~ecisions made by the 
27. 
appropriate professional, on the staff or 
retained, are entitled a strong presumption of 
correctness ~ howt:~ · a presumption is necessary to 
enable institutions of type--often, unfortunately, 
overcrowded and understaffed -to continue to function. A 
single professional may make decisions wi~h respect 
ying needs and problems in 
the course of a normal and 
required to make each decision in the shadow of an action 
for damages. We do not, of course, imply that the liberty 
td.~ 
interests identified above are not protected by the 
"' Constitution or that judicial review is not available in 
appropriate cases. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was 
erroreously instructed on the assumption that the proper 
\ 
I 
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. 
/ 
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
meb 03/26/82 








The question presented i~ whether respondent, a 
retarded adult involuntarily committed to a state 
institution, has a claim for damages against petitiofers, 
'l._ 
the director and two supervisors of the institution. 
Respondent brings suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming 
that the conditions of his confinement violate his ~ts 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
I 
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. 
/ 
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 
eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the 
most basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent 
lived with his parents in Philadelphia. But after the 
death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable 
;, ·· -
2. 
to control his violence. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility 
on a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained 
that she was unable to care for Romeo or control his 
violence. 1 As part of the commitment process, Romeo was 
examined by a physician and a psychologist. They both 
certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable 
to care for himself. Joint Appendix (J.A.} 2la-22a & 28a-
29a. The physician also described Romeo's self-
destructive behavior. 2 On July 11, 1974, the Court of 
... ,, 
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State 
1Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common 
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to 
handle him. He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks 
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't. 
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable 
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a}. 
2 J. A. at 2 2A: 
"Physican and mental findings at time of 
examination: Pt. [patient] is nonverbal-
restrained in bed. Recognizes examiner by 





School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable 
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 50 §4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous 
occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions 
of other inmates to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned 
about these injuries. After objecting to respondent's 
treatment several times, she filed this complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, 
plaintiff has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three 
occasions." The complaint originally sought damages and 
injunctive relief from Pennhurst's director and two 
supervisor s 3 ; it alleged that these officials knew, or 
should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and 
3Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent 
of Pennhurst; he had supervisory authority over the entire 
facility. Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of 
Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respandent Marguerite Conley 
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was 
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical 
doctors or psychologists. Youngberg and Matthews are no 
longer at Pennhurst. 
·' 
4. 
failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, 
thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transfered 
from his ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken 
arm. While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained 4 during portions of each day. 
These restraints were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a 
defendant here, to protect Romeo and others in the 
hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being 
treated intravenously. 7 R. 40, 49, 76-78. Although 
respondent normally would have returned to his ward when 
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that 
he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law 
suit. 5 R. 248, 6 R. 57-58 & 137. Nevertheless, in 
December of 1977, a second amended complaint was filed 
alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent 
for prolonged periods on a routine basis. 5 The second 
4Although the Court of Appeals described these 
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms 
only, were generally used. 7 Record (R.) 53-55, 59. 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to 
compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide 
him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay at 
Pennhurst. All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 6 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April of 
1978. Petitioners introduced evidence that respondent 
participated in several programs teaching basic self-care 
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior~modification program was 
designed by staff members to reduce his aggressive 
behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because 
'"' 5The first amended complaint was fileCi in January 
1977, after respondent's hospitalization, but it added no 
restraint-related allegations. Compare original complaint 
,!16 and first amended complaint ,!16 (change related to 
safety claim, not use of restraints) • 
6Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 
tj_Sl_u. S. l ( 19 81) (remanded for further proceedings) . 
7Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital 
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding, 
showering, drying, - dressing, self control, and toilet 
training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R. 
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48. 
Programming continued while respondent was in the 
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 41-
48, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive 
behavior to some extent, 7 R. 45. 
8 2 R. 7 , 5 R. 8 8- 9 0 ; 6 R. 8 8 , 2 0 0-2 0 3 ; Defendants ' 
Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short periods of 
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on 






of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced 
evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his "unit," 
though the District Court refused to allow testimony of 
two experts he proffered. 10 The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of 
treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was 
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983. Petn. 
App. 94a-95a. 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed 
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware 
of and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," such failure 
deprived him of his constitutional rights. Petn. App. 
73a. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants 
plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, i.e., 15 
minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others. 
9 1 R. 53; 4 R. 25; 6 R. 204. 
10The first of these experts was a psychologist, 
specializing in treating the mentally retarded. He would 
have testified that Romeo could have been more effectively 
treated under other programs and that the lack of 
programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive 
behavior. Respondent's other expert was a physician with 
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of 
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would 
have testified that residents at his private institution 
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar 
problems of aggression or injury. 
.... 
7. 
shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat 
him, his rights had been violated. Ibid. Finally, the 
jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as 
a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if defendants 
were "deliberately indifferent to the medical and 
psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his coristitutional 
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 
73a-75a. 
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, 
on which judgment was entered. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane, vacated 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 
(1980}. All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert 
"" ,, 
testimony should have been admitted. Id.~ at 164 & 173. 
They also agreed that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting 
cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, 
was not an appropriate source for determining the rights 
of the involuntarily committed. Rather, respondent's 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty right was implicated by the · 
conditions under which he was confined. Id., at 156-59, & 

























relevant standard to be used in determining whether 
Romeo's rights had been violated. 11 
The court's majority opinion began its analysis 
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment 
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty." Id., at 157 
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 u.s. 504, 509 (1972)). As 
a consequence involuntary commitment may be ordered only 
pursuant to due process. Ibid. The court further held 
that commitment does not extinguish all aspects of an 
individual's liberty interest; the power of locomotion 
without restraint and the right to personal security and 
freedom from punishment are fundamental liberties that can 
be limited only by an overriding, non-punitive state 
interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. 
In light of these views, the court considered 
Romeo's three claims: (i) the right to be free of physical 
restraints; ( i i) the right to safety and protect ion; and 
11The existence of a qualified immunity defense 
was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received 
instructions on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not 
challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After 
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court 
of Appeals noted that such instructions should be given 












(iii) the right to treatment. Id., at 159. Because 
physical restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive 
sanction," it can be justified only by compelling 
necessity. Id., at 159-160. And the failure to provide 
for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of 
substantial necessity. Id., at 160. Finally, the court 
held that when treatment has been administered, those 
responsible are liable only if the treatment is not 
I 
"acceptable in light of present medical or other 
scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 & 173. 12 
Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four, 
considered the standards articulated by the majority as 
indistinguishable from those applicabble to medical 
malpractice claims. In Judge view, the 
12Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment 
claim into three categories and adopted three standards, 
but only the standard described in text is at issue before 
this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if a 
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may 
hold the institut1on's administrators liable unless they 
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of 
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not 
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not 
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case. In 
addition, the court considered "least restrictive · 
analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on 
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration 
or surgical intervention, id., at 165-166, & 173, but 






Constitutiton "only requires that the courts make certain 
that ~rofessional judgment in fact was exercised." 644 F. 
2d, at /7( He concluded that . the appropriate standard 
was whether the defendents' conduct was "such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards in the care and treatment of this 
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 
2d, at 178. 13 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of 
the importance of the question presented to the 
administration of state institutions for the involuntarily 
committed. t/)1 u.s. Cjgz.,. (198_i_). We now reverse. 
13Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, 
but wrote separately to emphasize the nature of the 
difference between the majority opinion and that of the 
Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert 
criticized the majority for abandoning the common-law 
method of deciding the case at bar rather than 
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts 
of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at /'(~­
.J1.i. And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned 
that neither juries nor those administering state 
institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous ~ 
constitutional law tenets" articulated by the majority. 
Id., at 1'63 -; /t'('('" 
-- Judge-Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, 
and wrote separately to criticize the majority for 
addressing issu~s not raised by the facts of this case. 









We consider here for the first time the substantive 
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment14 to the Consti tution. 15 In this case, 
respondent has been commit ted pursuant to the laws of 
Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment. 
The broad question presented is whether, under the Due 
Process Clause, petitioners . have infringed a post-
commitment liberty interest by failing to provide 
constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement. 16 
14 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a 
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ..•. ".u.s. Const., 
Amend. XIV, §1. ' ... 
15The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth 
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights, 
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies 
only in cases concerning punishment of persons convicted 
of crimes"). 
16Respondent also argues that the Pennsylvania 
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for his 
federal substantive right. He maintains that he was 
commmitted for car.e and treatment under state law, and he 
therefore has a state substantive right entitled to 
substantive, not just procedural, protection under the Due 
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we 
note that this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court; it was not advanced in 
the courts below. 
Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
u.s. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process 
requires, at a minimum, terms and conditions of 
confinement that bear some rational relation to the 
purposes of confinement. Thus, respondent argues that the 














































Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive 
him of all substantive liberty interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 u.s. 
480, 491-494 {1980). And the conditions under which 
respondent is confined implicate the entirety of his 
wording of the relevant Pennsylvania commitment statute 
and the purposes for which he was committed--care and 
treatment--create a state-created right to treatment 
entitled to federal protect ion under Jackson because due 
process requires some relationship between the conditions 
of confinement and its purposes. In Jackson, however, the 
Court was considering only the need for a relationship 
between the single reason justifying confinement as a 
matter of federal law--temporary confinement pending 
competency to stand trial--and the "terms and conditions" 
of confinement. Romeo could, as a matter of federal law, 
be confined to protect others. See text and notes at n! 1 
& n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418, t/z...!. 
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975):"" 
Although respondent may have been confined for care and 
treatment under the relevant Pennsylvania statute, he is 
not seeking another state procedure, one that would commit 
him solely because he is violent. 
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive 
right to treatment should vary with the wording of the 
relevant state commitment statute or with the precise 
reason given for commitment. For example, as a matter of 
federal law, why should a mentally retarded person 
involuntarily commi t .ted to protect himself' aoo others 
receive less treatment or inferior conditions than one 
involuntarily committed only because he is unable to care 
for himself? It is true that state substantive rights 
implicate federal procedural due process. And i t is also 
true that we have never held explicitly that state 
substantive rights cannot be the basis for federal 
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. In 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 
842 n. 48 (1977), we indicated that even when a federal 
procedural right exists, the existence of a related 
federal substantive right is not automatic, oot is an 
entirely distinct question. 
If respondent were arguing that his state-law 
substantive right entitled him to certain pEocedural 
protections, Pennsylvania law would be relevant. See, 
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 u.s. 480 (1980); Wolf v. 
McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 557-558 (1974). This arqument is 
not, however, presented by respondent. 




remaining liberty interest. The initial question 
therefore becomes by what standard do we determine whether 
$ 
the care at Pennhurst inpermissibly infringe that residuum 
'\ 
of liberty of which respondent should not be deprived. 
Due process is a balance between "the liberty of 
the individual" and "the demands of an organized society." 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). In seeking this balance in other cases, the 
.-:. ... ..... Court has weighed the individual's interest in liberty 
against the state's asserted reasons for restraining 
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 
(1979) , for example, we cons ide red a challenge to pre-
trial detainees' confinement conditions. We agreed that 
"' 
the detainees, not yet convicted of the · ct'ime charged, 
could not be punished. But we upheld those restrictions 
'J 
on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate 
government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 
And in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 713, 738 (1972), we 
held that an incompetent pre-trial detainee could not, 
after a competency hearing, be held indefinitely without 






requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the 
nature and duration of commitment and its purpose. 
We have taken a similar approach in deciding 
procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment 
proceedings. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 
for example, we held that the state must prove the need 
for commitment by "clear and convincing evidence." We 
reached this decision by weighing the individual's liberty 
interest against the state's legitimate interests in 
confinement. And in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), 
we considered a challenge to state procedures for 
commitment of a minor with parental consent. In 
determining that procedural due process did not mandate an 
adversarisal hearing, we balanced the liberty interest of 
the individual against the legitimate interests of the 
state, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
additional procedures would entail. Id., at 599-600. 
Although the foregoing discussion includes cases 
rr· 
addressing procedural, as well as substantive, due ~ 
~~'/]./&: 
process, the same basic analysis has been usee in either 
" 




liberty interests are protected adequately in the 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, it is again necessary 
to strike the balance referred to by Justice Harlan in Poe 
v. Ullman, weighing the individual 1 s liberty interests 
against the legitimate interests of the state and the 
restraints within which the state must operate, including 
the practical problems of operating an institution such as 
Pennhurst. In seeking this balance, we must be mindful of 
the need to reserve the Constitution for appropriate 
issues; there are limitations upon the extent to which 
constitutional principles may be relied upon in 
considering the adequacy of the day-to-day care provided 
in a large institution operating within the inevitable 
.... 














reject standards at the extremes. The Pennsylvania 
standard of medical malpractice, imposing 1 iabili ty for 
any unjustified departure from established norms 
medical . 18 pract1ce, is not applicable in 
institutional setting-~ S@-e Estelle v. Gamb l e, 
~ Nor is the standard applicable to prison 
conditions appropriate. Although punitive conditions are 
permissible in penal institutions unless cruel and 
unusual, persons committed involuntarily to a state 
institution because of mental retardation are not detained 
for any crime or fault on their part and certainly cannot 
be punished at all. 
facility."); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 556 (1974) 
(In considering procedural due process claim in context of 
prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between 
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of 
the Constitution of general application."); Procunier v. 
Marttinez, 416 u.s. 396, 404-405,406 (1974) ("[T]he 
problems of prisons in America are complex and 
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
susceptible to resolution by degree. Most require 
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
r e sources, all of which are peculiarly within the province 
of the legislative and executive branches of the 
government."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and 
intervention in Developmental disabilities 75 (1981) 
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have 
adverse as well as positive effects on social change). 







We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge 
Seitz reflects a proper balance , Gf t:be Mathews fa-e-tor~.f 
He would have held that "the Constitution only requires 
that the courts make certain that professional judgment in 
fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts 
to specify which of several professionally acceptable 
choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 178. 
This standard avoids both of the extremes for which 
the parties have contended. It is higher than the 
standard applied when prison conditions are challenged, 
and may be viewed as less demanding than the standard 
.... . 
", 
applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical 
malpractice. Moreover, this standard strikes the proper 
balance between the relevant interests. Whether prisoners 
or patients, the involuntarily committed must depend 
entirely upon the state19 ; yet those committed 
involuntarily in civil proceedings are detained as # 






l . l 
18. 
dependents of the state, through no fault of their own. 
They are therefore entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions of confinement more responsive to their 
status and needs than are prisoners. We hold that when 
the rights of the involuntarily committed me tally 
'~h &--:j <12-u., 4~1 ,·11~ ~·se.Ja-J 
safety conditions considered 
*"o(J. ~i 
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment. 
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional 
burdens on states. We make clear, however, that judicial 
review is limited to ensuring that decisions with respect 
to these matters are duly made by. a qualified 
profesiona1. 20 The decision, if made by a professional, 
is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when 
20 rndeed, although respondent has claimed 
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles 
respondent to a right that can be characterized as 
procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are 
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a 
professional exercising his professional judgment--a 
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S~. 584 (1979) , a procedural due process case discussed 
in . and net:es eo 11. -- &.:6 __ , supra. 
5 . 















wi't.hic .......O.J: retained b_y the i ns..t itution, or ·,ihen the 
'(- Q8eision is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did _not 
base the decision on such a judgment. 21 
We turn now to consider briefly respondent's 
specific claims in light of this standard. The parties 
agree that the state must provide adequate food, shelter 
and medical care. 22 The remaining questions concern 
respondent's claims to entitlement to additional training 
for his disability, leis restrictive treatment, and safer 
conditions. In a sense, each of these claims relates to 
~ ,, 
an element of the care that a state must exercise with 
respect to persons involuntarily committed to mental 
21All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that 
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted. 
This issue was not included in the questions presented in 
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to 
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible. 
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were 
a substantial departure from accepted professional 
practice. 
22B . f r1e 
Respondent 
Connecticut 
of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 & n. 10; Brief of 
15-16. See also Amici Curiae Brief of 










Respondent claims the right to training and education 
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and 
argues that such treatment should be provided under the 
general standard adopted by the Court of Appeals: 
treatment "acceptable in light of present scientific 
knowledge." 644 F. 2d, at 173. As a general matter, the 
State supports the District Court's instructionsto the 
jury, instructions based on the Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
u.s. 97 (1976) (medical treatment of prisoners) standard 
of care: ·only deliberate indifference to medical needs 
breaches care required by the 
.... . 
. ' , 
Constitution. More 
particularly, the State maintains that when it commits an 
individual such as Romeo for care, it need not "assume a 
constitutional duty to provide him with additional 
services such as treatment [in the form of] training and 
education necessary to maximize his developmental 
potential." Brief of Petitioners 8. 













by both Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Aldersert in their 
separate opinions, the standard urged by respondent and 
adopted by the Third Circuit is no different from the 
medical malpractice standard • 644 F. 2d, at (!_]_ & /rt3 . 
And, although professionals are far from agreeing that 
effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded 
persons is even possible, 23 we certainly would not hold 
that due process is satisfied when innocent individuals 
involuntarily committed to state institutions are simply 
kept alive. When treatment or training might ameliorate a 
patient's suffering or improve his condition, such care 
should be considered by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment in making the treatment decision. 
~ 
" We do not suggest that the State has an obligation to 
provide optimal treatment. Normally, it is sufficient if 
the treatment chosen to improve the patient's condition is 
23see, e.g., Favell, Risley, Wolfe, Riddle, & 
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981): 
Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the Limiting 
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and 
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 {1981): 
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for 
the Substance of Things Hoped for: The Evidence of Things 
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental 











that prescribed by the responsible professiona1. 24 
B 
Respondent and the State also disagree as to the 
use of restraints. Respondent maintains, and the Court of 
Appeals held, that restraints can be justified only by 
"compelling necessity" and as the "least restrictive" 
method of dealing with a patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. 25 
The basis for this holding was the perception that 
restraints are "not normally within the conditions of 
... 
confinement contemplated in habilitative institutions." 
644 F. 2d, at 160 (footnote omitted}. The State asserts 
~;~ ::1 
24By "professional d cisionm ker", we mean a pe son ... 
reasonably competent, whet er by training or experie ce, 
to make the particular dec ion at issue. Although we 
would expect long-term treatm decisions to be made by 
persons with medical degrees or ~raining in a eas 
such as psychology, physical ther py, or ~he training and 
education of the retarded, other i~po~~aflt decisions ill 
be made by nurses or by employees without any formal 
training. 
25 rn his brief, respondent urges adoption of a 
standard proscribing "unnecessary custodial shackling" 
rather than the "least restrictive means" standard adopted 
by the Court of Appeals. But at oral argument 
respondent's counsel conceded that there is little 
practical difference between these formulations: 
respondent would consider restraints unnecessary if a less 
restrictive alternative were available. Transcript of 

















that there is no basis for this conclusion, noting that 
profoundly retarded patients often are violent and 
restraints are necessary. The State emphasizes its 
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare and safety 
of all of the residents in its institutions. 
In view of the facts of this case, the need for 
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. 26 Mrs. 
Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's 
propensity for violence, J.A. 18a, and his complaint 
alleged that during a specified period respondent had 
suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions. It is clear 
that the state, in discharging its duty to respondent 
himself as well as to other patients and staff personnel, 
must restrain respondent at times when violence is evident 
26 It is true that the majority of the Court of 
Appeals adopted a finding that there was an "absence of 
any dangerouness to others" among residents at Pennhurst • 
644 F. 2d, at n. 18. This finding was not, however, 
based on the record in this case, but on a finding in 
another case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital, 612 F. 2d <; ?' ! 92 (19jf), reversed and 
remanded, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
u.s. .z..- (1981). See 644 F. 2d, at l f~ n. 18. 
Moreover, he finding is · inconsistent with f e Court of 
Appeals' own description of the facts of this case: "It is 
not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, Romeo . was 
injured on over seventy occaisions. These injuries were 
both self-inflicted and the result of attacks by other 
residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive 
behavior." 644 F. 2d, at /~· 
... 
24. 
or reasonably expected. We do not think that either 
"least restrictive" or "compelling necessity" analysis 27 
is appropriate in reviewing decisions that must be made in 
an institution like Pennhurst. Frequently such decisions 
must be made quickly, with little or no warning, in order 
to restraint violence that would endanger the patient or 
others. The Constitution requires only that these 
decisions be made by a professional reasonably competent 
to make them. 
c 
Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would 
... . ,, 
impose liability for any injury to respOndent in the 
absence of "substantial necessity" or "sustantial 
explanations" based on the State's interest in providing 
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional 
27 rn the judgment of at least one professional group, 
... 
' · 
the least restrictive standard "is not always best from a · ·-
clinical standpoint," and, "as a practical matter, it may 
not be possible to identify the least restrictive 
alternative at all." Brief of the American Psychiatric 












order needed to provide that care and treatment. 644 F. 
2d, at 163-164 & 173. Petitioner argues that the proper 
standard was articulated in the jury instruct ions: there 
is no constitutional violation in the absence of 
"deliberate indifference" to respondent's safety. See 
J .A. 73a (jury instruction cited by petitioner). 28 Thus, 
the State would again apply the "deliberate indifference" 
standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 427 u.s. 97 (1976) 
(standard of liability for prison doctors in treating 
prisoners), in determining whether the failure to ensure 
. respondent's safety violated the Constitution. 
It hardly need be said that the State owes 
respondent a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure his 
physical safety. 
"' . ' , 
But we find no basis for holding that 
the Constitution requires adoption of the standard urged 
28specifically, petitioner cites the instruction on 
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the 
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable 
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," 
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A. 
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent 
himself, see Petn. App. 93a, the trial judge also 
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence 
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo's needs under the 
standard of Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), 
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment 
could have prevented injury. 
_. 
26. 
by respondent: liability in the absence of "substantial 
necessity" or a "substantial explanation." We also reject 
petitioners' view that the State fulfills its 
constitutional obligation by treating the involuntarily 
committed as though they were prisoners, i.e. , no 
constitutional violation in the absence of "deliberate 
indifference" to patients' needs, see Estelle v. Gamble, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976). Again, we think that an institution 
such as Pennhurst discharges its duty when decisions with 
respect to assuring the the. safety of inmates are made by 
the appropriate professionals. 
IV 
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all 
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitles 
those committed to optimal care and conditions. The 
substantial interests of the involuntari;;fy committed must 
be weighed against legitimate state interests and the ~ ·· -
constraints under which most state institutions 









adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care. And 
the state does not dispute that it has a duty to provide 
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within 
the institution. As indicated above, we hold that the 
state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for 
a patient such as respondent. But decisions made by the 
appropriate professional, whether on the staff or 
retained, are entitled to a strong presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable 
institutions of this type--often, unfortunately, 
J 
overcrowded and understaffed--to continue to function. A 
single professional may make ~ decisions with respect 
a,.~~ ~ 
to ~ patients with widely varying needs and problems in 
" ' . ' , 
the course of a normal day. The administrators, and 
particularly professional personnel ) should not be required 
to make each decision in the shadow of an action for 
damages. We do not, of course, imply that the liberty 
interests identified above are not ultimately protected by 
the Constitution or that judicial review is not available ~ ·· -
in appropriate cases. 




erroreously instructed on the assumption that the proper 
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. 
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent 




Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo 
The question presented is whether respondent, 
involuntarily committed to a state institution for the 
mentally retarded, has substantive righ~ under the Due 
, a~ :;;s; 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amen~_) W. W A Process 
-
training or "habilitation,"1 safe conditions of 
~--
confinement 1 ~ (i;v.t ) freedom from bodily restraints; 
~ 
Respondent ~ under 42 u.s.c. §1983 against three 
1 . 
administrators of the institud be~ages for 
the alleged breach of his constitutional rights. 
I 
1The American Psychiatric Associatiion explains that 
"[t]he word 'habilitation,' is used to refer to programs 
for the mentally retarded because mental retardation is 
•.• a learning disability and training impairment rather 
than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of habilitation 
is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief 




Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. 
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 
eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the 
most basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent 
lived with his parents in Philadelphia. But after the 
death of his father in May 1974, his mother was unable to 
control his violence. Within two weeks of the father's 
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission 
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia 
County Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state 
facility on a permanent basis. Her petition to the court 
explained that she was unable to care for Romeo or control 
his violence. 2 As part of the commitment process, Romeo 
was examined by a physician and a psychologist. They both 
certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable 
to care for himself. App. 2la-22a & 28a-29a. On June 11, 
2Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common 
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to 
handle him. He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks 
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't. 
He isAconstant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable 
to care for him." App. 18a. 
3. 
1974, the Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to 
the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the 
applicable involuntary commitment provision of the 
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 50 §4406. 
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous 
occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions 
of other inmates to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned 
about these injuries. After objecting to respondent's 
(})v - > } J9 7fJ., 
treatment several times, she filed this complaint in the 
A 
United States District court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged 
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, 
plaintiff has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three 
occasions." The complaint originally sought damages and 
injunctive relief from Pennhurst's director and two 
supervisors3 : it alleged that these officials knew, or 
3Peti t ioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent 
of Pennhurst: he had supervisory authority over the 
entire facility. Respondent Richard Matthews was the 
Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent 
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which 
respondent was incarcerated. According to respondent, 
petitioners are administrators, not medical doctors. See 
Brief of Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no 
Footnote continued on next . page. 
.. 
4 • 
should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and 
failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, 
thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transfered 
from his ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken 
arm. While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 
These restraints were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a 
defendant here, to protect Romeo and others in the 
hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being 
treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49, 76-78. Although 
respondent normally would have returned to his ward when 
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that 
he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law 
suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 & 137. Nevertheless, in 
December 1977, a second amended complaint was filed 
alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent 
longer at Pennhurst. 
4Although the Court of Appeals described these 
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms 
only, were generally used. 7 Record 53-55. 
5. 
for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second 
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to 
compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide 
him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay at 
Pennhurst. All claims for injunctive relief were dropped 
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class 
seeking such relief in another action. 5 
An eight-day jury trial was held in April 1978. 
Petitioners introduced evidence that respondent 
participated in several programs teaching basic self-care 
skills. 6 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was 
designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive 
behavior, 7 but that program was never implemented because 
5Pennhur st State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 
451 u.s. 1 (1981) (remanded for further proceedings). 
6Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital 
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding, 
showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet 
training, as well as a program providing interaction with 
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 
Record 44-56, 242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48. 
11 Tk£. _.P'rogram~ continued while respondent was in the 
hospital, 5 ~ecord 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, 
Record 32,34, 41-48, and t.aris pi!'OCJ::!:ammiA9)/ reduced 
respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 
45. 
7 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; 
Defendants' Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short 
periods of separation from other residents and for use of 
"muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, 
i.e. , 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
of his mother's objections. 8 Respondent introduced 
evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his unit. 9 
At the close of the trial, the court instructed 
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware 
of and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent 
repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo," such failure 
deprived him of his constitutional rights. App to Pet. 
for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the 
defendants shackled Romeo or denied him treatment "as a 
punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional 
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 
73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed that if they 
found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to the 
medical and psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," they 
might find that Romeo's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
others. 
81 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204. 
9The District Judge refused to allow testimony by 
two of Romeo's witnesses--trained professionals--
indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or 
different training programs. The trial judge explained 
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of 
treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was 
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983. App. 
to Pet. for Cert. lOla. 
7. 
rights were violated. Id., at llla. The jury returned a 
verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
sitting en bane, reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
644 F. 2d 147 (1980). The court held that the Eighth 
Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment of 
those convicted of crimes, was not an appropriate source 
for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. 
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment and the liberty interest 
protected by that amendment was the proper constitutional 
basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the court found that the involuntarily 
committed retain liberty interests in freedom of movement 
and in personal security. These were "fundamental 
~ \~ 
liberties" that could be limited only by an overriding, 7 
non-punitive state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. It 
further found that the involuntarily committed have a 
7 
liberty interest in training--a right to treatment--under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the 
relevant standard to be used in determining whether 
8. 
Romeo's rights had been violated. 10 Because physical 
restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive sanction," 
the majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that it can 
be justified only by "compelling necessity." Id., at 159-
160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for 
the failure to provide for a patient's safety. The 
majority considered that such a failure must be justified 
by a showing of "substantial necessity." Id., at 164. 
Finally, the majority held that when treatment has been 
administered, those responsible are liable only if the 
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present 
medical or other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 & 
173.11 
10The existence of a qualified immunity defense was 
not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received 
instructions on this defense, App. 76a, and it was not 
challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After 
citing Pierson v. ~, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of 
Appeals noted that such instructions should be given again 
on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172. 
11Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment 
claim into three categories and adopted three standards, 
but only the standard described in text is at issue before 
this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if a 
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may 
hold the institution's administrators liable unless they 
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of 
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not 
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not 
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case. In 
addition, the court considered "least restrictive 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
Chief Judge Seitz, writing for the minority, 
considered the standards articulated by the majority as 
indistinguishable from those applicable to medical 
~ 
malpractice claims. In Judge 
-1 
Seitz's view, the 
Constitution "only requires that the courts make certain 
that professional judgment in fact was exercised." 644 F. 
2d, at 178. He concluded that the appropriate standard 
was whether the defendants' conduct was "such a 
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 
practice or standards in the care and treatment of this 
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not 
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 
2d, at 17 8 . 12 
analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on 
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration 
or surgical intervention, id. , at 16 5-16 6, & 17 3, but 
respondent concedes that this-issue is not present in this 
case. 
12Judges Aldisert joined Chief Judge 
Seitz's opinion, but wrote se arately to emphasize the 
nature of the difference between the majority opinion and 
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge 
Aldisert criticized the majority for abandoning the 
common-law method of deciding the case at bar rather than 
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts 
of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-
183. And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned 
that neither juries nor those administering state 
institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous 
constitutional law tenets" articulated by the majority. 
!d., at 184. See id., at 183-185 
- Judge Garth also joined c_pief Judge Seitz Is opinion, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
We granted the petition for certiorari because of 
the importance of the question presented to the 
administration of state institutions for the mentally 
retarded. 451 u.s. 982 (1981). We now reverse. 
II 
We consider here for the first time the substantive 
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. 13 In this case, respondent 
has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he 
does not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that 
he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
~f:ty, freedom of movement, and training within the 
k 
r~ institution~ and that petitioners infringed on these 
~ u/1. ,.,; ~ 
rights by failing to provide adeqtla~~ conditions f 
separately to criticize the majority for 
issues not raised by the facts of this case. 
at 186. 
13In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a 
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .•.. " u.s. Const., 
Amend. XIV, §1. 
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as 
a direct source of constitutional rights, Brief of 
Respondent 13 n.12. 
11. 
confinement. 
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under 
pro~ procedures does not deprive him of all substantive 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, 
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 u.s. 480, 491-494 (1980). 
Indeed, the state concedes that respondent has a right to 
~~ 
adequate food, shelte~ ~and medical care. 14 We must decide 
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of 
movement or training ~ and, if so, under what circumstances 
ri' 
these interests are infringed in violation of due process. 
A 
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty 
interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, 
interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not 
~~ 
extinguish--indeed, petitioners do not argue to the 
1\ 
contrary. 15 The first is a claim to safe conditions. In 
14Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 & n. 10; Brief of 
Respondent 15-16. See also Amici Curiae Brief of 
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8~ 
15 . '- /) ....... !-L-~ 






the past, this Court has noted that the right to personal 
security 
');! 
constitutes a,.. "historic liberty interest" 
protected substantively by the Due Process Clause. 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u,s, 651, 673 (1977). And that 
right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for 
penal purposes. 16 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678 
(1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold 
convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be 
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed--
who may not be punished at all--in unsafe conditions. 
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from 
~_iL~~ J_.e...t_; ?&-$'-.#~ 
; ng . I\ In other contexts, the existence of such an 
interest is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. 
Indeed, "[1] iberty from bodily restraint always has been 
recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
16It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, 
analysis begins with the Eighth Amendment's proscription 
of cruel and unusual punishment, and that amendment has no 
direct bearing on non-penal institutions. See Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 u,s, 651, ___ (1977). But the Eighth 
Amendment has been applied to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenmt. If prisoners 
in state institutions have a federal right to some degree 
of safety, it is because their safety implicates a liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 
u.s. 46 (1947): Palko v. Connecticut, 302 u.s. 319 (1937). 
13. 
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action." 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 u.s. 1, 18-19 
(1979} (Powell, J., concurring}. This interest survives 
criminal conviction and incarceration. Similarly, it must 
also survive involuntary commitment proceedings. 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a 
constitutional right to "habilitation," i.e., training~ 
~ eaue~tion to improve his ability to function within 
Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training 
will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does 
not argue that if he were still at horne, he would have a 
right to training at the expense of the state. See Tr. 
Oral Arg. 33. And, since we Cha~ found 
constitutionally 
from restraints 
protected 1 iber ty interests in freedom _j 
f+,~ 
and safety, sorneF nt o ?r-Jlabi litati on..~ 
may be neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of 
those rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys 
a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore 
14. 
decide only the narrow question of whether ~one who has 
- l ~~ 
been t_:nvolu~ar ilj committed~ has a right to.!\ training--
h .. ~d ot er than erau~·Hlg relate to safety or the ability to 
I{ 
function free of restraints--when such training mig~ 
'"{ 
" 
~* himA function more independently within the institution, 
but cannot make possible his release. 
Respondent argues that, once a person has been 
confined, he has "no one but the state to turn to for help 
in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving 
whatever ski:) .. ls and abilities" he has. Brief of 
Respondent 23. Respondent concludes that the state 
therefore has a constitutional duty to provide reasonable 
both to preserve existing skills and develop 
new ones. In making this argument, respondent compares 
mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the 
state has quarantined the individual, and cannot then deny 
appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, 
however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of a 
certain level of intellectual ability, 17 and the 
17see 
Institutions, 
A. Baumeister, American Residential 
at 21-22, as printed in Residential 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I" 
15. 
"habilitation" respondent seeks, such as training to teach 
k~~~ 
him for the first time basic self ear€ skills~ correlates J 
more closely to education than to medical treatment. 18 
I; 
And we have never found a right to education under the 
. . 19 w Const1tUt1on. 
As a general matter, states are under no 
constitutional duty to provide services for 
~~ 
See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 u.s. 297 (1980) (publicly 
funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464 (1977) 
(medical treatment). When states do choose to provide 
services, they G r ;} gene.::ily1 gi ve:-J wide latitude in 
doing so. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 u.s. 78, 83-84 
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (Baumeister, ed. 
1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded 
in the United States, at 1 (1965). See also Brief 
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 
1 (quoted in n. 1, supra) 
18.There may be cases in which it is difficult to 
distinguish between claims to medical treatment and claims 
to training in the development of skills. This is not, 
however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any 
issues related to medical care--for example, he does not 
complain that he received inadequate medical treatment in 
the infirmary ward. And his claims to training are either 
related to safety and freedom from restraints or purely 
educational, i.e., training to make him less violent 
(related to safety and freedom from restraints) and 
training in self-care skills (educational). 
19see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 u.s. 1 (1973). Respondent does not argue that he is 
denied training or habilitation available to others in 
Pennsylvania institutions. 
16. 
(1971); Dandrige v. Williams, 
Specifically, states need not "choose between attacking 
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at 
all." Id., at 486-487. Here, the state has committed 
~
\ !!emeone who concedely cannot survive on the outside, ~ 
t~ s~aJ;;s willing to provide <Qa•o~ble food, shelter, 
a.,_~~ -1-o~~~ 
clothing and medical careA The narrow question presented 
~. / "'*' ·j»<tiJ 
is whether it~ must: ~ afford him training to develop~ 
~s,"~~~ ';;~~a~;:;t~ 
~- ~ 
We hesitate to find a new liberty inter~~ 
in ~~ cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment . ~ 
As we noted in determining that there ~instance. 
general right to education in San Antonio School District 
v. Rodriguez, 411 u.s. 1 (1973): 
"It is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws •••• 
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether 
there is a right to education explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
Id., at 33-34. 
~~ 
A similar reluetance is seen in cases considering new 
"liberties" under the due process. In Paul v. Davis, 424 
u.s. 693 (1976), we noted that the liberties protected by 
17. 
the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in 
state law--for puposes of procedural due process--or in 
~ 
the guarantees of the Bill of rights, wl:Hch have been 
..--
"incorporated" to apply to the states. Id., at 710-711. 
In addition, as noted earlier, some liberty interests are 
implicit in our historic notion of the meaning of that 




~A.. right to training fits none of these 
Respondent is not seeking procedural due 
process. 2~ Nor does he claim a right historically 
regarded as within the meaning of the concept of 
"liberty." And respondent points to no right to training 
either implicit or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights. 
~ J ~Respondent does argue that the Pennsylvania 
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for a 
federal substantive, not procedural, right. He maintains 
that he was commmitted for care and treatment under state 
law, and he therefore has a state substantive right 
entitled to substantive, not just procedural, protection 
under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. 
But this argument is made for the first time in 
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in 
the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of 
Appeals as a ground for reversing the trial court. Given 
the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any 
guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we 
decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 
u.s. 321, 3273 n. 1 (1977); Duigman v. United States, 274 
U.S. 196, 200 (1927); Jordan Mining Co. v. Societe des 
Mines, 164 U.S. 261, 264-265 (1921). 
18. 
The right respondent claims is a substantive due 
process right. Only when an action of a state against an 
individual is sharply at odds with our common sense of 
"liberty and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment bar the action. Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 u.s. 319, (1937) • Zl In deciding 
whether to provide individuals such as Romeo with 
habilitative ~/ the state must make a difficult 
decision regarding the allocation of its resources. We 
cannot say that due process requires that such individuals 
must be given training in the development of skills that 
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to~ 
~~ 
scarce resources on programs to attempt to A ~-.J.:tate . 
22 (JJ-1.,.. ~ ~~~~~ 
Romeo, o;J. \f.e~--.a~ "" •11PE>Ci<IL -•am to ed~e f-
2 ZLSee also Adamson v. California, 332 u.s. 46, 
~ ) 
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to 
determine whether the defendant was accorded due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary "to 
ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice 
of English-speaking peoples."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. , at, at (Under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has 
"subjected [an individual] to a harship so acute and 
shocking that our polity will not endure it."). 
~rofessionals in the habilitation of the mentally 
retarded disagree strongly on the question whether 
effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded 
individuals is even possible. See, e.g., Favell, Risley, 
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 
Footnote continued on next page. 
19. 
r ftner-city -children, is a difficult one that state and 
federal governments must face. The Constitution does not 
~CA.-~~ 
dictate an answer!.J~;;:,.~:.~ 
~ 4> de~<.-AZ.~ .. . 
We theref6re conclude that ~ involuntarily-
/ 
committed mentally retarded do not have a constitutionally 
a~~-~/ 
protected liberty interest in training ~
~ ~ ~J+ r=.,t_-: '•'~ 
per se., a'"it~e;~~ they do have constitutionally protected 
~~~ . 
interests in freedom from bodily restraints ~ _ 
~ ) -~ 
~ ~ 
and those interests ma-y require some amount of training. 
~ 
We turn next to consider the whether Pennsylvania 
have violated these two rights. • 
III 
A 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty 
Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 
37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the 
Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 
Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 
37 (1981); Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: 
Searching for the Substance of Things Hoped for; The 
Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention 




a-u- '·~·: Jj'~ .. W-( 
~~. 
interests in safety and freedom from bodily restraint that 
survive his commitment. Yet these interests are not 
absolute, indeed to some extent they are in conflict. In 
~~ . t't t' h p h t th ~b g an 1ns 1 u 10n sue as enn urs , ere ~il:L±e 
J\ 
occasions in which it is ~:OW for the state to 
~~ 
restrain the movement of patients--for example, to protect 
_/~~~~~ 




can not protect its inmates 
~~~ 
 of violence, if it is to permit them t 
The question then 
is not simply whether a liberty interest has been 
the~±~/:::::t:-=7.~~ 
......... 
infringed but whether 
violate due process. 
In determining whether a substantive right 
protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it 
is necessary to balance "the liberty of the individual" 
and "the demands of an organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 
367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
In seeking this balance in other cases, the Court has 
weighed the individual's interest in liberty against the 
state's asserted reasons for restraining individual 
' :__; ~ ~$ ~~~..k -'U.C! ~ 
~ ~~ 
~~~ ~I"'V\.. ~) ~ · 
/ 
21. 
liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979), 
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial 
detainees' confinement conditions. We agreed that the 
detainees, not yet convicted of the crime charged, could 
not be punished. But we upheld those restrictions on 
liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate 
government objectives and not tantamount to punishment.~ 
And we have taken a similar approach in deciding 
procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment 
proceedings. In Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979), for 
example, we considered a challenge to state procedures 
for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In 
determining that procedural due process did not mandate an 
adversarisal hearing, we ~~the liberty interest of 
the individual against the legitimate interests of the 
state, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
/ 
additional procedures would entai1. 24 Id., at 599-600. 
~ ----~---------
23see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 713, 738 
(1972) (holding that an incompetent pre-trial detainee 
cannot, after a competency hearing, be held indefinitely 
without either criminal process or civil commitment; due 
process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation 
between the nature and duration of commitment and its 
purpose) • 
Footnote(s) 24 will appear on following pages. 
'· 
/ 
considering whether respondent's substantive 
497, 522, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
~eedom of movement are J 
tirst State School 
to fi~the balance 
)e v. Ullman, 367 u.s. ~ 
dissenting) ~ 
.nterests against the 
~ and the restraints 
erate, including the 
institution such as 
~4see also Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 (1979). 
In that case, we held that the state must prove the need 
for commitment by "clear and convincing evidence." We 
reached this decision by weighing the individual's liberty 
interest against the state's legitimate interests in 
confinement. 
~: 25see Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979) 
(In limiting judicial review of medical decisions made by 
professionals: "[I) t is incumbent on courts to design 
procedures that protect the rights of individuals without 
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to 
deal with difficult social problems."). See also Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 u.s. 337, __ (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot 
assume that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to 
the perplexing sociological problems of how best to 
achieve the goals of the penal function in the crimina! 
justice system ••.• ")~ 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979) (In context of 
conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees: 
"[C)ourts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from 
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to 
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of 
how best to operate a detention facility.")~ Wolf v. 
McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1 
23. 
4 .. 1" • 
B 
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge 
~~~. 9-t-
Seitz,.\ r~ proper ,f;alance between the legitimate 
interests of the state and the rights of the involuntarily 
committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom 
from unreasonable restraints. He would have held that 
"the Constitution only requires that the courts make 
certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. 
It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been 
1-'\ 
made." 26 644 F.2d, at 178. 
procedural due process claim in context of prison: 
"[T]here must be mutual accommodation between 
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of 
the Constitution of general application."); Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 u.s. 396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he 
problems of prisons in America are complex and 
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily 
susceptible to resolution by degree. Most require 
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of 
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province 
of the legislative and executive branches of the 
government."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The 
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and 
intervention in Developmental disabilities 75 (1981) 
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have 
adverse as well as positive effects on social change). 
26our only disagreement with Chief Judge Seitz' 
holding is with regard to the existence of a right to 
treatment per se. He finds that such a right does exist, 
whereas we find no such right cognizable as a liberty 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 
F. 2d, at 




t-,v> q1~....t:----- This standard st~eh.e- !'<~~ .. ~ 
is higier than the s;,~ 
~~ ~ 
deliberate indifferenc~ applied in the context of penal ~)o 
~ 
institutions. Persons who have been involuntarily~ 
~ 
~ ... <A..tD..t'.t-. 
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and 
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions 
of confinement are designed to punish. ~ J t is lower 
than the standard of "compelling" or "substantial" 
necessity ~y~ Appeals. We think 
1\ 
that such a standar piaees-teo 
must administer ~ 
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily 
committed mentally retarded against the 
legitimate interests of the state, including 
administrative and fiscal constraints, due process 
requires that (i) the state subject these individuals only 
to reasonable physical constraints: (ii) it provide them 
reasonable safety conditions, and (iii) it afford them 
such training as is reasonably necessary to achieve these 
'let 
ends. 27 We recognize that this holding may impose some 
Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages. 
25. 
additional burdens on states. In determining what is 
"reasonable," however, we emphasize that courts must show 
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional. 28 1~ ) 
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to 
conditions in state institutions, interference by ihe 
federal judiciary 
institutions will 
with th~ internal operations of these 
'"") I 
0 v . 
be minimized. Moreover, ther~ 
1\ 
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than 
the appropriate professional in making such decisions. 29 
'V 1M- ~ ~·~ ~ J.t.;..J-~ 
~7we have expresse£ the con 'tutional right enjoyed ~ 
by respondent somewhat.:Jdifferen~ t!:kaA EH-d Chief Judge 
Seitz. Rath r them stating that the involuntarily 
committed the right to have certain decisions made / /1 ~ 
by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at __ , we ha17Q haJ:e~hat ~
they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety and 
reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to 
v h~ld that once such a /dec is ion is made by a professional 
in the exercise of his judgment, courts will defer to it. 
There i&, th~--ne -ett"bstant...i..y.e--...QiHQre1"i~Q bebreen th~ 
~. -1 tl)..e., d.£; ~r:.... vzuv-~.~ 
~l>f,A:Bour ~itl~ ~ht~-t, crp, 
... ~can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the S~ 
~ involuntary committed are entitled to an informal, non-
adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his 
professional judgment--a "procedure" not unlike that 
upheld in Parham v. J .R. 1 442 u.s. 584 (1979), a 
procedural due process case discussed in text at __ , 
supra. 
~ 2-9It may not be immediately apparent that decisions 
regarding safety conditions, the use of restraints, and 
related training programs involve the exercise of 
professional judgment by the institution's staff. But, 
for example, professional judgment is exercised in 
determining whether a certain training program can 
reasonably be expected to facilitate a patient's 
interation with staff and other patients without violence. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
26. 
See Parham v . J • R. , 4 4 2 U • S . 58 4 , 6 0 7 ( 19 7 9 ) ; Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 544 (1979) (Courts should not 
"second-guess administrators on matters on which they are 
better informed.") • For these reasons, the decision, if 
made by a professional, 30 is presumptively valid; 
liability may be imposed only when the decision by the 
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards as to 
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not 
base the decision on such a judgment. In an act ion for 
damages against a professional in his individual capacity, 
however, the professional will not be 1 iable if he was 
unable to exercise his professional judgment because of 
Similarly, professional judgment is exercised in 
determining whether a patient, whose violent tendancies 
have not been entirely curbed, should be allowed to 
interact with others or whether the risks of injury to 
self and others justify isolation or even the use · of 
restraints. 
~By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person 
competent, whether by education, training or experience, 
to make the particular decision at issue. Long term 
treatment decisions normally should be made by persons 
with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate 
training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or 
the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-
day decisions regarding care--including decisions that 
must be made without delay--necessarily will be made in 
many instances by employees without formal training ~ _ 
who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons~~ 
27. 
budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith 
immunity would bar liability. 
IV 
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-
commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against 
legitimate state interests and the constraints under which 
/A),(_~~ 
most state institutions necessarily operate. 'llhe state 
/l 
concedes a duty to provide adequate food, shelter, 
~~~ 
clothing and medical care. The state also has a~dut~ to ~------
provide reasonable safety for all patients and personnel 
within the institution and may not restrain patients in 
the absence of a legitimate state interest. We hold, 
however, that there is no constitutional right to 
habilitat~-;/: traini ';J- per se. ~ Yet we )t'Ould not be 
understood to hold that the state is under no obligation 
~~.. ~,A,~ 
to provide l'mbilitation. The state is ho1l-Ad to provide 
~ ~ 
~· ~ f..t:bt-
(l Romeo with }treatment fli the appropriate professional 
~ 
considers reasonable to ensure his safety ~ to facilitate 
1\. 
his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It 
may well be unreasonable not to provide training when 
28. 
training could significantly reduce the need for 





interests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably 
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training 
as may be required by these interests. In determining 
whether these rights have been violated, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a strong 
presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is 
necessary to enable institutions of this type--often, 
unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed--to continue 
to function. A single professional 
~to 
may make decisions 
/\ 
with respect to a number of patients with widely varying 
needs and problems in the course of a normal day. The 
administrators, and particularly professional personnel, 
should not be required to make each decision in the shadow 
of an action for damages. e do not, of course, imply 
the liberty interests identified above are 
ultimately protected by the Constitution or that judicia 
es. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury was 
29. 
erroreously instructed on the assumption that the proper 
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. 
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this decision. 
lfp/ss 05/23/82 Rider A, p. 18 (Romeo) 
ROME018 SALLY-POW 
s 





lfp/ss 05/23/82 Rider ~ , p. 18 (Romeo) ... 
ROME018B SALLY-POW 
These conditions of confinement comport fully with 
the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S.715, 738 (1972). Seen. 27, ante, in 
determining whether the state has met its obligations in 
these respects, 








lfp/ss 05/23/82 Rider A, p. 14 (Romeo) 
ROME014 SALLY-POW 
v~------- This case differs in critical respects from 
Jackson, a procedural due process case involving ~~~~ 
A 
involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by 
a court on petition of his mother who averred that in view 
of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor 
control his violence. Ante, at 2. Thus, the purpose of 
petitioner's commitment basically was to provide 
reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to 
him outside of an instituion. 
lfp/ss 05/25/82 Rider A, p. 8 (Romeo) 
ROMEOS SALLY-POW 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. 
In his words, he asserts a "constitutional right to 
minimally adequate habilitation". Brief, 8, 23, 45. This 
is a substantive due process claim that is said to be 
grounded in the liberty component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The term 
"habilitation", used in psychiatry
1
is not defined 
/ 
precisely or consistently in the opinions below or in the 
briefs of the parties or the amici. As noted previously, 
at 4 n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and 
development of needed skills". Respondent emphasizes that 
the right he asserts is for "minimal" training, and he 
would leave the type and extent of training to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of present 
medical or other scientific knowledge". 
h 
In addressing the asserted right~ training, 
we start from established principles. As a general 
matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide 
2. 
substantive services for those within its border. See, 
Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment). When a person is institutionalized - and 
wholly dependent on the State - it is conceded by 
petitioner that certain duties to provide services do 
exist, although even then a State necessarily has 
considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 u.s. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 u.s. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between 
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all." Id., at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of 
his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will 
make possible his release. Nor does respondent argue that 
\ if he were still at home, the State would have an 
obligation to provide training at its expense. See Tr. 
Arg. 33. It became necessary for the County Court of 
Common Pleas to commit Romeo, at his mother's request, 
because of his violence that resulted in injuries to 
3. 
himself, threatened injuries to others and damaged 
property. See 2 and n. 2, supra. It is clear from the 
record that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety 
and a minimum of physical restraint. As we hav~ecognized 
~ there is a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in safety and freedom from restraint, these 
established constitutional rights require at least 
minimally adequate training to assure that they are 
safeguarded. Ante, at __ _ 
We think it unnecessary in this case to decide 
specifically what additional training, unrelated to safety 
and physical restraint, may be required in this or 
similiar cases involving claims of institutionalized 
profoundly retarded persons. Chief Judge Seitz, in 
language apparently adopted by respondent, would hold: 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a 
constitutional right to minimally adequate care 
and treatment. The existence of a 
constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." Pet. 54a. 
But Chief Judge Seitz did not undertake to identify 
specifically or otherwise define - beyond the right to 
reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint -
the "minimally adequatf are and treatment" that may 
4. 
appropriately be required for thisfr espondent. Rather, he 
would leave this to "professional judgment", observing 
that "the Constitution only requires that the courts make 
certain that professional judgment is in fact exercised".* 
Pet. 58 a, 59 a. 
We agree with these views, and conclude that 
respondent's liberty interests ) in the circumstances of his 
case) require the State to provide such minimally adequate 
training as a professional judgment deems appropriate to 
~~~ 
~~iaG thg safety and freedom from undue restraint that 
were the purpose of his commitment. In view of 
respondent's condition and the state of the record. We 
~ 
need go no further ~Chief Judge Seitz's formulation. 
* It is clear that Chief Judge Seitz used the term 




The liberty interests in safety and freedom from 
bodily restraint are not absolute and to some extent they 
may be in conflict. 
lfp/ss 05/27/82 Rider A, p. 8 (Romeo) 
RR MARYB-POW 
B 
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. 
In his words, he asserts a "constitutional right to 
minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This 
is a substantive due process claim that is said to be 
grounded in the liberty component of th;;,fue 
AmendmentV The 
Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth term 
"habilitation", used in psychiatry ) is not defined 
precisely or consistently in the opinions below or in 
v 
briefs of the parties or the amici. ~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~ 25t As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers 
to "training and development of needed skills." 
Respondent emphasizes that the right he asserts is for 
"minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he 
would leave the type and extent of training to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of present 
medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45. 
In addressing the asserted right to training, we 
start from established principles. As a general matter, a 
2. 
State is under no constitutional duty to provide 
substantive services for those within its border. See, 
Harris v. McRae, 448 u.s. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded 
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464, 469 (1977) (medical 
treatment) • When a person is institutionalized--and 
wholly dependent on the State--it 
petitioner that 
a-
~A dutr to 
exist, although even then a State necessarily has 
considerable discretion in determining the nature and 
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 u.s. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 u.s. 
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between 
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all." Id., at 486-487. 
Respondent, in light of the severe character of 
his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will 
make possible his release. Nor does he argue that if he 
were still at home, the State would have an obligation to 
provide training at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
The record reveals that respondent's primary needs are 
bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and 
3. 
clearly claims,(~ related to these 
'2; \ if tl-t-
respondent 
needs. (new tnote) ant we have recognized that there is 
1\ 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety 
and freedom from restraint, ante at ___ ;~ training may 
be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of 
;;;-- a ee~>e H~lltiO'II<I't" d~ h ~ te tr au >R'! per se • On the basis 
of the record before us, it is quite uncertain whether 
respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training unrelated 
to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his 
brief to this Court, he indicates that even the self-care 
programs Romeo seeks are needed to reduce his agressive 
behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. 
And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent 
~~-~ 
repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his 
experts would show that additional training programs, 
including self-care programs, were needed to reduce 
Romeo's agressive behavior • Petition for Certiorari 98a-
.b 2--Z. 
104a. \)/If, as seems the case, respondent seeks only 
training related to safety and freedom from restraints, 





a mentally retarded person involuntarily committed to a 
state institution has ~~ight to training 
~-~-u;u,~~~ -~ 
per se, even whenAtrai l ing ~ARsbJlead to freedom. 
Chief~Judge Seitz, in l:nguage apparently 
·~~c4 ~ 
by respondent, : 
adopted 
"I believe that the plaintiff has a 
constitutional right to minimally adequate care 
and treatment. The existence of a 
constitutional right to care and treatment is no 
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F.2d, 
(Pet. 54a). 
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define--
beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from 
physical restraint--the "minimally adequate care and 
and on the basis of the record developed to date, we agree 
with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty 
interests require 
/>'-"~ 
the State to provide~ minimally 
~
adequate Atraining to prov i&~ safety and freedom from undue 
restraint. In view of the kinds of treatment sought by 
respondent and the evidence i~ fecord, we need go no 
~~~~ ?/fft 
~~~~~~~~Q-~~~~~~ffitilation. 
lfp/ss 05/28/82 Rider X (Romeo) 
ROMEOX SALLY-POW 
Note to Mary: Our problem is to afford some general 
guidance, while deciding this case narrowly on its facts. 
A possibility that we might consider is indicated below. 
First, add a footnote - keyed to the last 
sentence on page 4 of the long rider A: 
~ 
~ It is not feasible, as is evident from the 
variety of language and formulations in the 
opinions below and the various briefs here, to 
define or identify the type of training that may 
be required in every case. A court properly may 
start with the generalization that there is a 
right to minimally adequate training. The basic 
requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar 
to courts, may be stated as that training which 
is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty 
interests and the circumstances of the case. A 
federal court, of course, must identify a 
constitutional predicate for the imposition of 




v Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as 
synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, 
at ___ (petn 65a-67a, end of Seitz's opinion). 
The liberty 
restraint are 
e in conflict. 
III 
A 
lfp/ss 06/01/82 Rider A, p. (Romeo} 
ROMEOB SALLY-POW 
Add as a footnote: 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of 
mentally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to 
focus on the facts and circumstances of the case before a 
court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the 
court below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment 
of incremental decision-making in favor of promulgation of 
broad standards •... [that] lack[] utility for the 
) 
groups most affected by this decision". 644 F.2d, at 18 ~-
Judge Garth agreed that reaching 
issues not presented by the case requires a court to 
articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of 
seitZ 
t" "tt:eatrnen 
the tet:rn see 6 44 F. 
used . tion· 
-· h::\bill ta _ ..... ; nion) • 
5. 
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as 
synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, 
at ___ (petn 65a-67a, end of Seitz's opinion). 
The liberty 
restraint are 
e in conflict. 
III 
A 
lfp/ss 06/01/82 Rider A, p. (Romeo) 
ROMEOB SALLY-POW 
Add as a footnote: 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of 
mentally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to 
focus on the facts and circumstances of the case before a 
court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the 
court below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment 
of incremental decision-making in favor of promulgation of 
broad standards ••.• [that] lack[] utility for the 
3 
groups most affected by this decision". 644 F.2d, at 18 ~-
Judge Garth agreed that reaching 
issues not presented by the case requires a court to 
articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of 
2. 
\' 





V -tfin the trial court, respondent asserted that "state 
officials at a state mental hospital have a duty to provide 
residents ... with such treatment as will afford them a 
reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills 
necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities permit." 
App. to Pet~ for Cert. 94-95. But this claim to a sweeping ~ 
se right w£(dropped thereafter. In his brief to this Court, 
respondent does not repeat it and, at oral argument, respondent's 
counsel explicitly disav~wed any claim that respondent is 
constitutionally e 1t' d to such treatment as would enable him 
"to achieve his maximum otential." Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-48. 
~/82 0$1429g8 
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded 
~~IJ-k 
patients vary widely, sweeping generalizations as to training should 
(\. 
be avoided. As Judge Aldisert said in this case: 
"In the common law tradition, courts resolve disputes 
by examining the rules laid down by prior decisions. 
These are rules of law in the narrow sense, 'precepts 
attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a 
definite, detailed state of facts,' or "fairly concrete 
guides for decision geared to narrow categories of 
behavior and prescribing narrow patterns of conduct •.••• 
"The majority's abandonment of incremental 
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards 
is not only methodologically offensive, but lacks utility 
for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F. 
2d, at 182-184 (footnote omitted). 
Judge Garth agreed: 
"The problem with including this discussion and this 
[jury] charge [deciding questions not presented by the 
facts of this case] is apparent. It is crystal clear that 
the Plainttiff here had neither alleged nor suffered from 
non-reversible surgery. Nor did he allege or suffer from 
being medicated with a powerful anti-psycotic drug. Thus, 
the entire discussion in the majority opinion which refers 
to those two conditions is gratuitous and constitutes no 
more than dictum." Id., at 186. 
Judge Garth went on to note that reaching issues not presented by 
the case required the court to articulate principles and rules of 
law in "the absence of an appropriate record ••. and without the 
benefit of analysis, argument or briefing" of such issues. Ibid. 
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Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally 
retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts 
and circumstances of the case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in 
his dissenting opinion in the court below, was critical of the 
"majority's abandonment of incremental decisionmaking in favor of 
promulgation of broad standards ..•• [that] lack[] utility for 
the groups most affected by this decision". 644 F.2d, at 183-184. 
Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the case 
requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the 
absence of an appropriate record ••. and without the benefit of 
analysis, argument or briefing" on such issues. Id., at 186. 
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~~All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's 
expert testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not 
included in the questions presented for certioari, and we have no 
reason to disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible. 
It appears relevant to whether petitioners• decisions were a 
substantial departure from accepted professional practice. 
